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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Shevardnadze Interviewed on German Question *[Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA 13 Jul]* 1
Reportage on Shevardnadze, Two-Plus-Four Talks 1
USSR Position on Germany 'Final' *[AFP]* 1
Talks With Counterparts *[TASS]* 2
'Trade' in Sovereignty Denied *[Moscow TV]* 2
Maslennikov Holds 18 Jul News Conference 2
Foreign Debts Will Be Honored *[TASS]* 2
U.S. Warned Not To Interfere *[AFP]* 3
Summary of Briefing *[Moscow TV]* 3
Further on Official Visit by NATO's Woerner 3
Received by Gen Moiseyev *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jul]* 3
More on Supreme Soviet Speech *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jul]* 4
Answers Deputies' Questions *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jul]* 5
Interviewed on Moscow TV 6
Analyst Praises 'Fair Deal' With NATO *[London ITV]* 9

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Maslennikov on U.S. Ties With Ex-Party Members *[TASS]* 10
Shevardnadze, Bush To Meet in Irkutsk 1 Aug *[Moscow TV]* 10
Trade Covers for U.S. Intelligence Endorsed *[Moscow Radio]* 10
Ceremony Marks Anniversary of Joint Space Mission *[Moscow TV]* 10
Businessman Sees Promise of Broader U.S. Ties *[PRAVDA 17 Jul]* 10
Abalkin, U.S. Visitor Discuss Ruble Conversion *[TASS]* 11

China

End of PRC Military Confrontation Assessed *[Nikolayev on Moscow International]* 11
Rise Seen in Smuggling Across Chinese Border *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 12
Chinese-Indonesian Diplomatic Relations To Resume *[Moscow International]* 12
PRC Support Causes Khmer Rouge 'Recalcitrance' *[Moscow International]* 13

Northeast Asia

Japan 'Least Constructive' of G-7 Countries *[PRAVDA 17 Jul]* 13
Japan Rejects Sanctions Against PRC *[Moscow International]* 14
Lukyanov on CPSU View on Ties With Japan *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jul]* 15
Situation in Mongolia 'Precarious' on Anniversary *[Moscow International]* 15
Gorbachev Letter to ROK's No Tae-u Cites Ties *[Moscow International]* 15
No Tae-u Discusses Relations *[Moscow International]* 16
Resignations Threaten South Korean Assembly *[Moscow International]* 16
ROK Computer Exhibition Held in Moscow *[Moscow International]* 16

Southeast Asia & Pacific

UN Security Council Meeting on Cambodia Assessed *[Shchedrov on Moscow International]* . 17
Solution 'Hinges on Dialogue' *[IZVESTIYA 17 Jul]* 18
Consultations End *[TASS]* 18
Deemed 'Useful, Successful' *[Shchedrov on Moscow International]* 19

Near East & South Asia

Soviet, Arab Parliamentarians Meet in Moscow *[IZVESTIYA 14 Jul]* 19
Discuss Mideast, Jewish Resettlement *[Moscow International]* 20
Issue Joint Statement *[TASS]* 20

East Europe

GDR Parliamentarians Visit Supreme Soviet Body *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Jul]* 21
USSR, GDR Sign Trade Agreement in Berlin *[TASS]* 21
Hungary in Stalemate Over Troop Withdrawal Terms *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jul]* 21

West Europe

PRAVDA on Kohl-Gorbachev News Conference *[18 Jul]* 22
New Germany's Full Sovereignty Agreed Upon *[TASS]* 30
Sitaryan on Economic Ties With FRG Minister *[IZVESTIYA 17 Jul]* 31
European Community President Opens Moscow Visit 31
TASS Previews Visit 31
Delors Arrives 18 Jul *[TASS]* 31
Meets Deputy Prime Minister *[TASS]* 32
Meets With Gorbachev 19 Jul *[TASS]* 32
Interviewed on Europe's Future *[PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 32
Lukyanov Receives European Parliament Chairman *[TASS]* 34
Shevardnadze Visits With France's Mitterrand *[TASS]* 34
Returns to Moscow 18 Jul *[Moscow Radio]* 34
Sweden Places Conditions on Hijacking Trial *[TASS]* 34
Swedish Hijacking Policy Cited *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jul]* 34
Restrictions on Armenians in Turkey Noted *[Yerevan International]* 35
Envoy Andropov Meets With Portuguese Officials *[TASS]* 36
Politburo's Frolov Receives British Ambassador *[PRAVDA 19 Jul]* 36
Greek Naval Frigate To Visit Sevastopol *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Jul]* 36

Latin America & Caribbean

Official Meets El Salvador Foreign Minister *[TASS]* 36
Castro Reacts to CSFR Embassy Situation *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Jul]* 37
Cuban Foreign Ministry Comments *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 12 Jul]* 37
Places Responsibility on Embassy *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Jul]* 37
Komplektov Receives Cuban Envoy 12 Jul *[IZVESTIYA 14 Jul]* 38

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

28th CPSU Congress

Final Version of CPSU Statutes Published *[PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 39
Ryzhkov Meeting With Congress Delegates Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 15 Jul]* 51
Article Views Congress Atmosphere, Results *[IZVESTIYA 17 Jul]* 52
Unofficial Congress Impressions Report Published *[MOSCOW NEWS No 28]* 55
Newspaper Confiscated *[MOSCOW NEWS No 28]* 56

Political & Social

People's Deputies Announce CPSU Departures *[Moscow Radio]* 56
President Council Scheduled to Meet 20 Jul *[Moscow Radio]* 57
Draft Union Treaty To Be Examined 20 Jul *[Moscow TV]* 57
CPSU Control Commission Publishes Regulations *[PRAVDA 19 Jul]* 57
KGB Searches for Mass Graves in Moscow *[TASS]* 58
'Democratic Platform' Members Criticized *[PRAVDA 23 Jun]* 58
Minister Sees 'No Grounds for Optimism' on Crime
[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 17 Jul] 60

Crimes Against Foreigners Increase in Moscow *[TASS]* 60
Council of Ministers Decision on Antiques Trade *[TASS]* 61
Bill on Public Associations Discussed *[TASS]* 61
Multiparty System Restoration Reviewed *[NEW TIMES No 28]* 61
Success of New INTERFAX Agency Reported *[MOSCOW NEWS No 28]* 63
Local Soviet Challenges Arctic Atomic Test Plan *[IZVESTIYA 15 Jul]* 64
Satellite Television System Set Up in Moscow *[Moscow TV]* 64

Economic

Altay Seminar Views Chemical Pollution Problems *[Moscow TV]* 65
Draft Decision Aims To Boost Small Business *[IZVESTIYA 17 Jul]* 65

Agricultural

Agricultural Developments Reported for 15-17 Jul *[Moscow Radio]* 67
Grain Harvest Applauded *[Moscow Radio]* 67
Saratov Enterprises Resist Harvest Draft *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jul]* 67
Roundtable Meeting Considers Peasant Issues *[PRAVDA 19 Jun]* 68

Scientific

Further Coverage of Attempt To Repair 'Soyuz' 73
Cosmonauts' Effort Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 73
TASS Reviews Situation 74
Another Space Walk Probable *[Moscow International]* 74
Docking Unit Can Only Undock *[Moscow TV]* 74
Cosmonauts in Good Health *[Moscow Radio]* 74
Spending on Mars Program Criticized *[MOSCOW NEWS No 28]* 74
'Resurs-6' Satellite Coordinates Detailed *[TASS]* 75

Military

General Shlyaga Assails Army Depoliticization *[TASS]* 75
Government Aid in Housing Returning Troops Urged *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jul]* 76
Atomic Submarine Withdrawn From Northern Fleet *[TASS]* 76

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Preparatory Commission for Moscow Talks Meets *[Vilnius Radio]* 77
Lithuanian Travel Restrictions Lifted *[Vilnius Radio]* 77
Lithuania-Poland Border Post To Reopen *[TASS]* 77
Yazov Letter to Landsbergis on Draft Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 77
Lithuanian Leaders' Privileges Reported *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Jul]* 77
Positions of Independent Lithuanian Party Noted *[EKHO LITVY 19 Jun]* 78
Conference on Soviet Power Opens in Lithuania *[TASS]* 79
Estonian Miners' Strike Ends After Four Days *[Moscow International]* 79
Further on Latvian Government Report *[Riga Radio]* 80
Latvian Government Seeks Treaty With USSR *[TASS]* 81
Latvia's Rubiks Interviewed on Party's Future *[PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 81
Latvia Fails To Deal With Draft Dodging *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jul]* 83

RSFSR

Silayev Comments on New Russian Government *[TASS]* 83
Yeltsin Speaks to Russian Government *[Moscow TV]* 84
Resolution Appoints RSFSR State Arbiter *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Jul]* 84
Rayon Officials Resign From Party *[IZVESTIYA 17 Jul]* 84
Supreme Court Members View Needed Reforms *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 24]* 85

Radiation Contamination Reported in Shcherbinka *[Moscow International]* 87
Novozybkovo Hosts Atomic Energy Seminar *[TASS]* 87
Independent Trade Union Federation Plenum Opens *[TASS]* 87
International Airport Opens in Kaliningrad *[TASS]* 87
Losses From Maritime Kray Flooding Detailed *[TASS]* 88
Housing Initiative Launched in Krasnoyarsk *[Moscow TV]* 88
Tula Alcoholics' Center Strike Reported *[PRAVDA 13 Jul]* 88
Commercial TV Channel Formed in Ulan-Ude *[Moscow Radio]* 89
Interethnic Conflict Causes Death in Altay Kray *[Moscow Radio]* 90

Western Republics

Ukraine Supreme Soviet Continues To Meet *[Moscow Radio]* 90
'Text' of Ukrainian Sovereignty Declaration *[Kiev International]* 90
Provisions Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 14 Jul]* 92
Ukrainian Premier's Restructuring 'Unsuccessful' *[Kiev International]* 92
Kiev Business Development Fund Established *[Moscow Radio]* 92
Problems Mount in Western Border District *[PRAVDA 17 Jul]* 93
New Independent Newspaper Formed in Lvov *[Kiev International]* 94
TASS Views Recent Coal Mine Strike 94
Donetsk Miners Polled on Strikes, Demands *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 28]* 95
Donetsk Region KGB Uncover Fraud, Theft Cases *[Kiev International]* 95
Ukrainian Peasant Party Goals Outlined *[Kiev International]* 95
Fascist Victims Memorial Erected in Lutsk *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 14 Jun]* 96
Odessa Launches Commercial TV Channel *[Kiev International]* 96
Exodus From Belorussian Communist Party Explained *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jun]* 96
Belorussia Demands Return of Personnel *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 15 Jun]* 96
Belorussian Voting Irregularities Noted *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 23 Jun]* 97
Election Violations in Belorussia Noted *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 30 May]* 97
Decree Adopted *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 30 May]* 97
Belorussia Acts To Solve Unemployment Problem *[TASS]* 98
Attempted Hijacking on Minsk Flight Detailed *[TRUD 11 Jul]* 98
Moldavian Decree on Deputies' Immunity Published *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 14 Jun]* 98
Moldavia Issues Decision on Broadcasting *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 23 Jun]* 99
National Moldova Press Agency Formed *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 23 Jun]* 99
Article on Bessarabian Anniversary Published *[PRAVDA 28 Jun]* 99

Caucasus

Bakatin Holds Press Conference on Caucasus *[Moscow International]* 100
Reports on Armenian Interior Ministry's Seizure 101
Minor Incidents Reported *[TASS]* 101
Attempt on Ministry 18 Jul *[Moscow TV]* 101
Ministry Blockaded 18 Jul *[Moscow Radio]* 101
Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Situation Unstable *[Moscow TV]* 102
'Extremely Tense Situation' Reported in Bertazor *[Yerevan International]* 102
Armenian Nationalists Open 'Terrorist' Campaign *[Moscow Radio]* 102
'Insulting' Attacks on USSR Troops Denounced *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jul]* 102
Details of Latest NKAO Incidents Viewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 103
Georgian Foreign Minister Interviewed *[IZVESTIYA 15 Jul]* 104

Central Asia

Reportage on Continued Tension in Osh Oblast 105
Fighting, Stonings Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 105
Soviet Replaces Officials *[Frunze Radio]* 106
Increased Interethnic Clashes *[Frunze Radio]* 106
City Life 'Paralyzed' *[Moscow TV]* 107
More Troops Arrive *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Jul]* 108

Shevardnadze Interviewed on German Question

AU1807090390 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Jul 90 pp 1,5

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, by unidentified NOVOSTI reporter; place and date not given: "NOVOSTI for RZCEZPOSPOLITA": "Without Discrimination"]

[Text] [NOVOSTI] Will the talks with the federal chancellor and the federal minister of foreign affairs that are to take place in Moscow on 15 July pave the way for the unification of the two German states (before the 2 December elections)? What would the Soviet Union's agreement to such a move depend on?

[Shevardnadze] This question is surely the most frequently discussed international subject in our country at the present time; it was also raised at the CPSU congress. Of the several hundred cards containing questions that I received from delegates following my speech at the congress more than half—sometimes couched in very strong terms—concerned the German question. This is what I would like add on this subject.

Following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was firmly in favor of a united Germany and actively opposed the plans to divide the country that appeared at that time. In recent times, we have also never denied Germany the right to unity while, at the same time—on the basis of existing realities—warning against the artificial promotion of this idea.

We consider the construction of German unity to be an expression of completely understandable historical longings on the part of the German people. Without eliminating the division of Germany, we cannot eliminate the division of Europe, which is precisely the task that we set in formulating the idea of building a common European home.

We fully trust the German people, close ties have linked it and the Soviet people for several dozen years now, and we hope that the construction of German unity will provide an enormous impetus to the further development of positive trends on our continent, without which the construction of that unity would simply be impossible. I am thinking, above all, of the Helsinki process and the dismantling of the material structure of military confrontation. I would place the transformation of relations between the two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—on the same level. In our opinion, in a situation in which the the cold war that engendered them has become a thing of the past, they should become an instrument for broad, mutual cooperation between that the states that belong to them.

Does what I have said mean that are no problems connected with the unification of Germany? Of course not. There are problems, quite a number of them, and some are very complicated. Not just the Soviet Union has problems, but so do other countries that are taking part in work on a final international and legal settlement of the position of Germany. It is a question of the so-called foreign aspects of the construction of German unity, which are to be settled by means of the "two-plus-four" mechanism.

I have to say that we are in favor of the maximum intensification of "two-plus-four" work and for the regular holding of meetings of experts. We are convinced that if appropriate efforts are made by the parties involved, all these problems can be resolved before the meeting of the 35 CSCE participant states toward the end of this year, so that the Six can report to it on their work.

We presented our blueprint for a final international and legal settlement of the position of Germany at the second meeting of the Six in Berlin on 22 June. In our opinion, it can become a good starting point for productive discussion.

As a result of a settlement, we think that Germany will become a state like any other without being discriminated against in any way. It will occupy its appropriate place in Europe and the world. There can be no question whatsoever of offending the Germans' national sentiments or their sense of statehood. Similarly, other states and peoples should not make displays of their hurt feelings and issue reminders about the matters affecting them that are still to be settled. The one and the other would call into question the stability and permanence of the structure of a future without wars and conflicts that we are building jointly.

In a word, Europe is now going through a period that entails extraordinary responsibility. The Soviet leadership places the greatest emphasis on the maintenance of permanent working contacts with the leaders of the FRG.

Reportage on Shevardnadze, Two-Plus-Four Talks

USSR Position on Germany 'Final'

AU1807142390 Paris AFP in English 1411 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Paris, July 18 (AFP)—The position of the Soviet Union regarding the unification of Germany is "final", Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said here on Wednesday after a meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand.

Mr. Shervardnadze took part in the third meeting of ministers from the four war-time Allied countries and the two German states in Paris on Monday and Tuesday on the external aspects of unification.

The meeting with a general agreement guaranteeing the frontier between Germany and Poland after unification.

"The meeting yesterday is very important. We are about to achieve big solutions," Mr. Shevardnadze said. "We have very good mutual understanding on this crucial problem with the French leadership," he said.

"President Mitterrand lends his support to the ideas and outlook for development of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and countries in East Europe," he said. This also applied to East-West cooperation.

French presidential spokesman Hubert Vedrine said that the meeting had been concentrated on relations between France and the Soviet Union in the context of the forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is due to be held in Paris on November 19.

Talks With Counterparts

LD1807155290 Moscow TASS in English 1549 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Paris July 18 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze held talks in Paris with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and East German Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, who were taking part in a "two-plus-four" meeting here.

The talks with Baker amounted to a conceptual and practical discussion of fundamental changes in Europe as the Helsinki process develops, confrontation in relations between alliances is overcome, and German unity realised.

The two foreign ministers expressed a mutual desire to complete the overall expert arrangements of the external aspects of German unity by the "two-plus-four" meeting in Moscow this September.

As a follow-up to their regular contacts, they also discussed a whole number of disarmament and regional problems and issues concerning bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations.

Shevardnadze and Baker agreed to hold a special meeting in Irkutsk on August 1 for an indepth discussion of the entire range of subjects covered by Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

The Shevardnadze-Genscher meeting dealt with specific approaches to the fulfilment of recent accords reached by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as regards the settlement of issues arising in view of German reunification and the long-term development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and united Germany on a broad basis.

Shevardnadze briefed Meckel on the results of Gorbachev's talks with Kohl. The two ministers said that favourable opportunities are now available for the timely resolution, in the interest of all sides concerned, of external problems of building German unity.

Asked by reporters if participants in the Paris talks disagreed on the deployment of NATO forces in what is now East Germany, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from there, Shevardnadze said:

"We have mutual understanding with the Germans on this issue: There will be no foreign troops on that territory. This is our position. Bundeswehr units will, of course, be stationed there, in keeping with a sovereign right of united Germany. But nuclear weapons will not be deployed on what is now East German territory. We do not disagree about that."

Baker, asked about the U.S. position on a Cambodian settlement, said that one of the U.S. Administration's principal aims was to prevent the return of "Khmer Rouge" to power in Cambodia.

This is why, he said, the United States was going to change its policy towards Cambodian representation in the United States. This would mean, Baker explained, that the United States would no longer recognise the right of Norodom Sihanouk's antigovernment coalition, which includes "Khmer Rouge", to represent Cambodia.

On relations with Vietnam, the U.S. secretary of state said there was yet no question of normalising relations with that country, but the U.S. Administration intended to open dialogue with it.

'Trade' in Sovereignty Denied

LD1807212290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The third meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, France, Great Britain, the FRG, and the GDR within the "two-plus-four" formula ended in Paris today. They discussed the external aspects of German unification.

[Correspondent S. Iyezuitov] Journalists also asked questions of the following kind: How much has the Soviet side been paid for its consent to German unification? Although the question was addressed to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, his Soviet colleague thought it necessary to make his addition to the answer.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] There is and will be no trade in such categories and phenomena as the forming of a nation's state sovereignty, national unity, and national self-determination. [end recording] [passage omitted on Shevardnadze meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker and French President Mitterrand]

Maslennikov Holds 18 Jul News Conference

Foreign Debts Will Be Honored

LD1807152390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 18 July (TASS)— The question of the state of the USSR's payments situation, touched on at USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev's and FRG Federal

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's press conference in Zheleznovodsk, gave rise to numerous comments in the international press.

Because of this, Arkadiy Maslennikov, head of the press service attached to the USSR president, explained at a meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists today that "what was meant was not a possible cessation of payments and a rescheduling of them, but seeking ways of resolving the payments situation." At the same time, he said, "what was understood was improving the structure of the existing debt burden by attracting fresh long-term credits, while restraining the growth of the overall debt burden."

Accordingly, Maslennikov emphasized, all previously signed credit agreements will be honored without review of their conditions.

U.S. Warned Not To Interfere

AU1907081090 Paris AFP in English 2227 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 18 (AFP)—Soviet presidential spokesman Arkadiy Maslennikov warned the United States Wednesday that its plans to establish contacts with Soviet opposition parties could constitute interference in this country's internal affairs. Mr. Maslennikov, speaking at a press conference here, said that if the goal of the contacts is to influence Soviet policies, "it is possible to consider them as an interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and we will not permit this."

He was referring to remarks made Monday by American Secretary of State James Baker, who had indicated that the United States would proceed to establish contacts with Soviet opposition parties in the same manner in which the U.S. communicates with the opposition in other countries.

"If this is a case of normal international practice, where the political forces of various countries, including governments, establish ties and exchanges, then it should not cause any problems," said Mr. Maslennikov. "If, however," he continued, "as certain comments in the press have suggested, these contacts are intended to influence the political situation of the country, then-...they may be considered as an interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and we will not permit this."

Summary of Briefing

LD1807174690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A press conference given by Arkadiy Maslennikov, head of the press service attached to the USSR president, took place in Moscow today.

[V.Romantsov, correspondent] One of the topics of the press conference was the published statement by U.S. Secretary of State Baker, which expressed agreement with those who believe that the United States should not pin all its hopes on President Gorbachev, but that it is necessary to maintain contacts with the opposition which spoke against him at the 28th CPSU Congress. Commenting on this statement of Baker's, Comrade Maslennikov said that if it assumes a desire to gain a better understanding of our life, then there is nothing bad about it. But if it is a desire to influence the development of the political situation in our country, it cannot fail to cause perplexity and will be viewed as interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs.

Besides this, a statement was made on the matter of the Soviet Union's payment of its external debt, which was discussed earlier by President Gorbachev with FRG Chancellor Kohl in Stavropol:

[Begin Maslennikov recording] It did not deal with the possible cessation of payments and their rescheduling, but with a search for ways of resolving the payments situation. This entailed an improvement in the structure of our indebtedness by attracting new, long-term credits while restraining growth in overall indebtedness. Accordingly, all previous signed credit agreements can be observed without review of their conditions. [end recording]

[Romantsov] Answers were given to journalists' questions. [video shows Maslennikov addressing peace conference]

Further on Official Visit by NATO's Woerner

Received by Gen Moiseyev

PM1807120990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "M. Woerner's Visit to the USSR. Meeting at the General Staff"]

[Text] NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, who is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union, met Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, 16 July. During their ensuing conversation M. Woerner pointed out that the improvement in the situation in Europe makes it possible after the conclusion of an agreement on conventional arms in Europe to immediately embark on the subsequent talks to develop this agreement, including steps to limit the numerical strength of armed forces in Europe.

In the opinion of NATO's secretary general, who was previously the FRG defense minister, military men have a better idea than other people of what war is. That is why military specialists, he said, have been given an important role at the negotiating table. The process of radically transforming the planet is impossible without their involvement, M. Woerner pointed out.

In response to the guest's questions, Army General Moiseyev described the military reform taking place within the Soviet Armed Forces. He recalled that the USSR is unilaterally cutting back its troops by 500,000 men, is clearly fulfilling its pledges to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and is withdrawing its formations and units from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, and Mongolia strictly in accordance with the agreed schedule. "The Soviet Union has clearly defined its position on defense questions, expressing it in its new defensive doctrine," Army General Moiseyev said. As is well known, in its military policy the USSR proceeds on the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the defense sphere, he added.

Commenting at a TASS correspondent's request on the results of this meeting, Army General Moiseyev described it as "exceptionally useful and very promising."

M. Woerner laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall. In the afternoon he left Moscow for Leningrad.

More on Supreme Soviet Speech

PM1807150390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondents S. Zharkov and I. Filippov: "USSR-NATO: Partners in Conditions of Stability"]

[Text] A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, called NATO Secretary General M. Woerner's official visit to the Soviet Union convincing evidence of the rapid changes for the better in the world and in Europe. There persists in the USSR a desire for a better understanding of the plans of NATO—the military-political alliance our country would like to see transformed into a political-military alliance, and then into a political organization, he stressed during the 16 July meeting between the leader of the North Atlantic alliance and Soviet parliamentarians.

Addressing Supreme Soviet members, USSR people's deputies, politicians, and public figures, M. Woerner said that in itself his visit symbolizes the passing of the cold war. A new Europe is emerging, united by an infinite desire for freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Never before has it had so tangible an opportunity to disrupt the war and peace cycle, which has played such havoc with its history, he said.

NATO intends to take advantage of this opportunity and is making its contribution to the implementation of this process. At the same time, the secretary general noted, we are greatly indebted to the Soviet leadership for the very promising era that is opening up before us. President M.S. Gorbachev was the initiator of the new thinking in your country. It was he who recognized the urgent need to fundamentally change not only the structure of Soviet society, but the entire scheme of East-West relations.

The era of confrontation is past. The hostility and distrust of the past must be buried, the North Atlantic alliance leader went on. We no longer see your country and all the other Warsaw Pact countries as enemies, but regard them as partners in building what you call a common European home, to be erected on the foundation of democratic values, human freedoms, and partnership.

In an era when no state can safeguard its security alone or in isolation from its neighbors, this security must be based to an ever increasing degree on cooperation. Of course, NATO will maintain reliable defenses, as will the Soviet Union. At the same time, our aim is to reduce military forces in Europe to a minimum. Our aim is a Europe in which military aggression or the threat of aggression are impossible from the material and senseless from the political viewpoint.

Talking about the areas of change in Europe, M. Woerner noted that it must take place in such a way that there are no losers, but only winners. This also applies to the question of German unity, he said, stressing that Germany's membership of NATO will strengthen stability for all. In his view, this meets to an equal extent the interests of the Germans and their neighbors in East and West, including the Soviet Union. The USSR is acquiring partners, cooperation with whom will help it become an active and constructive component of a 21st century Europe with developed economic and technological interdependence.

In leaving confrontation behind, the North Atlantic alliance leader said, we can address the solution of today's and tomorrow's immense global problems: ecological degeneration, drugs, famine, population growth, the spread of extremely destructive military technology in the third world. Together we can achieve a great deal, he stressed.

Among the questions raised by the parliamentarians, Academician Ye. Velikhov touched on the problem of how to avoid an accidental outbreak of nuclear war, proposing, in particular, the elaboration of a joint missile detection system. Moreover, in his view, an immediate ban on nuclear tests is needed as the first step on the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Voicing interest in the scientist's proposals, M. Woerner said that they merit careful bilateral study. As for the very existence of nuclear weapons, he advocated keeping them in accordance with the "minimum deterrence" doctrine because, he said, people in the world will retain the knowledge of how to make them. In the event of an armed conflict involving conventional weapons, the danger would arise of their being produced again. In his view, a small quantity of nuclear weapons would also prevent conventional wars from occurring.

The NATO secretary general said that he did not believe in the concept of "nuclear-free zones" because "they only create an illusion of security." Such a zone, he said, could only be really nuclear-free if no one was able to make a nuclear strike against it. However, Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons, as is known, enable them to hit any part of the world.

Answering the question why NATO and the United States are reluctant to discuss the problem of naval armaments, of which they have considerably more than the USSR, M. Woerner said that this position is associated with the "maritime character" of the North Atlantic alliance. The United States is 4,000 nautical miles away from Europe and our ships mean the same to us as your railroads and highways do to you. They are our supply lines, he said.

Answers Deputies' Questions

PM1807155590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Captain M. Zheglov: "From 'Cold War' to Cooperation"]

[Text] NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, who is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union, met with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR people's deputies, politicians, and public figures from our country 16 July in Moscow.

Opening the meeting, A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, stressed that the NATO secretary general's visit to the Soviet Union is convincing evidence of the significant changes taking place not only in Europe but also throughout the world. The USSR still wants a better understanding of the plans of NATO—a military-political alliance that people in our country would like to see converted into a political-military alliance, and subsequently into a political organization.

In turn M. Woerner stressed that his visit to the USSR is evidence that the cold war has become a thing of the past. A new Europe is emerging, a Europe united by an unbounded striving for freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Of course, the NATO secretary general believes, the chronic fears and suspicions will not disappear straightaway, but they can be dispelled. Never before has there been such a palpable opportunity to break the cycle of war and peace that has so tormented its history. NATO no longer regards the Soviet Union and all the Warsaw Pact countries as an enemy but sees them as partners in building a common European home.

At a time when no one state can guarantee its own security alone or in isolation, this security must increasingly be founded on cooperation. Of course, NATO, like the Soviet Union, retains reliable defenses. At the same time our aim is to reduce military forces in Europe to a minimum. Our aim is to see a Europe where military aggression or the threat of it is impossible from the material and pointless from the political viewpoints, he said.

The NATO secretary general then familiarized the gathering with the decisions adopted at the NATO Council session in London and set out his viewpoint on problems relating to the further development of Warsaw Pact-NATO relations. M. Woerner answered a number of questions:

[Question] Don't you think that it would be useful to organize a meeting between NATO and Warsaw Pact servicemen.

[Woerner] Our proposal involves broadening cooperation in the military as well as the political sphere. I have already invited Soviet military leaders to meet our military leadership. This meeting would be the first step. Other steps could also be taken in the future. At some stage the proposal for a meeting between soldiers could be very useful.

[Question] What is your view of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone on the territory of a future united Germany?

[Woerner] The FRG, where I was defense minister for almost six years, has voluntarily renounced possession of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons I think that a united Germany will continue this policy and make the appropriate pledges. As for the nuclear weapons in what is now the GDR, they do not belong to the Germans. I do not believe in the concept of nuclear-free zones at all. They could indeed exist if no one had the opportunity to attack them using—once again—nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States are able to make a strike anywhere in the world. I do not think that nuclear-free zones increase security, and I think that the highest level of security can only be created by reducing nuclear weapons to a minimum level.

[Question] Is NATO proposing to cut the funds allocated for modernizing arms?

[Woerner] We have both begun to cut our military budgets. These are good steps and must be continued. In the future we need to discuss this question, which is, in my opinion, one of the questions for the talks on confidence-building measures.

[Question] What is your attitude to the American SDI program?

[Woerner] The point is that the United States is not the only country conducting studies in this field. The Soviet Union is also doing this. Admittedly the American program is better known. I am in favor of these studies, but only if they increase the chance of a retaliatory strike and prevent a first nuclear strike.

[Question] Does NATO intend to begin talks on naval forces? If so, when and at what forum?

[Woerner] I must say that there has been no change in our stance on this question. Why? This is down to the "naval nature" of the North Atlantic alliance. The United States is separated from Europe by 4,000 nautical miles. Our ships mean the same to us as railroads and highways do to you. You have one viewpoint, we have another.

Other questions were also answered.

Interviewed on Moscow TV

LD1807191690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1744 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Interview with Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary-general, by political observer Valentin Zorin; place and date not given; from the "Undiplomatic Conversations" program—recorded; Woerner speaks in English with Russian translation superimposed]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello there, comrades. If a political Guiness Book of Records existed, some time ago the conversation I want to present to you could quite easily claim an entry in such a book. Indeed, could one have imagined two or three years ago that we would be talking on Soviet television to none other than the secretary-general of the North Atlantic bloc? Events are proceeding in such a way that I have the opportunity today of presenting Mr. Woerner, secretary-general of NATO, to you, comrade television viewers. I'd like to say something briefly about today's guest. He was born in September 1934 in the West German town of Stuttgart, to the family of a businessman. He was educated in the best universities in West Germany and France. He had a legal education. Incidentally, Mr. Woerner, when I was preparing for our conversation, I shall not hide the fact that I examined quite a thick file, and discovered the subject of your doctoral thesis. The doctoral thesis was called, Deployment of Foreign Troops in Friendly Countries. Isn't that so? [Woerner chuckles] So Mr. Woerner's interest in this sphere is of many years' standing. And his interest has not just been theoretical. Mr. Woerner is an Air Force pilot first class, and has the military rank of Reserve Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel. He entered the political arena in 1956 within the Christian Democratic Union. It was a very successful career.

From 1982 to 1988, Manfred Woerner was minister of defense in the government of Chancellor Kohl. It was almost exactly two years ago—this was also a political sensation of sorts—that for the first time a West German representative took up such a high position in NATO: Manfred Woerner became secetary-general of the organization. Mr. Secretary-General, I'd now like to return to the beginning of our conversation, to something I said, and to ask you this. When you walked into your office two years ago at the NATO headquarters in Brussels for the first time, could you then imagine the possibility of such a conversation as this?

[Woerner] No, of course not. If you had told me two years ago that this was going to happen, I would have taken you for a dreamer, a naive person. Now here I am sitting here. It's hard to comprehend. It seems incredible to me. It's a good sign: Events have changed so much that this has become possible.

[Zorin] I'd like to ask you this. What had to happen in our world for the NATO secretary-general to be able to come to Moscow and meet Soviet leaders, and address Soviet television viewers?

[Woerner] I think that two things have happened. First, the new thinking in your country has exerted a vast influence in initiating perestroyka and glasnost. But at the same time, changes have also taken place in our alliance. The international climate and relations between West and East have changed so much for the better that we are starting a new era of cooperation instead of confrontation. That is why I am here, and my visit is the best proof of these changes.

[Zorin] I'd now like to ask you a personal question. I wouldn't in the least want you to consider it indiscreet. But, after all, our program is called Undiplomatic Conversations, so I'll risk it! [Woerner chuckles] For many years of your political activity, you were considered a hawk. That is what you were called. By the way, I asked one of your predecessors on our TV program, Mr. Joseph Luns, about this, and he said to me that he had been a hawk not out of conviction but by virtue of the official position he held in NATO. What is the situation on this in your case?

[Woerner] Let me begin by saying that I don't like the actual comparison between hawks and doves, because they are stereotypes and cliches that do not reflect reality. Naturally I have defended the security interests of my country and of our alliance. But the times have changed. I have always been sincere. I was sincere in defending the idea of the defense of my country, and I am sincere now in advocating cooperation. Why should I have to renounce my past? Today I am also willing to defend my present convictions. We trust you. You should trust us.

[Zorin] That is very interesting. But in this connection I'd like to ask you this. Do what you are saying now and the actions that you take testify to changes both in your concepts and your assessment of circumstances, or are they just a sort of diplomatic desire to adjust to the situation?

[Woerner] It's both. I think that the present changes have become possible because of the activities of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership, and we are responding to these actions. So it's both. We are accommodating ourselves to a situation which to a certain extent we have created ourselves. The same thing can be said about the Soviet Union. The main thing is that we understand that the time has come to tackle global problems, and that this can only be achieved through joint efforts. Your country plays a very important role. It is a country with vast territory, a country rich in history and traditions. You have a major contribution to play in

the construction of the new Europe, and so do we. This is only possible if we join forces and stop squandering material resources against one another. And it seems to me that everyone stands to gain from that—your people, our people, politicians, indeed everyone.

[Zorin] I said that you are now speaking somewhat differently from before, but to be frank I must also acknowledge that what I write and say today is not exactly what I wrote and said a few years ago. And I must say that it is very difficult to change customary stereotypes and customary assessments. We are doing this very sincerely, but it is very difficult. How are you managing it?

[Woerner] It is equally difficult. You see, we are human beings, and it is human to have shortcomings and to make mistakes. Of course, everyone feels a quite natural desire to stick to his views. They must somehow be overcome, and this is done in a struggle with oneself. But it seems to me that we are coping with this successfully. I must tell you that, having spoken with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardndadze, my impression is that they have also overcome this particular old mode of thinking. Of course it's not easy. It's not easy to overcome mistrust. But I think that we shall succeed. You managed to do it here. That means I shall also succeed.

[Zorin] I think that the time has already come to talk about the organization which you head and its problems. Throughout the whole period of its existence, it has acted on the premise of what is known as an enemy image, and it was principally the Soviet Union which was viewed as such an enemy. It is very likely that serious people in Europe do not believe in the Soviet threat now. But meanwhile, NATO is maintaining its military structure and its divisions and naval and air squadrons. How do you justify that to yourself? Against whom is it all directed in the new conditions?

[Woerner] That is, indeed, a very good question, and I shall be glad to answer it. It is a question which I get asked in my country too, not only in the Soviet Union. I think that the answer is very simple. The enemy has disappeared. We no longer regard the Soviet Union as our enemy, our adversary. We see you as a partner in creating common security. We want to cooperate with you.

So, why are we maintaining our defense system? It is because we want to be confident that, whatever happens, we shall be in a position to avert war. There are still very many centers of instability and conflicts in this world. Therefore, we want to maintain the necessary level of confidence, but by means of a much lower number of weapons and soldiers. For this reason, we need to continue our efforts to attain an arms control agreement, in order to reduce the levels of our weapons and armed forces. But both you and we shall maintain a sufficient quantity of these weapons to defend ourselves and ensure that nobody dares to attack anybody. This is our goal. In my opinion, it is a reasonable goal, which we can achieve.

You see, weapons are not the problem, nor are soldiers. The source of confrontation is political tension, while weapons are to a significant degree a consequence of it, not its cause. Therefore, if we can reduce political tension and remove it, and if we manage to achieve political cooperation and create a common security system and a new order of cooperation in Europe, that will make weapons meaningless.

I shall cite a personal example for you. As you have already mentioned, I studied in France. It was in 1954, a time when the memory of the past war was still very strong in France. But today, Germany and France are friends, real friends. How was that possible? We opened the frontiers, we mixed with each other and exchanged groups of young people and those of the older generation, and that had an effect. At the same time, both we and the French maintain our armies, but we do not threaten each other. We have understood that war has become impossible.

Why could the same thing not happen between us and the Soviet people? We know that the Soviet people love peace and do not want war. We do not want it either. I was 11 years old when the Second World War ended. I was buried alive in a basement, but I was dug out. I have had enough of wars. The only thing to which I aspire is peace, and I know that your people have the same aspirations. So, let us build our relations so that weapons become meaningless, let us draw lessons from history.

[Zorin] That is a very pleasing statement to hear from the mouth of the NATO secretary general, but I would like to ask you a question. Perhaps, it may seem to you to be indelicate, but in any event this is not spoken of aloud in NATO circles. I would like to ask you this: In connection with what is going on within the Warsaw Pact, are there any plans, any efforts, any strivings being undertaken, to exploit this for your own purposes, to tip the balance, not necesarily the military balance, but perhaps the political balance? Naturally, nothing is spoken aloud about this.

[Woerner] I would not use the word exploit. It is up to the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact to decide what will happen to your organization. If you democratically come to the conclusion that it is necessary to preserve it, we shall respect that decision. And if the bloc is dissolved, I repeat, that is, once again, a matter for the member-countries of that bloc.

What we are striving for, regardless of the future and the fate of the Warsaw Pact, is to develop relations between the Western countries and the USSR, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. That is precisely why I received in Brussels your foreign minister, the ministers of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is precisely for that

reason that I have come to the USSR, to develop relations between us, regardless of the fate of the Warsaw Pact.

[Zorin] My next question is connected with the process of German unification. Mr. Secretary General, of late you have frequently said that this process cannot take place without NATO. Many arguments have been advanced about this from both sides. Therefore, I would like to ask you a question, perhaps, on the personal level. When you express these positions, do you start from the fact that you are a German or from the fact that you are secretary general of NATO?

[Woerner] Because I am a German and because I am secretary general of NATO. In both capacities I come to the same conclusions. Why? In the first place because we agreed that every state has the right to independently decide which bloc to belong to. Secondly, it seems to me, because NATO is changing and because it does not threaten anyone any more, the membership of a united Germany in our bloc is a factor of stability.

I can understand the bitter feelings of Soviet people, because I know what suffering they underwent, terrible sufferings, in the Second World War. But they should understand that a united Germany's membership in such an organization as NATO really strengthens stability. If the arms control process continues, if the numbers of personnel in the armed forces is lowered to a sensible level, and if we create a new order of cooperation and a pan-European security structure in which the USSR and the other members of the Warsaw Pact and the members of our alliance are partners, this should satisfy the understandable and justified worries of your people about their security.

[Zorin] You have anticipated the next question I wanted to ask you. I wanted to ask whether you in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took account of the Soviet people's feelings in connection with the process of German unification. For the generation is still alive which underwent one of the most terrible tragedies in the history of the Russian state, and this tragedy came from German soil.

[Woerner] Yes, I can understand these feelings, and I say this not because simply I am sitting here and I want to appear polite. But look at me, as I have already said, I was 11 years old when the war ended. I have drawn lessons for myself, personally, from that war, just as other Germans of my generation have done. War will never again stem from our territory. Never again should dictatorship become established in our country. Friendship and cooperation—these are the lessons we have drawn.

But even if the bitter feelings of your people still remain for some time, you also should be interested in Germany's being part of NATO,of the structure of the countries' armed forces which are becoming integrated, but which do not threaten anyone any more. I think that the time has come to stop seeing NATO as the enemy. You, too, need psychologically to accept the idea of partnership with us, the idea of friendship.

[Zorin] Thank you. My next question is connected with certain political processes within our country. Some of our politicians reproach President Gorbachev for taking certain foreign political steps under pressure from the West. When I looked through some of the speeches that you have made in past years, I came across the very same thought. Can one conclude from this that you now share the point of view expressed by those who criticize President Gorbachev in our country from the right, or has your point of view now changed?

[Woerner] No, no, I have nothing in common with them. I believe Gorbachev has made a very important contribution to the development of international relations, and he did not do this under pressure from us. He did it because he knew that your country had to do that, that it had to find new partners and friends. He knows that the whole world, and your country in particular, is losing masses of money, energy, resources on creating weapons instead of making use of these resources for producing goods for people. Therefore, he is now trying to direct these resources to peaceful purposes, to create a new order of cooperation. And this does not at all make you losers and us winners. There are no losers and winners here. I tell you that we are all winners—Gorbachev, the Soviet people, and we too. Because we are winning peace, freedom, and cooperation for many years to come. I simply cannot understand such accusations against President Gorbachev. I have never criticized him this way, never. I think that he is a person who is doing what is necessary for his country, and is thereby serving the interests of his country just as we serve our interests, in defending the ideals of free exchange and cooperation in the economy, politics, and even in the military sphere.

[Zorin] And in conclusion, I want to ask you a personal question. Rumors have reached me that you are a great fan of and expert on Russian literature. Is that true?

[Woerner] Oh, yes. I have several favorite Russian authors. My most favorite one, whom I like even more than German writers, is Dostoyevskiy. But I am also familiar with Tolstoy, a little bit of Turgenev, Pushkin of course. They are great figures in world literature. I admire them.

[Zorin] Thank you very much for this conversation, Mr. General Secretary. I hope that when you and I meet next time, it will not surprise either us or you or our viewers. Thank you very much.

[Woerner] Thank you. Until we meet in Brussels. Thank you.

[Zorin] Thank you.

Analyst Praises 'Fair Deal' With NATO

PM1707135090 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 16 July 90

[Interview with Genrikh Trofimenko, foreign policy analyst at the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by correspondent David Smith in Moscow on 16 July, from the Channel 4 "News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Trofimenko] Really, really big breakthrough in, one might say, German question. You see, actually, it's the solution to the German question acceptable to both sides, and since acceptable to both sides, then I think it will be acceptable to all the interested parties.

[Smith] How much of a climbdown is this by President Gorbachev—accepting Germany in NATO?

[Trofimenko] You see, it is not a climbdown. I wouldn't say it's a climbdown because, you see the main—and I think we already discussed that, you see—the main thing was the position on NATO, and I think NATO, in its London meeting had this really seminal decision which satisfied the Soviet Union.

[Smith] Do you think this will be acceptable to the Soviet people?

[Trofimenko] I think so, I think so. You know, the thing is that there is an inevitable process. Actually Germany is united, in my mind and in the mind of many.

[Smith] How much of a factor for Mr. Gorbachev is the promise of West German aid and the promise of German help in getting aid from the West in general?

[Trofimenko] I guess it plays its part. You see, it... the, the, the [words indistinct] Gorbachev is underlining: We would not accept aid with some strings attached and so on. But of course it plays its role. You see, we.... Gorbachev was correct, you see: that if you want the Soviet Union to be fully integrated into the universal system, you see—a system of free markets and so on, so—one should help the Soviet Union come out of this predicament. We don't probably have, have forces on our own to do it quickly, so....

[Smith interrupts] Do you think, in the end, President Gorbachev has accepted this because he believes that this is the, the only way out—the best deal he's ever going to get?

[Trofimenko] I guess so, but I think we got a fair deal, you know.

United States & Canada

Maslennikov on U.S. Ties With Ex-Party Members

LD1807183190 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Leonid Timofeyev and Aleksandras Budrys]

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's statement that the United States intends to touch base with the opposition that quit the Soviet Communist Party at its 28th congress last week, "cannot but raise questions and bewilderment", Soviet President Press Secretary Arkadiy Maslennikov said.

Maslennikov quoted THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper's report that Baker said he agreed with conservative U.S. circles that the United States should not pin all their hopes on Gorabchev, but should also establish contacts with his opposition.

The statement and commentaries to it "cannot but raise questions against the background of positive assessments of the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress made by the international public and Western political circles", Maslennikov said.

He said these groups noted that "the results of the congress will benefit not only the Soviet Union but the whole international community and will improve the international situation". A similar estimate of the congress was made by U.S. President George Bush in his recent telephone conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev, Maslennikov said.

Assessing Baker's statement, Maslennikov noted that, "if he meant the usual international practice of political forces, including various countries' governments, establishing contacts, there can be no objections".

But if the intended contacts with the opposition conceal "a desire to influence the development of the political situation in this country", this "could be assessed as interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs", he said.

Shevardnadze, Bush To Meet in Irkutsk 1 Aug

LD1807220590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2051 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Today Shevardnadze met with James Baker in Paris. After the talks it was announced that the United States is withdrawing its recognition of the rebel group in Cambodia. In the United States today that is one of the most important pieces of news. The reason for the United States changing its position is the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. It was announced that the next meeting of Shevardnadze and Baker will take place on 1 August in Irkutsk.

Trade Covers for U.S. Intelligence Endorsed

LD1807202190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The official Senate Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Congress has endorsed a bill which allows the Department of Defense to engage in commercial activity in the interests of ensuring the security of operations aimed at collecting intelligence abroad. According to this bill, the Pentagon leaders can issue an order creating a trade corporation, a company, or any other profit-making enterprise, the genuine goal of which is to gather intelligence and counterintelligence data beyond the United State's borders. Thus, the United States has officially declared the right to use international business as a disguise for the activity of military intelligence. In the opinion of Pentagon representatives, this will not only ensure greater security of intelligence operations of the Defense Department, but also provide freer access to important information. Let us hope that the representatives of this country's foreign trade departments will now be able to draw appropriate conclusions from this report.

Ceremony Marks Anniversary of Joint Space Mission

PM1807113790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report over video on ceremony to mark 15th anniversary of Soyuz-Apollo mission]

[Text] [Announcer] Soviet-U.S. cooperation in space will definitely continue, and in the next 20 years an important milestone will be a joint flight to Mars. This is the view expressed by the Soviet cosmonauts and U.S. astronauts who docked in space in July 1975 on spacecraft belonging to the two powers. Valeriy Kubasov and Aleksey Leonov, who took part in the Soyuz-Apollo program, and their U.S. colleagues on the joint mission Thomas Stafford and Donald Slayton have come to Seattle for a ceremony to mark the 15th anniversary of the docking. The third member of the U.S. crew—Vance Brand—is unable to attend since he is preparing for a flight on the shuttle Columbia.

Businessman Sees Promise of Broader U.S. Ties

PM1807094790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 7

[Interview by TASS correspondents M. Vaskov and B. Shestakov with L. Vaynberg, chairman of the board of the Association of Joint Ventures, Associations, and International Organizations on USSR Territory and general director of the "Interkvadro" joint venture, under the rubric "Our Interviews"; place and date not given: "No One Will Do It for Us"]

[Text] The recent Soviet-U.S. summit meeting was not only a major political event but also created real preconditions for considerably enlivening the as yet none too vigorous business dialogue between the two countries.

It was in order to seek new forms of cooperation that a very large "force" of representatives of the new Soviet enterprise culture landed in the United States at that time. It included L. Vaynberg, chairman of the board of the Association of Joint Ventures, Associations, and International Organizations on USSR Territory and general director of the "Interkvadro" joint venture. It is to him that our questions are addressed:

[PRAVDA] How do you assess the state of USSR-U.S economic relations, and what are the prospects for their development in the future?

[Vaynberg] I will not be saying anything original if I say that the scale of our countries' cooperation in the economic, scientific, and trade spheres plainly does not correspond to the desire either of the peoples or of their most active section—business people—for rapprochement and the maximum expansion of mutually advantageous contacts. And the reason for this is certainly not that U.S. business is not interested in our market. Until recently, alas, practically all significant deals were implemented in a monopolistic way by state structures: ministries, departments, and foreign trade associations. The mechanism was rather cumbersome, and the preparation and realization of decisions dragged on for long months and even years.

Now the situation is changing. The decentralization of state structures has disrupted the center's monopoly on foreign economic activity, and with the transition to a market there is an urgent need to involve a wide range of participants in this activity. If we seriously want to make the transition to a market, the legalization of different forms of ownership is inevitable. And then the problem of our readiness to realize various projects will arise acutely. At present the Soviet participants are cooperating mainly with small and medium Western firms, while large corporations and concerns do not yet see any organizations or individuals in our market that are capable, according to their criteria, of being worthy partners. You could call these temporizing tactics. But in my opinion the ice has now begun to break.

[PRAVDA] Are you optimistic? Are there grounds for this?

[Vaynberg] Undoubtedly. The thing is that we have participated in preparing a large-scale agreement on the joint project "Culture, Science, Education: United States-USSR." Its essence is the global introduction of information technologies into the system of school education, the instruction of invalids and children with speech, hearing, and sight defects, and also the training of management specialists. Like a number of others signed in the United States, this is not an intergovernmental agreement.

[PRAVDA] Are you serious about U.S. business supporting Soviet perestroyka?

[Vaynberg] Perfectly. Because this means stability or, if you like, the prospect of stability, which mankind has lacked for so long. Under present conditions the USSR can really participate in the international division of labor. Without this you cannot be serious about our economy's progress or about raising the people's living standards.

But there must be no illusions: Neither the United States, nor West Europe, nor anyone in the world will do for us what we must do ourselves. We must not experiment but seek our place in world civilization, relying on our colossal intellectual and raw material potential and our tremendous labor resources.

[PRAVDA] And the final point. Your impressions of your meetings with U.S. businessmen?

[Vaynberg] There is genuine interest in what is happening in our country. Anxiety over the fate of perestroyka. A desire to communicate, to get to know us, and to live and work together for the common good.

Abalkin, U.S. Visitor Discuss Ruble Conversion

LD1807090190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2222 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jul (TASS)—Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, today received Fred Firth, the well-known American entrepreneur and lawyer, who initiated the holding of an international contest for the best scheme for ensuring the convertibility of the Soviet ruble.

Some 600 schemes from 23 countries were entered for the contest. Prizes were awarded to six pieces of work—three Soviet and three foreign.

Matters concerning the holding of an international conference on the issue were discussed at the meeting, and consideration was also given to practical measures for further cooperation between Soviet and foreign specialists in implementing the program of transition to a convertible Soviet currency.

China

End of PRC Military Confrontation Assessed

OW1807204190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin in 0100 GMT 6 Jul 90

[By station commentator Nikolayev; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] In his report to the 28th CPSU Congress, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze pointed out that, in a bid over the last five years to turn enemies into friends through diplomatic activities, the USSR has done a great deal in normalizing relations with various countries. However, how much has the USSR spent on confrontation in various aspects? Our station commentator Nikolayev writes as follow:

Though there are no complete figures at this time, available information leads us to regret the losses that could have been avoided. On the other hand, we are much relieved. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told the 28th CPSU Congress that the USSR has spent 200 billion rubles on establishing a military structure designed to confront the PRC. What a price to pay in confronting a neighboring country. Both the PRC and the USSR, the one-time allies, had prepared themselves for a long time for the cold war to escalate into a real war. Then leaders of both the PRC and the USSR regarded each other as the potential military enemy, and both sides massed huge numbers of troops along their frontier as a result. The PRC-USSR confrontation also posed threats to other countries, spurring arms races in this area. In other words, losses were mounting with no one turning out the winner. Fortunately, the state of confrontation that characterized the last few decades did not destroy the traditional profound friendship between the peoples of the two great neighboring nations. With the ending of the state of confrontation and the normalization of relations, both the PRC and the USSR can now utilize their vast resources for national construction. Of course, for now, both sides will have to spend money in the process of easing the military confrontation.

However, I believe that fruitful results are expected in the future.

Rise Seen in Smuggling Across Chinese Border

PM1907084290 Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 p 4

[Report by V. Mikhaylov: "I Exchange Rubles for Yuan!"]

[Text] The offices of the investigators of the USSR KGB administration for Chita Oblast look like a market stall. Several cases are in progress concerning contraband operations on the Soviet-Chinese border, and confiscated goods are piling up on desks, filing cabinets, and even the floor.

The smuggling boom began recently on the border. A part was played by the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, the opportunities for frequent visits to each other, and the empty counters in our state. The start of large-scale attempts to ship in goods and evade customs was marked by a notable event: the trial in Chita of Barbadian citizen Dabre Banko, who tried to ship nearly half a kilo of heroin in transit through the USSR... in the soles of his trainers. But V. Fedoseyev, a staffer at the Zabaykalsk customs office, noticed a foot that was being hidden discreetly under the seat, and as a result the man found himself "inside" for three years.

And then it began. What do they smuggle? Our people mainly take Soviet money to China. It is now "convertible" over there—in the stores and markets the sellers take rubles instead of yuan in payment for goods at a one-to-one rate. The Chinese, many of whom work in the Transbaykal under contract, bring with them large consignments of consumer goods, sell them off, and then buy whatever they can in excahnge. For instance, scarce motorcycles. Recently a group of PRC citizens tried to take home two such machines, carefully dismantled, in their mattresses.

The KGB investigators are now investigating the case of smugglers from Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrug. Some drivers from there, on returning from a trip to the PRC, were detained at the customs post in the border city of Zabaykalsk. Specially equipped receptacles were found under the bodies of the trucks, where there were sets of cosmetics, canisters of spirits, sports clothing, women's underwear....

And the smuggling boom goes on. The other day customs officers were checking trucks carrying food products for Chinese people working in the oblast. They opened one of the food cans to test it, and found there, instead of the fish indicated on the label—pure alcohol. And there were about 50 more, with the same content.

Chinese-Indonesian Diplomatic Relations To Resume

OW1807081790 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 5 Jul 90

[From the "World Today" program]

[Text] According to XINHUA, Li Peng, premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and President Suharto of Indonesia will sign a formal agreement in Jakarta on 8 August this year to resume diplomatic relations between these two big Asian nations. In this regard, our station commentator Mikhaylov writes as follows:

This decision was endorsed in a communique signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries. Thus, the fundamental purpose of the recent visit to China by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas, the first Indonesian foreign minister to visit Beijing for the past 23 years, has been achieved.

We would like to note here that diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia were suspended in 1967 by the Jakarta authorities. After attempted coup in Indonesia in 1965, Jakarta accused China of interference in its internal affairs.

In recent years, the two nations have taken obvious steps toward normalization of their relations. In 1985, bilateral direct trade was resumed and has developed rapidly. It is estimated that the total trade volume will reach $800 million this year. In February last year, the foreign ministers of the two nations held talks in Tokyo. They met while attending the funeral of the late emperor. At that time, both China and Indonesia had expressed their desire to resume ties.

China and Indonesia have a tradition of friendliness and cooperation. After the Second World War, Indonesia

achieved independence and estabished diplomatic relations with China in 1950. At that time, Sino-Indonesian ties developed quite smoothly. China extended large loans to Indonesia for economic development. Both countries participated in the Bandung Conference, and both also took constructive positions on the fundamental issues in regard to foreign policies. As Premier Li Peng of the State Council of China said when he met the Indonesian Foreign Minister, the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence is not only in the interest of the peoples of the two countries but will also play an important role in enhancing peace and stability in Asia. The resumption of diplomatic ties between the two nations will give new impetus to the settlement of the Cambodian issue.

Let me add in passing that the Cambodian issue was one of the most important topics at the negotiations between the two foreign ministers in Beijing. Both parties pointed out that there were many similarities in their positions on this issue.

Lastly, I would add that China and Indonesia will both set up embassies, thus ushering in a new chapter of China's ties with ASEAN. This is because Singapore has previously its intention to immediately normalize its relations with China after Beijing resumes diplomatic ties with Indonesia.

PRC Support Causes Khmer Rouge 'Recalcitrance'

OW1807211890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 8 Jul 90

[From the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] Judging from various circumstances, the ceasefire call by Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the hope they expressed in Tokyo one month ago have remained merely good intentions. Has their call caused more intense fighting among the various conflicting forces on all fronts, thereby aggravating tension in Cambodia? This passage is found in a report filed from Phnom Penh by IZVESTIYA reporter Vinogradov. He wrote:

The Khmer Rouge's obstinacay is to blame for causing such a situation. The Khmer Rouge has colluded with the other two opposition groups to initiate a series of attacks on strategic cities in some Cambodian provinces. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said: Under the present situation, the government army should make preparations for more fighting in order to gain final triumph. Undoubtedly, this statement should be taken as signaling an action that has been forced by the moves of the opposition groups which have dashed hopes for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The IZVESTIYA reporter also pointed out: The negotiations between delegates of the Cambodian Government and the opposition forces on organizing a supreme national council also have proceeded without much vigor. In accordance with the Tokyo agreement, a supreme national council should be formed this month, and a total cease fire should be in effect prior to its formation. As everybody knows, the Khmer Rouge has refused to endorse the Tokyo joint communique. Their recalcitrance is founded on Beijing's support and economic assistance. However, it is still uncertain whether the Khmer Rouge will be more inclined to resume negotiations if the assistance is reduced or cancelled. The issue of stopping arms supplies to all of the Cambodian conflicting forces should be put on the agenda for international discussion. Obviously, if this is not done accordingly, it will be impossible to found a neutral country. The permanent members of the UN Security Council are committed to facilitating the founding of such a country.

Northeast Asia

Japan 'Least Constructive' of G-7 Countries

PM1807092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 6

[Igor Latyshev "Viewpoint": "Counting on 'Pressure'?"]

[Text] Tokyo—The annual meetings of the leaders of the seven major Western countries are regarded in Japan as important landmarks in the development of international events. In informing the public about the meeting of "the Seven" in Houston, the Japanese press naturally gives prominence in its reports to the stand of the Japanese delegation headed by Toshiki Kaifu, the country's prime minister.

This time this stand proved more conspicuous than at previous meetings in at least two aspects, namely with regard to the PRC and with regard to the Soviet Union. It revealed certain special features distinguishing it from the stands of the other participants.

Special correspondents for Japanese newspapers report from Houston that, when the Japanese prime minister addressed a "working supper" for the meeting participants last Tuesday, he informed his listeners of the Japanese Government's intention to abandon, in point of fact, the "sanctions" against the PRC which have been implemented over the past year jointly with the other countries of "the Seven" and to resume talks with the Chinese Government on granting the PRC the earlier promised Japanese credit to the tune of 810 billion yen, which was later "frozen." The press reports that Kaifu agreed this decision in advance with U.S. President Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher, who treated their Japanese partner's intention with "understanding."

It is not hard to understand the reasons for Japan's desire to resume economic relations with the PRC: Japan's subscribing to the anti-Chinese policy of "sanctions" last summer has harmed a number of Japanese firms. For several months now, Japanese business circles have been trying to persuade the government to return to its former

positions. Yielding to this pressure, Tokyo is at the same time seeking to take advantage of the situation that has come about in order to outstrip the others involved in the "sanctions" in arranging economic relations with the PRC. And thereby still further consolidate its role as the leading foreign partner in the Chinese economy.

As regards the "special stand" taken by the Japanese Government in Houston with regard to the Soviet Union, it once again revealed the inveterate adherence of a certain section of Japanese conservative circles to the dogmas of the "cold war" period and their concealed reluctance to promote the Soviet Union's further inclusion in the system of global economic ties. Otherwise you cannot possibly account for Kaifu's none too successful attempts to dissuade the other participants in the Houston meeting—the FRG and French leaders, above all—from their intention to widen the scale of their economic cooperation with our country. Kaifu backed up this stand with references to the Soviet Union's refusal to satisfy Japanese territorial claims.

To judge from Japanese newspaper articles, the most that Japan will agree to in the matter of promoting perestroyka in the Soviet Union is so-called "intellectual assistance," whose essence boils down to sending a group of Japanese experts to the Soviet Union for the purpose of "giving advice" to particular departments of ours on questions concerning the implementation of economic reforms. All this attests that the Japanese leadership took the least constructive stand with regard to the Soviet Union at the conference of "the Seven" in Houston.

One wonders what guided the Japanese side in openly displaying in Houston its reluctance to expand economic ties with our country? I believe that what is concealed behind this stand of the Japanese Government is the desire of Tokyo's political strategists to use the Soviet Union's temporary difficulties associated with the restructuring of its economy in order to put "pressure" on Moscow with a view to securing certain one-sided concessions from it.

The calculations, let us state bluntly, are not very far-sighted. In the new system of international relations which has taken shape nowadays in connection with the abandonment of confrontation with the Soviet Union on the part of the United States and a number of other Western countries, it is a manifest anachronism to count on "pressure," and those who are guided by this come into conflict, whether or not they want this, with the global course of the development of international relations. The course of these events convincingly shows the irregular and inappropriate nature of any thoughts of preserving tension in the Asia and Pacific region and any maneuvers aimed at putting the brakes on Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation and good-neighborliness.

Japan Rejects Sanctions Against PRC

OW1907042090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 17 Jul 90

["Excerpts" of article from the 17 July PRAVDA by Tokyo correspondent Latyshev: "Japan's Position at the Houston Summit, Seven Western Industrialized Nations"[

[Text] This time, the stand taken by the Japanese delegation, headed by Prime Minister Kaifu, proved more conspicuous than at previous summits in at least two respects, namely, regarding China and the Soviet Union.

Regarding China, Prime Minister Kaifu disclosed to the delegates of other nations participating in the summit that Japan would actually reject sanctions against China, and resume talks with the Chinese Government on granting credits amounting to 810 billion yen.

On the other hand, regarding the special stand taken by the Japanese Government at the Houston summit on the Soviet Union, it revealed the faithful, but obstinate, adherence of a certain section of Japanese conservative circles to the dogmas of the "cold war" period, and their concealed reluctance to promote the Soviet Union's further inclusion in the system of global economic relations. Moreover, we cannot say that Prime Minister Kaifu was successful in his attempt to dissuade the other participants at the Houston Summit, particulary France and West Germany, from expanding the scale of their economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Kaifu tried to justify this stand under the pretext of the Soviet Union's refusal to satisfy Japanese territorial claims.

Judging from Japanese press reports, the most that Japan can do in cooperating with the Soviet Union to promote perestroyka is the so-called intellectual assistance. Its essence boils down to dispatching a group of Japanese experts to the Soviet Union for the purpose of giving advice to various Soviet government departments on various questions concerning the implementation of economic reforms. All this proves that the Japanese Government has taken the least constructive stand regarding the Soviet Union, compared with the other summit participating nations.

Then, why is it that the Japanese side has openly indicated in Houston its reluctance to expand economic exchanges with the Soviet Union? In bringing up this question, PRAVDA Tokyo correspondent Latyshev states his personal views as follows:

I feel that what is concealed behind this stand of the Japanese Government is the intention of Japanese political strategists to use the Soviet Union's temporary difficulties associated with perestroyka in the economy to impose pressure to secure certain one-sided concessions.

To speak frankly, such measures can never be said to be farsighted. As the United States and a number of other

Western nations have abandoned confrontation with the Soviet Union, a new system of international relations has been formed. Under this new system, it is an apparent anachronism to count on pressure. Those who are guided by such an idea will come into conflict, whether they want it or not, with the global course of the development of international relations.

I think the course of these events convincingly indicates that any schemes aimed at putting the brakes on Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation and goodneighborliness, as well as any attempts to preserve tension in the Asia-Pacific region are not only illegitimate, but also inappropriate.

Lukyanov on CPSU View on Ties With Japan

PM1907102390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For the Development of Cooperation"]

[Text] USSR Supreme Soviet chairman Lukyanov met with T. Sato, chief editor of the Japanese TOKYO SHIMBUN newspaper, in the Kremlin 17 July. In a thorough conversation the guest was told about the work of the 28th CPSU Congress. The Soviet communists' forum, the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman said, differed sharply from the previous congresses and really reflected the processes occuring in society. Under conditions of the delimitation of functions between the party and the state the CPSU, which is being renewed, is going over to fulfilling political tasks. Among the specific results of the congress's work, Comrade Lukyanov noted the program statement, in which the paths for the further development of Soviet socialist society are defined, the CPSU Statues, and a number of important resolutions. It was stressed that the forecasts about a split in the party had not been justified. On the contrary a turn toward consolidating and further democratizing it had taken place. The CPSU, which unites millions, and which is historically linked with the fate of the people, will continue to play an important role in the country's life, it was noted at the meeting.

The chairman of the higher legislative body spoke about the work of the new Soviet parliament and about its relations with the Supreme soviets of the Union republics, particularly Russia.

Comrade Lukyanov spoke in favor of the development of a broad spectrum of Soviet-Japanese relations in various spheres and of turning the Asia and Pacific region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace and fruitful international cooperation based on the principles of the new political thinking.

Situation in Mongolia 'Precarious' on Anniversary

OW1907055390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0200 GMT 11 Jul 90

[Text] Dear listeners, 11 July is the day of revolutionary victory for the Mongolian people; it is also Mongolia's national day. This year's national day is to be celebrated amid major social changes in Mongolia and at a time when Mongolia is reevaluating its own historical road. Our station commentator, Sidorov, notes in this connection:

The victory of the 1921 revolution brought independence to Mongolia. While summing up its own lengthy historical development, Mongolia is also pondering its own future. The ruling party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, maintains that the nation building of the past 70 years has been essentially positive. Social reforms were seriously carried out to meet the social needs. Soceity is built on a competitive basis which can not be sabotaged.

However, there are people who hold different views. The Mongolian Democratic Alliance, the largest opposition party in Mongolia, objects to the mere reform of existing systems and institutions. It insists on undergoing reform of a revolutionary nature, thus changing the face of the nation with Western democratic values.

The internal balance of power is now very precarious. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, with its widespread organization and its control over the media, has a total membership of 95,000 and enjoys a state subsidy of 30 million tugrik. However, recently its influence has diminished, one reason being its involvement in criminal activities conducted under its dictatorial rule. It takes times to prove that the party is still strong. The opposition, the Mongolian Democratic Alliance, commands considerable support and is still enjoying an upward trend. However, its it is still loosely organized and is short of funds.

Which side will the Mongolian people favor? Our station commentator Sidorov points out that the general election scheduled for 29 July will answer that question.

Gorbachev Letter to ROK's No Tae-u Cites Ties

SK1907014590 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] It was officially announced in Seoul today that the ROK President No Tae-u has received the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to his personal letter. In his reply Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet-ROK highest level meeting held on 4 July in San Francisco opened outstanding prospects for improving bilateral relations.

The Soviet Union is ready to receive a ROK Government delegation and to discuss with it on the issue of expanding cooperation.

It was also announced in Seoul that the ROK delegation will arrive in Moscow in the next week and discuss the issue of establishing official relations between the two countries.

As is known, there have been no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK. However, ties

between them and ties in the trade field, in particular, have been remarkably expanded in recent years.

No Tae-u Discusses Relations

SK1907015190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The ROK President No Tae-u stressed constructive economic cooperation with and normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. He was interviewed by a reporter from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in connection with his meeting with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on 4 June [as heard] in San Francisco.

President No Tae-u said that with the [San Francisco] meeting itself the Soviet leadership has shown its firm determination to carry out a policy of peace and cooperation in the Pacific.

Referring to relations with the DPRK, President No Tae-u recalled Seoul's proposals for holding North-South highest level talks to seek ways for solving the (?overall) questions between the North and the South.

Resignations Threaten South Korean Assembly

SK1807025290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Talk entitled "On Crisis in South Korean National Assembly" from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] According to a report from Seoul, lawmakers from opposition parties, including the Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] expressed the intent to resign en masse, protesting that control of the press is being intensified by the state and that lawmakers of the ruling party committed violent acts when the National Assembly was passing various bills.

In connection with this, our commentator (Sergey Petrov) writes: The basic cause of the crisis in the ROK National Assembly is related to the passage of 23 bills at the Assembly. Among them, five bills drastically reduced the ability of public organizations in the ROK to keep activities of the military in check, and restricted the autonomy of television and radio broadcasting stations.

People could predict the resulting situation, where five lawmakers from opposition parties headed by the president of the recently-formed Democratic Party resigned.

They stated that the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP], the ruling party, is attempting to deprive the people of the right to keep a check on the military and seeks to maintain the press under its control. The attempt of opposition lawmakers to exercise certain influence on the development of the situation ended in a failure and relevant bills were passed.

The DLP, which has more than two-third of seats in the National Assembly, resorted to hard-line measures while abusing the numerical superiority. Employees of two television stations and four radio stations across the country began strike protesting the DLP's steps. Despite threat of the ROK Information Minister that he will ask for mobilization of police force against strikers, they intend to continue the strike.

We would like to ask a question as to what role the ROK Government and the leadership of the ruling party are trying to give to the opposition forces.

Judging from present situation, it is apparent that they are attempting to use the opposition forces as a screen to conceal their acts. The opposition forces (?hoped) to be able to exercise certain influence on establishing state policies and on forming comparative factions within the ROK National Assembly. The only means available for opposition forces was mass media. However, according to the recently-passed bill, mass media will come under the complete control of the government.

Obviously, there is a possibility for [word indistinct] when this bill comes into effect. However, history shows that democracy can hardly be (?seen) by the (?people) after they seize power.

The attempt to seize the military, which is the most powerful force in the course of social democratization, is causing the people concern. One should not forget that the military may possibly give the decisive support. This is precisely what the opposition forces are afraid of.

We should also point out that it is a common practice in South Korea for the police to wield bayonets to repress mass media. However, if they continue adhering to such a war [as heard], the resistance demonstration will become even greater.

I think that there is only one outlet for the prevailing situation. That is: They should come to the negotiating table with opposition forces and seek measures for compromise. Otherwise, the South Korean situation cannot avoid a new social crisis.

ROK Computer Exhibition Held in Moscow

SK1707003990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 14 Jul 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] An international personal computer exhibition is being held at the People's Economy Exhibition Hall in Moscow. (?Three) ROK companies are participating in the exhibition. They are Hyundai Group, Gold-Star (?software) company, and Qnix computer company.

We will now have an on-the-scene report of the event by our station reporter who visited the exhibition.

[Station reporter's report read by announcer] Though it was a weekday, and despite a relatively high admission fee, the exhibition has attracted many people's interest. Some people were there only to see the computer samples and the young ones were there to play video games.

State-run enterprises and cooperative associations were interested in the purchase of computers. Even before I got to the exhibition hall, I saw many people carrying advertisement bags and pamphlets offered by the ROK companies.

In fact, every day, many people visited the exhibition hall to see the ROK companies' exhibits. So it was even hard to ask questions. I had to stand in line. My first interviewee was Han Tong-su, representative of the Hyundai Group in Moscow.

[Begin Han Tong-su recording] This is the first time Hyundai has participated in a special electronics exhibition. People are friendlier than we expected and they are very supportive. Many people have visited us and they have viewed our exhibits with great interest. They seem to be greatly interested in technology. So I am favorably impressed. At present, we are carrying out a project with a good Soviet partner. When a special economic zone is established in Nakhodka, we will build a computer assembly plant there and will assemble approximately 100,000 computers a year. Then, within five years, we will develop Soviet components and will produce 100 percent Soviet products to market in the country and to export. This is our project. Taking advantage of this opportunity, we will conduct various surveys. With regard to this, another team has come here from our company for the construction of the plant. So, when this exhibition is over, I think we will actively and convincingly carry out the project. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Next, a report on visitors' impressions of the exhibition. (Boris Byskovich), an electronic expert, told our station reporter:

[Begin (Boris Byskovich) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] I like the exhibits of the Qnix and Gold-Star companies very much. At the Leningrad exhibition I had already seen the products of ROK companies. The inventions of the ROK companies are interesting and their products are of high quality. As for the level of all the exhibits at this exhibition, they are just average.

[Announcer] (Anatoliy Leonov), a military colonel, was critical of (?our situation). He had this to say:

[(Leonov) heard speaking in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] We are awfully backward in computer technology. Instead of a quest for new technology, we are still using (?old technology). Here, I see many young people. They seem to be interested in almost everything displayed at the exhibition. I think the significance of the international computer exhibition is to introduce all these things to those Soviets who have no opportunity to see such technology where they work and to let them know the possibilities which these things can provide for creation. If the ROK companies sign certain contracts to sell many computers to us, I think that will serve as a concrete opportunity for us in pioneering a new world.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

UN Security Council Meeting on Cambodia Assessed

BK1707140490 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Commentary by Oleg Shchedrov]

[Text] Another meeting on the Cambodian issue by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] opened today, 16 July, in Paris. The aim of this meeting is to coordinate international efforts for a solution to the Cambodian problem. These five countries which began their consultations in January held their latest meeting two months ago in New York. Our commentator, Comrade Oleg Shchedrov, writes as follows:

The conflict—between the Cambodian Government supported by Vietnam on the one side and the warring Cambodian opposition faction on the other—has dragged on for 11 years now. The political leader of this faction—Sihanouk—and the leader of a group in this faction—Son Sann—are supported by the Western world. The militarily strongest group of this faction, the Khmer Rouge, is backed by China. In this connection, international participation in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict is needed. Meanwhile, the five permanent member countries have repeatedly emphasized that the most important point is for the Cambodian factions to come to an agreement while the consultation by the five UNSC permanent members is just a supplementary aid to the search for solution.

The outcome of this consultation depends on the progress in the efforts toward reaching internal reconciliation. The dialogues held more frequently by the conflicting Cambodian factions, particularly since the middle of last year, have created hope that peace would soon prevail in this country. But for the past few months, the prospects for this solution have suddenly turned dim. The source of this crisis is the Khmer Rouge who are responsible for the massacre of three million of their own people during their rule in Cambodia. This group must not be allowed to return to power. This is the essential condition for the solution in whatever form. All other groups, except for the Khmer Rouge, have agreed on this condition. In words, the Khmer Rouge have persistently demanded an equal share of power in the government after the end of the war. But in deeds, they are forging ahead toward seizing a monopoly of power.

At the Tokyo meeting in June, the Khmer Rouge obstructed the cease-fire agreement between the warring factions, and, thereafter, have vigorously intensified their military offensive.

The lightning attack on and capture of Kompong Thom town, 120 km from Phnom Penh, shows that the Khmer Rouge's ambition is not groundless. Indonesia's attempt to call up an urgent meeting of the conflicting factions to hold informal discussion has failed. The atmosphere is

full of uncertainty. At a closer look, this gloomy atmosphere can also be seen at the Grillon Hotel in Paris, where the five permanent representatives of the UNSC member countries are meeting. This time, there is no hope of any substantial result. Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is something that one can and must accomplish, that is, the cessation of military aid to all conflicting factions. And Beijing—the protector of the Khmer Rouge—should be the first to do so. Such a step will certainly lead toward lessening the tense atmosphere and returning all Cambodian parties back to the negotiating table.

Solution 'Hinges on Dialogue'

PM1807131390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by Yu. Kovalenko: "Equation With Many Unknowns. Cambodia: LE MONDE Makes Forecasts"]

[Text] Paris—On Monday and Tuesday in Paris there is another meeting of representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on reaching an all-embracing political settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

Let me remind you that during the previous round of talks a few months ago in the French capital accord was reached on creating "transitional UN authority in Cambodia." Back then the permanent members of the UN Security Council issued an appeal to the four Cambodian parties to the conflict to reach consensus on creating a Supreme National Council to embody sovereignty and national unity for the duration of the transitional period and to run the country.

It is believed here that at the present moment everything hinges on the dialogue between Hanoi and Beijing. However, China, in the opinion of Paris observers, is in no hurry since in recent months its proteges, the "Khmers Rouges," have scored several important points.

Time is again on the side of the "Khmer Rouge," LE MONDE writes. And although they have not managed to mount any major operation since the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in the fall of last year, the press points out, since the month of May, taking advantage of the rainy season, they have been able to infiltrate settlements and villages and to strengthen their strongholds in the jungles. The Pol Pot supporters are threatening the vitally important communications linking Phnom Penh with the west and northwest of the country, and also the highways leading to the sea. They are present in practically all Cambodian provinces, including those adjoining the capital.

According to LE MONDE, the Cambodian authorities, who last fall successfully withstood enemy attacks in the west and northwest of the country, have been encountering serious difficulties in the struggle against the Pol Pot supporters for several weeks now.

Since the "Khmer Rouge," the press states, are stepping up the pressure—sometimes with the help of their Sihanouk allies—Beijing feels extremely confident at the talks: Within the framework of a settlement it is pressing for the formation of a provisional government including representatives of all four parties to the conflict. (Beijing advocates a 12-member Supreme National Council with the participation of the "Khmer Rouge" under the chairmanship of Norodom Sihanouk.)

While the "Khmer Rouge" are continuing to weave their web, LE MONDE notes, Beijing is waiting for concessions from Hanoi. China, Paris believes, does not want the discredited Pol Pot supporters to return to power and, to all appearances, once it has secured concessions from Vietnam will then moderate the appetites of the "Khmers Rouges," who are wholly dependent on its aid.

For its part, Hanoi, newspapers write, has no intention of making concessions since it is hoping that certain Western powers, in particular the Americans, will stop assisting their opponents—Sihanouk and Son Sann, who are helping the Pol Pot supporters.

What can be expected of the latest conference of the "Five," to which the Cambodian sides have not been invited? Today everyone seems to agree that in the event that a political solution is reached the United Nations will play the decisive role in monitoring a cease-fire, holding free elections, and so forth. However, at present the permanent members of the UN Security Council, local observers believe, have little influence on the course of the Cambodian conflict. It is necessary for Vietnam and China to reach agreement first, LE MONDE points out.

Consultations End

LD1807151190 Moscow TASS in English 1449 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Shvets]

[Text] Paris July 18 TASS—The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council wound up the next round of consultations focusing on achieving a political settlement to the Cambodian conflict. The discussions involved deputy foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain, France and China.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev also held separate consultations with Cambodian Minister Hor Nom Hong and with U.N. Under-Secretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed. Representatives of the Cambodian parties were not present at the Paris meeting because of the absence of accord on the form of their participation.

During working meetings the deputy ministers summed up the results of the conferences on the Cambodian settlement held since the beginning of this year, discussed the initiatives advanced by the Asia-Pacific countries and also issues related to armed groups in Cambodia and the U.N. role in settling the conflict.

They noted that meaningful success was achieved on the way towards accord on the issues under discussion and agreed to meet again in New York on August 27-28.

The document adopted upon the completion of the meeting points to the urgent need to cease combat operations in Cambodia and begin talks between representatives of the four Cambodian warring factions.

Participants called upon the leaders of the Cambodian parties to reach as soon as possible accord on the issue of setting up the Supreme National Council, a body composed of authoritative representatives of the Cambodian people, which will govern the country during the transition period.

Progress was made on two key issues—on the directions in the Cambodian Administration's activity before the holding of general elections in the country, and on settling issues pertaining to the activity of armed groups on Cambodian territory.

In addition, the deputy foreign ministers drew attention to the need to speed up work on other issues, specifically on the procedure for holding free elections, human rights protection and international guarantees of settlement.

Deemed 'Useful, Successful'

BK1907070990 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Commentary by Oleg Shchedrov]

[Text] Another meeting on Cambodia of representatives from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council was concluded in Paris. For two days, foreign ministers from the five countries discussed ways to assist in normalizing the situation in Cambodia. The five countries' representatives have met frequently since the beginning of this year. Here are comments by Oleg Shchedrov.

A character by the American writer Kurt Vonnegut put up on the wall of his room a prayer which says: O Lord, give me the strength to change what I can, the patience to accept what I cannot, and the wisdom to know the difference between the two.

I feel that the participants of the Paris meeting were guided by this appropriate prayer. Their statement says the normalization of the situation in Cambodia can be achieved only through reconciliation among the parties in conflict. The five countries' representatives appeal to warring Cambodian parties to leave the battlefield and sit at the negotiating table.

It is regrettable that in the past two months, the military situation in Cambodia has greatly worsened. Following the failure of the cease-fire agreement, the opposing parties have intensified military activities. The Khmer Rouge are mostly responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Their leaders frequently talk about the desire to use weapons to seize power they lost 11 years ago. The efforts of neutral parties, particularly of Indonesia, to get the warring Cambodian parties to return to negotiations got nowhere. In the deteriorating situation in Cambodia, the United Nations was restricted in its means. This could perhaps explain the results of the Paris meeting. The participants did not put forward any major initiatives. However, they appreciated the consultation as a useful and successful meeting, the essence of which is the establishment of a concrete mechanism for national reconciliation in Cambodia and for building the country after the war.

Accompanied by the gunfire in Cambodia, this task has been considered meaningless. However, the war, no matter how long it has lasted, cannot go on forever. Sooner or later, the situation will force the opposing parties back to negotiations. At that time, the readiness of the proposal and plan to be implemented will produce results, concludes our commentator Oleg Shchedrov.

Near East & South Asia

Soviet, Arab Parliamentarians Meet in Moscow

90UF0337A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Strengthening Soviet-Arab Dialogue"]

[Text] The talks on 12 July in Moscow between R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and a delegation of the Arab Parliamentary Union headed by Hilal bin Ahmed Lutah, chairman of the United Arab Emirates Federal National Council, was a continuation of the mutually beneficial Soviet-Arab dialogue. The delegation is composed of the leaders of the commissions for Arab and international affairs of the parliaments of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia.

Problems of multilateral cooperation and a settlement of the political situation in the Near East were the focus of the attention of the meeting of the members of parliament. It is essential to use the entire potential of peace initiatives advanced recently for a settlement of the Near East conflict, R.N. Nishanov emphasized. The Soviet side confirmed its readiness to conduct a meeting between representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in the Soviet capital.

The representatives of the Arab world shared their concern at the expansionist aspirations of Israel and the buildup of the military power of this state. Disquieting facts testifying to the creation in Israel of new models of arms and a propaganda campaign being developed there to justify aggressive actions in the region were enumerated. Problems connected with the settlement of emigres from the Soviet Union in the occupied territories were discussed also.

The chairman of the chamber of the Soviet parliament expressed support for the just cause of the Palestinians and all Arabs. He advocated a strengthening of relations

in various spheres, including both interparliamentary contacts and intercourse between ordinary citizens.

As observed during talks held the same day by A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, the Near East direction of Soviet foreign policy is disturbing, as before. [sentence as published] Despite any changes in the world, Soviet people will always be on the side of the Arab peoples and will support a just solution of the Palestinian problem, said USSR People's Deputies A.A. Ananyev, M.S. Kapitsa, V.P. Maslin, and E.Yu. Yusupov, who took part in the discussion.

The same day the emissaries of the Arab East met with A.M. Belonogov, deputy USSR foreign minister.

A number of questions of the current international situation, the situation in the Near East particularly, were discussed.

Expressing concern at the exacerbation of tension in this region, the parties advocated a stimulation of efforts oriented toward an all-embracing settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the convening to this end of an international conference on the Near East. The participants in the talks confirmed their intention of continuing their opposition, with the use of UN mechanisms included, to the plans to settle immigrants on the occupied Arab territory.

Other issues of mutual interest were also discussed during the meeting.

Discuss Mideast, Jewish Resettlement

LD1807150590 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Soviet and Arab parliamentarians expressed their deep concern at the explosive situation in the Middle East. They called for holding an international conference with the participation of all the concerned parties, including the PLO, in order to settle the conflict in the region.

In a joint communique on the results of the Arab parliamentary delegation's visit to the Soviet Union, the two sides condemned the persecutions committed in the occupied territories. They discussed Israeli moves to settle the emigrants, including those from the Soviet Union, there. The two sides asked for effective measures to be adopted in order to stop any demographic changes in the occupied territories. The Arab parliamentarians praised Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's statements on this issue.

Issue Joint Statement

LD1907084190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2040 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 July (TASS)—Soviet and Arab parliamentarians have declared their support for the "tendencies gathering strength to improve the international climate, establish the principles of the new political thinking, and strengthen the role of parliaments in world affairs." This is said in their joint statement, circulated here today, on the results of Arab Interparliamentary Union [AIU] delegation's official friendly visit from 11-16 July at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation was led by Hilal Ahmad Lutah, AIU chairman and United Arab Emirates Federal National Assembly speaker. The delegation comprised representatives from the parliaments of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, as well as from the AIU General Secretariat.

In the course of meeting and conversations, including with Rafik Nishanov USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities chairman, a complex of issues in Soviet-Arab relations was examined and a thorough exchange of views was held on key international problems.

The joint statement stresses that "the Arab parliamentarians highly commend Soviet efforts to halt the arms race, disarmament, and resolve regional conflicts." Expressing deep concern over the explosive situation in the Middle East and the absence of a fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, both sides noted the urgent need to improve the peace process in the region and convene an international conference with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO, as well as the five permanent Security Council members.

The Soviet and Arab parliamentarians considered the question of the Israeli authorities' illegal actions in settling immigrants, including those from the USSR, on occupied Arab lands, which is a flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention and the relevant UN resolutions, the parliamentarians' joint statement emphasizes. The sides noted the need to adopt effective measures, including in the United Nations, to prevent any change in the demographic structure of these territories.

Both parties stressed the need for Israeli troops to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and favored strengthening Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and attaining national concord in that country. Satisfaction was also expressed with the invigoration of the dialogue between Iraq and Iran, and with the initiatives aimed at seeking an Iran-Iraq settlement on the basis of the fully implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

In the course of the parliamentarians' meetings the sides agreed to continue the dialogue and cooperation through the exchange of experience on parliamenary work, information and visit by delegations, and by holding consultations on problems being discussed within the Interparliamentary Union and other international forums. Stress was laid on the need to develop relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the Arab countries in all fields, especially in the economic sphere.

East Europe

GDR Parliamentarians Visit Supreme Soviet Body

PM1307115590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Parliamentarians' Meeting"]

[Text] A meeting with a delegation from the GDR Volkskammer Committee for Disarmament and Defense has taken place in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security. The Soviet parliamentarians told their guests about the committee's structure, the tasks facing it, and the draft laws concerning questions of defense and state security.

The parliamentarians from the GDR, who represent various parties in the Volkskammer, expressed themselves on problems of the unification of Germany, the future of the National People's Army, and the presence of the Western Group of Forces on GDR territory.

The members of the delegation from the GDR laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall, attended a talk in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and visited the Taman M.I. Kalinin guards motorized rifle division, where they were familiarized with the equipment and weapons and life and daily routine of the personnel.

USSR, GDR Sign Trade Agreement in Berlin

LD1807205790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1450 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[Text] Berlin, 18 Jul (TASS)—An intergovernmental agreement on economic ties between the USSR and the GDR has been signed today in Berlin. The document provides for a transition to mutual calculations in freely convertible currency and trade at current world prices from 1 January next year.

The agreement was signed by K.F. Katushev, USSR minister for foreign economic ties, and G. Pohl, GDR minister of economics.

Hungary in Stalemate Over Troop Withdrawal Terms

90UM0716A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by V. Litovkin: "Disagreements Not Overcome"]

[Excerpt] Twenty-six military camps, transferred by the group command to the Hungarian side, stand with windows darkened. Five hundred and fifty-six buildings, 317 of them built just recently with Ministry of Defense funds, are empty, decaying, in some places quietly being pulled apart or falling into disrepair.

No one has lived for a half year now in most of the abandoned apartments. Our country receives no compensation for their cost, no reimbursement in money or construction materials, which are in such short supply now at the new garrisoning points.

Two hundred and sixty trains with gasoline, kerosine, diesel fuel, other petroleum oils and lubricants, and military property, which the Hungarian side promised to buy from the Soviet military or help them to sell, stand frozen on sidings, scattered among storehouses, warehouses, and storage tanks. By mutual agreement these trains are not included in the troop withdrawal schedules. But there have also been no payments made for them. And it is not known when, by whom, or at what price we will be paid for all this property. Or will they pay? Perhaps it will have to be returned home; our country is having a hard time with petroleum oils and lubricants. We urgently need them ourselves. And there are more than a hundred thousand tons of such goods.

The military airfield at Debrecen drowses in an unaccustomed half-slumber, the first of six such abandoned by our aviators. In terms of international classification it is one of the best in Europe. Two airstrips with monolithic pavement, not counting taxiways, length 2,500 meters, width 40 and 60 meters, which may be used by aircraft of any type. Next to them are flight lines for centralized aircraft maintenance, with reinforced concrete hangars and large underground fuel storage tanks, as well as technical maintenance buildings, living quarters, a school....

The total cost of the property incorporated in metal, brick, and concrete is more than 65 million transferable rubles. And if you consider that the airfield is literally at the very center of a wonderful tourist and resort area of Hungary, the Hortobagy Pusta, that it lies on the route from Western European capitals to India, Japan, and Malaysia, and that the residences are tomorrow's hotels, than the value immediately increases several times over.

Our country has still not received a kopeck for it. And it is not clear if it will. Just as for the other airfields—Tekel, which is in Budapest proper, and Kiskunlaszhaz, Szarmelek, Kunmadaras, Kaloche, and another seven others. They are a little lower in class, but capable of receiving and maintaining helicopters and light planes.

We do not know what will happen to the 150-person sanatorium at Balatonfured with a hectare of excellent Balaton beach, or to the 500-bed hospital in the capital region of Rakoshpalot, equipped with the latest diagnostic and treatment facilities, which could fully accommodate a European center of modern medical technology with the participation of the leading specialists of our country and the world, and perhaps also a complex of Soviet institutions in Budapest. By the most approximate and clearly reduced calculations, the cost of all the Soviet installations is 2.5 billion transferable rubles. And it is not impossible that we will not receive a red cent for them.

Why? Because Hungarian representatives participating in the negotiations insist that all payments be made only after the withdrawal of all troops, on the basis of the total balance, when costs and their financial claims are combined. This was announced at a meeting with the commanding general of the Southern Group of Forces, Colonel General M. Burdakov, by the chairman of a parliamentary commission of the State Assembly of Hungary Miklos Vasharkhey.

I happened to be present at that meeting of leaders of the Group of Forces and experts visiting from Moscow, representing the Soviet embassy in the Hungarian Republic, with deputies of the Hungarian Parliament. The talk was pointed. Our partners presented many claims to us. Serious ones, such as the harm done to the environment of the republic, and unconvincing ones: that Soviet soldiers allegedly were selling weapons to the populace. Of course the parliamentarians did not cite a single specific fact to confirm their claim. But the detail is significant, reflecting, it seems to me, the attitude toward our troops.

This whole talk, as other impressions from trips through the republic, leads me to believe that they do not want to pay us and will do everything to reduce the payments to a minimum.

M. Burdakov told me, "The inter-government agreement 'On the Legal Status of Soviet Troops Temporarily Located on the Territory of the Hungarian People's Republic,' dated 27 May 1957 and 1 April 1958, and the March agreement of this year say that we will transfer all installations to the Hungarian Army in their technical condition on the day of transfer, with allowance for their further utilization. Our partners understand this provision in their own way. If they do not want some facility, they demand that we tear it down, haul it away, and recultivate the land. They are supposed to reimburse us in forints for our construction expenses. But again, pointing out that by Hungarian law everything constructed on republic land belongs to it, they avoid a decision on the payment question. We cannot submit to attempts at such overt pressure or acknowledge the priority of Hungarian laws over international ones."

Matvey Prokopyevich continues. "The 1990 agreement has a special clause which says: 'Property, finances, and other economic questions related to the troop withdrawal not settled by the agreements in force will be settled by special understandings. The sides will take steps for the most rapid attainment of such understandings, bearing in mind that these questions are supposed to be decided before conclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawal.' But we still have not reached such understandings. For some reason neither the Soviet side nor the Hungarian government is in a hurry to conclude them. And time will not wait. I was forced to order that storehouses, prefab barracks, and other installations be dismantled and that all this equipment and construction materials be transported home, to new garrisoning points. And apparently I will be forced to put the camps, now without our families, under the guard of soldiers and officers remaining there. If the matter of payment of compensation for each installation individually continues to be dragged out, I will be forced to halt the withdrawal. Otherwise the people whom we are sending back to the Union without adequate housing will not understand me or the Group leadership. Nor will they understand our government."

Where is the solution to this situation? I believe it lies in creating a standing intergovernmental commission, which should be headed on both sides not by representatives of a particular department, but at a minimum by Deputy Prime Ministers, in order that all questions be resolved quickly, effectively, at the state level, and with mutual benefit to both sides and both peoples. Also, after proclaiming the transition to the market, to a controllable market economy, it is finally time to get away from ideological dogmas, to learn to trade in what belongs to us according to market laws, using not only persuasion, but also economic levers in the process.

Our army is leaving Hungary today, but we still have to live as neighbors, respecting one another and cooperating tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and for many years to come. We cannot cloud the future with today's largely petty misunderstandings.

Before departure from Hungary I visited a Soviet tank regiment located in the village of Polgardy. The deputy unit commander, alumnus of the Hungarian Military Academy imeni M. Zriny, Maj. V. Belous told me:

"We were starting to remove the tin roof from the combat equipment storage parks when the chairman of the local Soviet Dyula Gubish came up and said, "Don't tear down the bays Vasiliy. I'll give you the brick and the tin, everything for a technical maintenance point. The combines and tractors at our goskhoz are under the open sky....

"I took a chance," the major says. "I stopped the dismantling, but I began to worry, what if the local bureaucrats or worse yet the public put a spoke in his wheel, and ours too?

Spokes in the wheels, just as the red light that some would like to put in front of the departing military trains, will never be a sign of state wisdom.

West Europe

PRAVDA on Kohl-Gorbachev News Conference

PM1807111590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 1,5

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl News Conference"]

[Text] As already reported, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl held their final news conference in Zheleznovodsk 16 July.

In his opening address H. Kohl said:

This news conference concludes the two-day meeting between President Gorbachev and myself, between the two countries' foreign ministers and finance ministers, and also between our delegations. I think that the meeting will be a new pinnacle in the history of German-Soviet relations—in terms of the density and intensity of our talks in Moscow, in the aircraft, and here, in President Gorbachev's home region. I see his invitation to visit his home area as a special gesture. The special climate of relations between all the participants in the talks helped us to deepen mutual trust still further.

Our talks were notable for their supreme sincerity, mutual understanding, and personal sympathies. This was also promoted by the conditions in which we found ourselves. And the cordial meetings with the residents of the Stavropol area, and also with peasants in the grainfield where we found ourselves during the helicopter stopover. But the particular significance of our meeting resides in its results. We agree that it proved possible to take a great step forward on the main issues.

This success was possible because both sides realize that historic changes are happening at present in Europe, Germany, and the Soviet Union that place particular responsibility on us. This is true of the development of ties between our two countries and of the future of all Europe. President Gorbachev and I agree that we must take on this historic responsibility. We will try to meet it together. We also see this task above all as the particular duty of our own generation which consciously witnessed the war and its consequences but which has received an important opportunity—possibly even the only one of its kind—to shape the future of our countries and our continents in conditions of peace, security, and freedom.

President Gorbachev and I are well aware that German-Soviet relations are assuming particular significance for the future of our peoples and also for the future of Europe. We want to express this, and we agreed to conclude an all-embracing fundamental bilateral treaty immediately after German unification which will regulate our relations on a long-term, good-neighborly basis. This treaty should encompass all spheres of our relations—not only political spheres but also questions of mutual security, the economy, culture, science and technology, youth exchanges, and much else. The aim is to put our relations on a stable, predictable footing based on trust and also interaction in our common future.

Our talks have served to clear up important issues under discussion within the framework of the "two-plus-four" talks. We have an accord that was secured and resolutely confirmed during the six foreign ministers' meeting in Berlin in June, namely the accord that the "two-plus-four" talks should be completed promptly in order for their results to be submitted to the meeting of the CSCE heads of state and government in Paris in November. I can state the following today with satisfaction and with President Gorbachev's agreement:

First. German unification embraces the FRG, the GDR, and Berlin.

Second. When unification takes place, the four powers' rights and responsibility will be completely abrogated. Thus a united Germany will obtain full unlimited sovereignty on unification.

Third. Exercising its unlimited sovereignty, a united Germany will be able to decide freely and independently whether it joins any bloc and, if it does, which one. This accords with the CSCE Final Act. Clarifying the FRG Government's viewpoint, I said that a united Germany would like to be a member of the Atlantic alliance and I am sure that this also conforms with the GDR Government's opinion.

Fourth. A united Germany will conclude a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union on troop withdrawal from the GDR, which must be completed in three or four years. At the same time an interim agreement will be concluded with the Soviet Union on the consequences of the introduction of the West German mark in the GDR, to run for the same period of three to four years.

Fifth. NATO structures will not extend to what was the GDR as long as Soviet troops are still stationed in this part of Germany. This will not affect the immediate application of Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty from the very outset. Bundeswehr troops that do not form part of the NATO military organization, that is territorial defense subunits, can be stationed in what is now the GDR and Berlin immediately after German unification. The three Western powers' troops must, in our opinion, remain in Berlin after unification as long as Soviet troops are stationed in what was the GDR. The Federal Government will ask the three Western powers about this and will regulate the question of their troops' presence on the basis of a treaty with the relevant governments.

Sixth. The Federal Government states its willingness to make a statement during the current Vienna talks about its commitment to cut a united Germany's armed forces to 370,000 men in three or four years. These cuts should begin as soon as the first Vienna agreement comes into force.

Seventh. A united Germany will renounce the production, possession, and siting of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and will remain a member of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Ladies and Gentlemen! This joint accord represents a very good starting point for us to reach a timely and successful agreement on the external aspects of German unification within the framework of the "two-plus-four" talks. Immediately on my return I will establish the requisite contacts with the GDR Government, and I am sure that it will share our opinion. At the same time we will inform the three Western powers about today's

results. FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will brief the three Western foreign ministers during his meeting tomorrow in Paris.

We—primarily my colleague Waigel and his colleague Sitaryan—have had detailed talks on further possibilities for economic and financial cooperation within the framework of both bilateral and multilateral relations. I want to say that President Gorbachev also warmly thanked the FRG for its constructive stance in the past. We agreed to continue and further concretize our talks at all levels.

As we conclude these talks allow me, Mr. President, to cordially thank you for your remarkable hospitality. This hospitality made a special contribution to mutual understanding. I would venture to say that personal trust has been further strengthened. But I have every reason to cordially congratulate Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Genscher, who did splendid preliminary work during the preparations for this conference, above all within the framework of the meetings they also had in connection with the "two-plus-four" talks.

Mr. President, I thank you for your hospitality and venture to take this opportunity once again before your country's public to invite you with all my heart to visit Germany. I hope that I will have an opportunity to welcome you to my native region, Palatinate.

In his opening address M.S. Gorbachev said: I will take advantage of the fact that the chancellor has said a very great deal about our joint work and the results of what we both consider to be this very important visit. I want to stress two things before moving on to assess some concrete issues.

First, I think that this kind of work on such a very large package of issues affects the fundamental interests of not only our two peoples but also of all Europeans and the whole world community. We have been able to work fruitfully because we have come a long way over the last few years in developing our relations. Today they are characterized by a high level of political dialogue, a definite degree of trust, and intensive summit exchanges. The chancellor and I make use of various forms—personal meetings, visits, telephone conversations, and exchanges of letters. This is very active dialogue.

Our foreign policy departments, headed by H.-D. Genscher and E.A. Shevardnadze, are working fruitfully and intensively, with representatives of other departments and the governments of both countries participating.

The characteristic atmosphere of our relations has enabled us during a difficult stage of profound changes to act effectively, in a spirit of mutual understanding, in a quest for answers to most burning questions. It must be said that we have come a long way over the last few months, particularly during this meeting which was preceded by intensive work. That is the first thing.

I think that we could hardly have secured the accords that the chancellor mentioned were it not for the present context in which the chancellor paid this working visit to our country I am referring to the fact that there have been dozens of top-level meetings over the last few months centered on all the main problems linked with the fundamental changes in European and world politics and in relations between countries. We are leaving one era in the development of international relations behind and entering another. We think that this will be an era of a lengthy period of peace.

But it is not only the meetings that are important. We expected there to be corresponding changes in such an organization as NATO. Changes are taking place within the Warsaw Pact in this context. As is well known, this military alliance's doctrine was changed previously. But the latest Warsaw Pact meeting was effectively a call for new relations to be developed, military organizations to be transformed into military-political organizations, and direct ties to be established between them.

And now we have sensed an impetus from London, where the latest NATO sitting took very important positive steps, reacting to the challenge of the time and the invitation from the Warsaw Pact countries and other European states. I would not say that we applaud everything that was said in London, that is by no means true. But I would nonetheless describe the beginning of movement as a historic turnaround in NATO development. Thus, we emphasize the importance of the context of our current meeting with the chancellor.

We hope that what was said in London will enable us to draw up and ratify a declaration that will be adopted by both alliances and will have an enormous effect on European and world politics, so I repeat: Without the things I have just mentioned, it would have been hard for us to work effectively with the chancellor today and yesterday and achieve the things he has already mentioned.

We acted in the spirit of the well-known German expression: "Realpolitik." Realistic politics requires that the whole highly complex series of changes taking place at present, in Europe, in world politics be taken into consideration. A process of rapprochement is under way. We felt ourselves to be organic—albeit different—parts of human civilization, and we are conscious of our interdependence in the face of global challenges. We must act together in a well-considered fashion, in the spirit of realism and responsibility for the fate of the European peoples and the entire world community. This was something that was present during our meeting.

I would say that the results of the meeting integrate both the FRG's and the Soviet Union's positions. The West German side has probably not obtained in unadulterated form things it had been counting on. Nor did we get in unadulterated form things that we had been counting on in the past. But we were realists, we evaluated the thrust of the changes, made comparisons, constantly keeping in

tune with the European context, and tried to organically combine all these processes. Although the chancellor's visit has been described as a working visit, I think that I would rank it as one of the most important visits of our time.

I have already pointed out that the chancellor said the main thing. We are proceeding on the premise that we are moving via a final document with international legal standing toward putting an end to the four powers' rights and responsibility derived from the relevant international legal decisions based on the outcome of the war. That is, a united Germany is to obtain complete sovereignty. It is entitled to use this sovereignty and make its own choice. This applies, alike, to social development, which alliances it wants to join, what ties it maintains, and with whom it establishes or renews relations. These are all features of the full sovereignty which the state is to obtain.

We discussed this part of the question in detail. I remember saying at one time that, whether we like it or not, there will come a time when a united Germany joins NATO, if that is its people's choice. But even if that is their choice, to some extent, through certain interrelationships enshrined in legal procedures, it will cooperate with the Soviet Union, and thus with a considerable part of the Warsaw Pact. An associative entity is emerging here. Thus we have an important problem which we discussed thoroughly in a constructive vein—the problem of the deployment, dates, legal status, conditions, and so on of the group of troops which are already being and will be cut back. This has been clarified and mutual concern relieved. None of this must affect the sovereignty of a united Germany, but at the same time the interests of the Soviet Union must be taken into consideration.

At the "two-plus-four" meeting we will voice our arguments that NATO structures must not extend to the territory of what was the GDR.

The question arises: What happens then? We hope that after our troops have been systematically withdrawn over a certain period—we spoke of three or four years with the chancellor, and of course this question will be further studied and considered—nuclear weapons and foreign troops will not appear on the territory which will naturally be totally under the sovereignty of a united Germany, which will be entitled to station its own troops, the Bundeswehr, there. This is a precondition for preserving the trust that has taken shape and the responsibility that is present in our actions vis-a-vis each other and other Europeans.

Mr. Chancellor earlier advocated the need to attain a new relationship between the Soviet Union and a united Germany and he developed this idea at our meeting. It is impossible to speak now for a united Germany, since it is a question of thoughts and judgments for the future. I welcome his remarks and this approach of his. Why? Today the FRG is our biggest partner among the Western countries and the GDR is our biggest partner among the East European countries. Our peoples need to analyze what is now happening at a new level and with a view to the new era to formalize and enshrine the new nature and new impulses of Soviet-German relations in appropriate international legal documents. All this was the subject of broad discussion both yesterday and today. N.I. Ryzhkov, the head of our government, also took part in this section of the talks. They agreed with Mr. Chancellor to exchange thoughts and important documents regarding this.

Thus, as you can see, at this meeting we acted constructively and responsibly, above all with regard to our own peoples, in the interests of our countries and in a spirit of responsibility before the whole world. In my view, we have something to say to our partners in further talks.

Now Mr. Chancellor and I will endeavor to answer your questions. [Gorbachev ends]

Before giving the floor to journalists, A.A. Maslennikov, leader of the president's press service, read out a short telegram received from the FRG. Mrs. Matilda Kumpel writes: "I hope glasnost and perestroyka triumph from Russia to America."

In my view, this very good wish from a West German representative gives grounds for allowing a Soviet journalist to have the first question, A.A. Maslennikov said.

Soviet Radio correspondent: Last year, during your state visit to Bonn, you said that the final line was being drawn under the military past between the peoples. How do you assess what has been done in this context over the past year?

M.S. Gorbachev: I tried to talk about precisely this in my introductory remarks. We would not have attained the results we attained during our present meeting if we had not cooperated intensively and constructively throughout the last year, especially in recent months. It is in precisely this respect, I believe, that there are advances, and considerable ones. You are probably referring also to the fact that there have been great changes on German soil since my visit to Bonn. It seems to me that thanks to all this a safety margin [zapas prochnosti] had formed by the start of the well known events—the turbulent processes on German soil. And it helped us to act responsibly and constructively at this complex time. This is very important. And I think that what has now been done together with Mr. Chancellor confirms that conclusion.

West German journalist: A question for President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl. Yesterday you both visited Stavropol peasants and talked with them. What joint actions in the agrarian sector were discussed and planned by the Soviet Union and Germany? Is it planned above all to support family farms or is it intended also to cooperate with kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]? The FRG Government is providing support in implementing the project for creating a

joint German-Soviet agrarian school near Moscow. What hopes do you pin on this school, Mr. President?

H. Kohl: First of all, I want to note that the problem of agrarian policy was not the central topic of our discussions. We discussed the development of bilateral and multilateral economic links. And, as I have already said, Mr. Waigel has done much work here with his Soviet colleagues so far as the intensification of economic relations is concerned. Within the framework of the general concept, of course, it is possible that we will develop activity also in the sphere you mention. But this was not a special topic, and as for the second part of the question, unfortunately I am unaware of the fact you refer to.

M.S. Gorbachev: It was good for us to meet with peasants and to experience the smell of the earth, which this year is promising a rich harvest. This gave us strength—we must think about this earth, about the people who are growing the harvest, about their future. It was an inspiring meeting. That is the first point.

Second. Mr. Chancellor is right: Questions of economic cooperation, including in the sphere of agrarian and light industry, were discussed by Mr. Waigel and Comrade Sitaryan. Today, when we met as full delegations, S.A. Sitaryan put forward the agrarian problem as an important sphere of cooperation. There is talk of possible collaboration, especially in the sphere of technologies and processing and food industry. If today we could harvest, preserve, and process everything we grow, we would have at least 30 percent more food products. This is a sphere for applying the capital and the experience and technologies that the German economy has at its disposal.

And, finally, you touched on the question of whom we will help if we are going to cooperate. As is well known, it is peasants who work in both kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agricultural firms, and individual farms. The fact that they use different forms of economic management is a different matter. We are in favor of equality for all forms of ownership and economic activity in the agrarian sector: Let them complete and prove which is most effective. When the chancellor and I were looking at the Stavropol fields from the helicopter, I thought: It would scarcely occur to anyone to start to "wreck" and spoil these fields instead of thinking about how to make efficient use there of fertilizers, new technologies, and highly productive machines and preserving and gathering the harvest to the greatest possible extent. That is what we should think about.

It is possible to introduce incentives into kolkhoz members' labor too. Many kolkhozes in Stavropol switched several years ago to economic accountability and cost recovery and to the lease system and are creating small cooperatives inside large ones in order to utilize the whole infrastructure of large kolkhozes and sovkhozes. It would be stupid to destroy everything, to create small farms, and then to create the infrastructures afresh. So we will cooperate on the basis of realities. That is the most correct way.

APN correspondent: Mikhail Sergeyevich, the major results of the talks are certainly a manifestation of great trust on both sides. Obviously, a new situation is arising with regard to questions connected with the future military-political status of a united Germany. Could you comment in a little more detail on your approach to this acute question, and what is required in the future for mutual trust to be indeed completely justified?

M.S. Gorbachev: The present, I would say comprehensive position on this question as it were integrates and harmonizes the interests of a united Germany and the Soviet Union. So far as is possible. I think that if someone seeks contradictions in this position, he can find them. But politics is the art of the possible, and in this case I think we are proceeding from the premise that a united Germany, receiving its full sovereignty on the basis of the termination of the rights of the four states, must ponder everything within the context of a newly elected parliament and government and make its choice as to where it should be. We recognize that all peoples have the right to choose, we cannot deny this to the great German people at a new stage in the existence of their state. But we calculate that the Germans, who have behind them the lessons of the past, grim, tragic lessons, have drawn conclusions in both states and have proved by their entire postwar history that they are open to processes of democracy, that they are contributing to implementing a policy ensuring that the threat of war never again emanates from German soil, and that they are ready to cooperate with other peoples. That is an important precondition. Without that nothing could take place.

Second, there are transitional features. I am referring to the fact that there is a large grouping of troops on Germany's territory. And we must be realistic about this. Hence our firm line: NATO structures do not extend to the territory of the former GDR. What is more, we will conclude a treaty with a united Germany on the conditions for the presence, reduction, and gradual withdrawal of these troops over a specific timespan. We are collaborating in normalizing our relations, aware that we must to some extent share as far as possible the costs in order to untie all the knots. On this score we have met with understanding in both the political and economic contexts from our partners.

We further agreed that after we have implemented on a mutual basis the idea of ending the presence of the Soviet troops and have resolved all the questions connected with their withdrawal, there will be no nuclear weapons or foreign troops on the territory of the former GDR, which, of course, will now be within a sovereign, united Germany, under the power of a single government. That is a very important element. In this respect there must be no advances "on the East."

Finally, the most important point. Let us not forget what kind of a time we are living in. In other times I do not think we would have reached the accords, everything that has happened today and is leading to the unification of Germany. For we are simultaneously developing the European process and attaining the Vienna accords. The FRG leadership advocated that the future Bundeswehr be reduced in overall size by almost half—42-45 percent of the present overall strength of the armies of the two German states. This also characterizes the responsible position of the FRG leadership, and I hope that this will be transformed into the policy of those who will act in a united Germany. This is also a very important element. And finally, the nature of NATO is changing. There will be a joint declaration by the two alliances. They are opening up to each other and establishing contacts, appropriate institutions are being set up, and collaboration is also beginning with regard to verification. That is, we now have a completely different situation.

I would say that this is a transitional situation on the way to future European security structures. I think that only thus is it possible to understand the sheer complexity and dialectical nature of the process. In these conditions we and our partners from the FRG are acting in a responsible and considered fashion, respect each other's interests and taking into account each other's concerns.

The German people are showing enormous interest in what we are discussing and deciding together. There is also enormous interest on the part of the Soviet people. People are following the course of events, and therefore it is particularly important to be up to the demands of the time. It must be added that we want to bring about a turn in our relations with a united Germany that meets the interests both of our two peoples, and of all the European peoples. This also indicates that here we have not only been thinking about today, but also about tomorrow. That is the context in which to see the position we have adopted, which integrates the entire range of questions discussed here.

West German correspondent: You have spoken about the economic and financial prospects for future German-Soviet cooperation. Could you, Mr. Chancellor, mention some of the main avenues in this connection? Could you, Mr. President, say whether you would consider it desirable for aid on a multilateral basis to be stepped up?

H. Kohl: As you know, this topic has been discussed very intensively in recent weeks at a whole series of international conferences, including the European Community summit in Dublin and the international economic meeting in Houston a few days ago. President Gorbachev sent President Bush, who chaired the Houston meeting, a letter, to which a reply has already been dispatched.

In the near future talks will take place between the Soviet Union and various international organizations, as well as numerous bilateral talks. In this connection I would like to point out that the first EC summit meeting under the chairmanship of an Italian representative is to take place in Rome in early November, and we agreed in Dublin that at that time we will hear reports on this question.

The decisive factor—and this was much discussed during our meeting here—is that the Soviet leadership, and first and foremost the president himself, will develop initiatives in the direction of creating a market economy. In this context, various discussions are possible in the next few weeks. We also discussed our proposal to grant any expert assistance. And when a finished project for the reforms is before us, we will make efforts on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis to create a common strategy, using to this end the potential of NATO, the "Seven," and all others who show an interest in this. Our aim, or rather my aim, is to give the necessary assistance to Mikhail Gorbachev and his country in this transitional period.

M.S. Gorbachev: I would like to add this to what Mr. Chancellor said: We have discussed these questions. It may appear that we are talking about details, that someone has to be thrown a lifebelt, and so forth. No, it is a question of far-reaching, large-scale changes, it is basically a matter of highest-level strategy. What is happening in the Soviet Union, the fact that as a result of perestroyka and the revolutionary transformations it is turning toward man's interests on the basis of the principles of democracy and freedom and is seeking new forms in economic, political, and spiritual life—all this is not only of domestic significance. At the same time the Soviet Union is turning in the direction of world civilization as a whole. And that is not merely an idea, much has already changed in this respect. That is why we are meeting in an entirely different atmosphere, are conducting in-depth, promising talks, and have embarked on the resolution of many topical questions.

What we are doing in the Soviet Union is very necessary in order that in this country, with its enormous potential, this country inhabited by a people many millions strong with a culture going back centuries, even millenia, an outlet may be found to democratic, broad, forward-looking, and progressive development. That is what perestroyka is for. But by virtue of the country's worldwide role, its enormous scale, by virtue of the responsibility it bears for universal security, it would be highly desirable for us and for the rest of the world for our mighty economy to be incorporated organically in world economic relations. This is advantageous, expedient, and necessary to other countries. At a profound turning point in our transformations, in the course of structural changes, naturally tension and difficulties arise. We are now on the point of very profound changes. And it is necessary to make use of the potential of the international division of labor and the utilization of various financial resources to master the present moment, to overcome it, to pass through the most difficult stage. But we do not expect sops, we do not need charity. We are talking about mutually beneficial accords and talks. We need, in particular, somehow to prolong the repayment

of our debts on the most appropriate terms. That is another reason why what we have discussed here is necessary and important.

We are raising these questions frankly, openly, as questions of big politics that affect everyone. And the chancellor and I were frank about this: This cooperation meets the interests not only of our two countries, but the interests of the whole of Europe and the entire world economy.

Stavropol Kray Television: Mikhail Sergeyevich, we are very pleased to see you on your home ground, where people know you well and trust you. I would like to ask you how you felt when you arrived on your home ground.

M.S. Gorbachev: I think I am in the position of that famous ancient hero who draws new strength from contact with his native land. I thank my fellow countrymen for their warm feelings, they have supported me greatly during these days. Thank you. And I greet all of them and embrace them wholeheartedly.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Munich: I have two questions—one for the federal chancellor, the other for Mr. President.

Mr. Federal Chancellor, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership has granted the Germans full sovereignty. We are talking about a new era, new security structures in Europe, and I can picture tomorrow's headlines in certain Western newspapers, such as: "Europe's Biggest Economic Power for Closer Cooperation With the Superpower USSR." How would you dispel the misgivings associated with the concept of "Rapallo"?

And a question for the president. Mr. Gorbachev, in what context did you discuss the problem of the Soviet Germans, and how do you intend to remedy the injustice that was perpetrated with regard to that national group without granting it an autonomous territory?

H. Kohl: As for the first part of your question, I cannot, of course, prevent anyone from writing stupid commentaries. But those with any idea of history know that a comparison with Rapallo is entirely inappropriate. At that time there was an entirely different historical situation, and the easiest way to grasp that is to compare the Soviet Union of the early twenties with the Soviet Union of 1990. This comparison is simply wrong, in any sense.

But there is a more important aspect of the question. A united Germany—and that is the Germany we are talking about—as part of NATO and part of the EC, and this is my profound conviction, even under a pan-German government, will continue the course which, by common agreement, leads to the creation of a great all-European market by 31 December 1992, a European Community with a population of 336 million people. At the EC summit meeting in Rome at the end of this year, it is planned to hold two government conferences—one on questions of the economic and monetary union of the EC, and the other, in general terms, on the creation of European state unity.

This means that a united Germany will follow a path that does not run alongside the Western community, but will be an integral part of that Western community. That is one aspect. Furthermore, I do not think that what President Gorbachev and I discussed last year in Bonn, and particularly here, and what we have in mind when we speak of this treaty that will indicate the path to the future, can contain anything directed against third countries. On the contrary, all Europeans passionately want the Germans and the Soviet Union to have good relations, peaceful relations. If relations between the Germans and the Soviet Union are good, if they are developing intensively, if they develop better chapters in the history of our relations, and we have had many such chapters, then we will all benefit from it.

Germany's geopolitical status is conditioned by our position in the center of Europe. During wars the routes of military movements from East to West and from West to East have passed through our territory. But, at the same time, we are, if you like, a "bridge for ideas and beliefs." German culture is inconceivable without such fertilization. Take mathematics, philosophy, painting—I could give many examples. And what motivated us, the president and I, and both delegations at the talks was a desire to continue these chapters. As I said in my initial statement, in our one-on-one conversations we talked for a long time about the great responsibility we have for the current generation of children.

We were 14 or 15 when the war ended. And we feel we have a responsibility for using this grim experience, using it to a good end, and starting a rational, new chapter in our history. The end of the century is 10 years off, so why don't we, at the end of the century, learn lessons from the several mistakes? This, in fact, is the formula that is needed. It threatens no one; it benefits everyone. Above all, of course, Germans and Soviet people.

M.S. Gorbachev: You have raised a very important question. While welcoming Mr. Kohl's detailed reply, for my part I want to say the following. When we laid wreaths at the Eternal Flame in Stavropol, H. Kohl and I had a brief but very memorable meeting with some war veterans. They were resolute people and they included some heroes of the Soviet Union. We heard from them that the overall lesson is that we must do all we can to get our peoples to cooperate, to make our relations friendly, to be partners, and to ensure that nothing like it ever happens again. These are the instructions of people who went through all the ordeals of that terrible war, which Hitlerism plunged us into and which shook our peoples to the core. In recent years, particularly in recent months, the chancellor has constantly addressed the theme of cooperation and development of relations between our peoples and has advocated a new scale of cooperation not only in the economic and trade sphere

but in the sphere of human contacts, youth exchanges, and ties between scholars and writers. I can see in this the responsibility expressed by the chancellor for the future of relations between our peoples. We, Soviet people, appreciate this and I, as leader of the state, welcome it.

I must stress once again that the visit and the talks that have been held have been suffused with an appreciation of the necessity that a new and better future should open up before our peoples. We have assimilated the lessons of the past. It is very important that the development of our current relations with Germany is taking place in conjunction with the European process. You can also see that the "two-plus-four" formula, involving six states, is operating. And the leaders of all the states of our continent, plus the United States and Canada, are participating in the European process. So it cannot be said that we are planning any Bonn-Kremlin secrets, wherein lurk potential dangers for Europeans and for other peoples. We are currently cooperating with them all and we want to build a new future together—the new Europe, the new relations which will benefit everyone and ensure lasting security in Europe. This is the central point of world politics and the pivot of world security.

As for the question of the future of the Soviet Germans, we touched on it in our one-on-one conversation. I welcome the calm, realistic approach to the question. There is a problem. Our supreme organs and the USSR Supreme Soviet are looking at it. We want it to be resolved taking into account the interests of all Soviet people. Incidentally, I must say the Volga Germans and Soviet Germans, wherever they live and wherever they work in the country, are treated with respect. But there are problems created by the specific times we live in and there is no getting away from them. We want to approach their solution on the basis of initiatives by Soviet people themselves. And such initiatives are already appearing. We are sympathetic to such initiatives and will put our heads together to consider how we can come to a calm, proper decision that suits everyone. I trust we appreciate that we all have a stake in a fair solution.

FRG television: Mr. Federal Chancellor and Mr. President, do you still have differences of opinion on the question of the status of a united Germany within the NATO framework? You have just said that following the withdrawal of Soviet forces the NATO structures will be extended to the rest of Germany, whereas President Gorbachev has resolutely stated that there must be no foreign forces or nuclear weapons on this territory. Could you explain this and how do you see the nuclear armament of Germany as a whole in the future?

H. Kohl: As for the first part of your question, there is no contradiction. We agreed that while there are Soviet forces on the territory of the current GDR a united Germany will not station the NATO formations of an all-German Budeswehr there and only territorial subunits will be sited there. We also agreed that any all-German Budeswehr formations would be able to be stationed there later, following the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces. It would a sovereign decision for the Germans. I do, however, base what I say on the fact that an all-German Budeswehr will not station nuclear weapons on GDR territory. Moreover, we agreed that non-German units will not be stationed on this territory following the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

West German correspondent: Mr. President, if I understood the federal chancellor correctly, the Soviet troops and allied troops remaining in Berlin for the transitional period do not possess rights which would affect or infringe Germany's sovereignty. How would you describe the status of the Soviet troops? What are they, guests?

H. Kohl: Mr. President, I think that I have to answer this question first. Possibly I was not clear enough in explaining that under full sovereignty we proceed from the premise that treaties on the presence of troops in Berlin are concluded by a united Germany. This applies to Soviet, American, French, and British units alike. We also agreed that the numerical strength of these units will in no case exceed the present level and may possibly even be less. That is, we are talking about a normal process from the viewpoint of international law: These treaties are concluded by a sovereign Germany.

M.S. Gorbachev: In case confusions arise I would like to add something. The full sovereignty of united Germany comes about with the termination of the four powers' rights and responsibility. But in this connection it is evident that the very first, all-embracing treaty will incorporate a reference to the fact that a separate treaty will be concluded between the governments of the Soviet Union and a united Germany on the presence and legal status of the grouping of Soviet troops in a united Germany. And, finally, there are questions linked with the transition to new payments systems in connection with the changes in the currency sphere. Therefore another treaty, relating to precisely this sphere, will also be concluded. Thus everything will be settled on the basis of two treaties between a united Germany and the government of the Soviet Union. I believe that we cannot allow a situation in which the grouping of Soviet troops in Germany would remain in a state of limbo. This is a very important question, and it's good that you raised it.

All-Union Radio, the "Mayak" program: As you said, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and as Mr. Kohl said, relations between the USSR and the FRG are characterized by the deepening of human ties. How do you assess the human factor in international relations?

M.S. Gorbachev: There are very many substantive factors and important components in politics. It seems to be that for politics to be successful it needs to cooperate with science. And politics—it may seem paradoxical, but I see this as an imperative of the times—must be increasingly based on normal moral foundations. I can

see a new element—the democratization of foreign policy: It is no longer a matter for politicians alone but also for the public at large.

Finally, in conditions when we are confronted by the resolution of the pivotal tasks of essentially making the transition to a new phase in international relations the significance of cooperation and personal relations between politicians, of personal mutual trust, is increasing particularly. This is a very important factor. From this viewpoint I have to note that our relations with Chancellor Kohl are progressing, and this is one of the important elements conducive to our solving major problems. The same can be said about relations between our ministers, Mr. Genscher and Shevardnadze, and, for their part, about relations between myself and Mr. Genscher and relations between Shevardnadze and Mr. Kohl and other FRG representatives. I attach great significance to the personal factor; it is here that the necessary degree of trust develops, and trust is the best environment in which to achieve breakthroughs in international relations.

H. Kohl: I would like to add my voice to what has been said. Personal relations alone cannot eliminate problems. But things are totally transformed when you understand your partner's language, when trust exists, when it is possible to proceed from the simple practice of not suspecting the other person of things that you yourself should not be suspected of. If this is taken as a working principle and there is also a sense of humor and similar [skhozhiy] interests, I find this very positive. I find it extremely gratifying, and would like to stress this here, that in recent years we have achieved the kind of personal relationship that—even given the inevitable differences of opinion—not only makes life easier but also makes it easier to find solutions.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: Mr. Federal Chancellor, what significance do you attach to the planned bilateral treaty, and what treaties might flow from it in the future?

H. Kohl: This must be an all-embracing treaty, and we intend to start intensive work on it shortly. I have already mentioned the main areas of this treaty. The president and I realize that our objective must be to conclude such a treaty within a year at most.

M.S. Gorbachev: Well, we seem to be approaching the end of our meeting. I thank the chancellor for this news conference. It has completed our joint work of recent days. I wish to respond as an ordinary person to the chancellor's invitation to visit Germany and the places that are dear to him. I think this will happen. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, comrades.

New Germany's Full Sovereignty Agreed Upon

LD1807161790 Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—An agreement between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl on the complete and unrestricted sovereignty of a united Germany and the possibility for it to decide its future military-political alliance naturally evokes an unequivocal reaction [as received] in the Soviet Union and other countries. Will stability on the continent be ensured after the merger of the FRG and the GDR? What are the guarantees of security for the USSR and other states? These problems concern many people.

As a military expert, I believe that to answer these questions one should consider circumstances preceding the West German chancellor's visit to the USSR and the joint decisions taken during the visit. In the first place, one should cite NATO decisions in London, which point in the right direction and pave the way for Europe's future security. The North Atlantic Alliance, in response to the challenges of time and relevant steps by the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty, has begun to move towards greater politisation and reconsider its strategy and military structures. Goodwill and cooperation now characterises the relationship with Warsaw Treaty States. The joint statement by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty renouncing the use of force will give further boost to them. One can assume therefore that the future combination—a new Germany in a new NATO—will not pose a danger to the Soviet Union.

As for the two Germanys, there is obvious evidence that both states advocate peace, and the process of German unification is proceeding democratically. Moreover, whatever the future military-legal status of the territory of what is now the GDR, the Soviet defensive potential is enough to make any potential aggressor pause.

At talks in the Soviet Union important agreements were reached in terms of European stability and security, which are directly related to the military-political aspects of German unification. The controversial issue of the strength of a united Germany's Armed Forces was also resolved. The West German Government expressed readiness at the Vienna talks to commit itself to cutting down the size of the West and East German Army, totaling 600,000 people, to 370,000. It is believed that this will not only speed up the attainment of agreements at the talks on conventional forces in Europe but also extend the range of issues under discussion.

Other extremely important issues were also clarified. The future united Germany will renounce the production and possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and observe the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. During the transition period, while the Soviet troops are located on the territory of what is now the GDR, NATO structures will not extend to its territory and neither foreign troops nor nuclear weapons will be deployed there in future.

Finally, issues of reciprocal security will be clearly defined in a major comprehensive bilateral treaty to be concluded by the USSR and the united Germany. Thus

relations between the two states will be built on the basis of stability, predictability and trust.

Sitaryan on Economic Ties With FRG Minister

PM1807131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] On 15 July S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received FRG Finance Minister T. Waigel, who is in Moscow within the framework of the Soviet-West German summit meeting.

The conversation discussed questions of raising the level and quality of economic, financial, and scientific and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and the FRG in the new conditions emerging as a result of the building of German unity.

T. Waigel stressed the West German side's interest in preserving and improving the experience accumulated in cooperation with the USSR and readiness to assist the economic transformations in the Soviet Union.

At the guest's request S.A. Sitaryan briefed him on progress in forming the new economic model in the Soviet Union.

It was emphasized that the Soviet Union duly assesses the intentions of the government of the FRG and other Western countries to develop collaboration with the Soviet Union on a new basis and to promote the broad involvement of the USSR in world economic ties and the activity of international financial institutions.

European Community President Opens Moscow Visit

TASS Previews Visit

LD1807101890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0825 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Georgiy Mikhaylin]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the official visit, beginning today, of Jacques Delors, president of the Commission of the European Communities (EC) and hopes that his arrival will impart a fresh quality to cooperation between the Soviet Union and the EC, Ernest Obminskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, declares. The head of the supreme executive body of the EC will be visiting the USSR for the first time, and moreover in the capacity of plenipotentiary representative of the 12 West European states which have expressed readiness to give the Soviet Union assistance in implementing its profound economic reforms, Obminskiy stressed in a conversation with the TASS correspondent.

The Soviet Union is grateful for the intention of the "twelve" to grant it broad financial aid in overcoming its economic difficulties. It is planned to discuss this question in the course of Jacques Delors' visit. "If there is agreement on it," the deputy minister thinks, "favorable conditions will be created for expanding and deepening cooperation between the USSR and the EC, and consequently for the country's speedier and complete integration into the system of the world economy."

Justification for this conclusion can be seen in the first positive results of the sides' economic collaboration since they signed a wide-ranging agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation in December of last year. In accordance with that document the USSR-EC mixed commission was formed. Its first session was held in May this year. At it the delegations of the Soviet Union and the EC advocated the creation of favorable conditions for mutual trade for the purpose of expanding it. The sides drew up specific measures for ecological and scientific-technical cooperation, discussed the possibilities of collaboration in the agrarian sector of the economy, power engineering and the mining industries, and also agreed to encourage contacts in the field of the protection of intellectual, industrial, and commercial property. The Soviet side feels satisfaction at the understanding shown by the communities that with the unification of Germany and consequently the GDR joining the EC no damage should be inflicted on the USSR's links with that country formed earlier, ernest Obminskiy continued.

Now the "twelve" are examining the Netherlands' proposal on setting up a European community for power engineering with the participation of the USSR and East European countries. This quesiton may also be a subject of discussion with the leader of the EC Commission.

"Against this favorable background," Ernest Obminskiy noted, concluding the conversation, "it will be extremely useful to establish direct contacts between the Soviet leadership and Jacques Delors, president of the commission, for the purpose of a wide-ranging exchange of opinion on problems of development of bilateral relations in the current rapidly-changing situation, and also for the purpose of joint searches for possible variants of the 'architecture' of the Europe of the future."

Delors Arrives 18 Jul

LD1807121790 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—Jacques Delors, chairman of the Commission of European Communities, arrived for an official visit here today.

At the airport he was welcomed by Deputy Soviet Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Secretary Vyacheslav Sychev and Italian Ambassador to the Soviet Union Ferdinando Salleo—Italy currently chairs the Common Market's ruling bodies.

Commenting to TASS on his forthcoming meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, Delors said that he plans to discuss

relations between the Soviet Union and the European Communities, building "Greater Europe" and preparations for the CSCE summit in Paris.

Meets Deputy Prime Minister

LD1807210190 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—European Community Commission President Jacques Delors who arrived in Moscow today, began the working part of his official visit to the USSR with a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin.

During the meeting, Delors informed Abalkin of decisions made by the European Council of the EC heads of state and government concerning their support for the USSR in implementing deep-going economic reforms, as well as of instructions by the council to the commission he heads.

Describing the progress of and prospects for economic changes in the USSR, Abalkin stressed that their aim is to create conditions for the smooth transition of the Soviet economy to economic integration with Europe.

During the meeting, the sides achieved an understanding in principle to develop in the near future mechanisms which will efficiently help changes in the Soviet Union.

The programme of Delors' visit to the USSR provides for his talks and meetings with Preisdent Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council on International Relations.

Delors told TASS at the airport that he intends to discuss in Moscow not only European problems but also trade relations and economic cooperation between the USSR and the economic community in compliance with the mandate worked out by the Council of Europe.

Meets With Gorbachev 19 Jul

LD1907092790 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev received European Communities Commission Chairman Jacques Delors, on an official visit to the Soviet Union, in his study in the Kremlin today.

Gorbachev praised Delors visit as unprecedented, saying that it reflected positive changes in Europe and the world.

Earlier today Delors had talks with Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The two discussed Soviet economic reforms and their prospects. Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan, who attended the talks, said.

Delors expressed understanding about changes going on in the Soviet Union.

The sides also discussed ways of incorporating the Soviet Union into global economic ties and expanding its relations with the European Community. They also discussed aid to the Soviet Union. Ryzhkov said that only a mutually beneficial cooperation is being discussed.

Interviewed on Europe's Future

PM1907094990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Jacques Delors, president of the EC Commission, by own correspondent V. Peresada in Brussels on 17 July under the rubric "Interview Before Visit to the USSR": "'Europeans Must Cooperate'"]

[Text] [Peresada] Mr. President, you are known as the architect of the new stage in West European integration and your name is associated with the process of forming a single market and currency-economic union between the 12 EC member-states. What is this idea based on?

[Delors] We must think back to the postwar period, when six countries—France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—decided that there should never be another war in Europe or, at least, not between them. To this end they agreed to unite their efforts, combining the desire for solidarity with the preservation of their national characteristics. Thus the Treaty of Rome, which was subsequently joined by other signatories, came into being.

The integration process in Western Europe has known both ups and downs. When I was appointed president of the EC Commission at the beginning of 1985, in order to revive this project, which had remained hard to attain, I thought: There is, after all, a very important argument in its favor. That is the need for our countries' economies to gain new dynamism in the face of the rapid changes taking place in the world, which is becoming increasingly competitive and, to a certain extent, increasingly dangerous.

The formation of a large single market would make it possible for us to enter the future boldly.

[Peresada] What has been done so far on the way to achieving that kind of market? And what, in your view, is the most difficult aspect and creates particular problems?

[Delors] The main work has already been done: The economy of the Twelve has undergone profound changes. Let us compare the period 1982-1984, which preceded the plan of active integration, with the last three years: 1988-1990. At that time, annual economic growth in the EC amounted to 1.6 percent, but now it is 3.6 percent. Whereas in those years 1.6 million jobs were cut, we have now created almost six million new ones.

Investment growth then was tantamount to zero, but it now stands at seven percent per annum. Surely this is an economic miracle?

Overcoming the obstacles connected with those who reject change is not the most difficult task now. What is most difficult is to reconcile national characteristics with the political objective which is seen to follow the creation of a single market.

[Peresada] Nevertheless, the ultimate plan is to form a political union of the Twelve. How will it take shape in practice?

[Delors] First, the foundations of the "12-nation home" have already been laid. The economic foundation is already in place, the social foundation is being created, we are going to have a common currency policy, and, in the future, there is going to be a common currency. These are all signs of a united ensemble. Second, the 12 governments regularly work out foreign policy decisions together with the EC Commission. The link between what I would call the economic community and the foreign policy community is becoming increasingly close. The progressive unification of these two aspects will lead to political union.

[Peresada] What is the place of Eastern Europe in current EC strategy?

[Delors] The building of the political, economic, and social community of the Twelve certainly does not mean that we are laying claim to some monopoly on the European continent. We are also concerned with the architecture of a "greater Europe." To this end we are endeavoring to strengthen ties with all other European states.

The democratic changes in Eastern Europe have brought us closer together and allowed us to show our solidarity, which we will continue to demonstrate in the future. The EC Commission is now coordinating efforts to give aid to Poland and Hungary, which will also be extended to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—and Romania too, in the future, we hope. We have concluded agreements on trade and cooperation with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union.

[Peresada] One of the central problems of European politics is German unification. Could you set out the EC Commission's stand on this matter?

[Delors] I have always believed that it is our moral and political duty to promote German unification. The external terms of unification must be defined, of course. That was the point of the talks recently held between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl. But, in principle, our approach has always been clear: We are in favor of unification in the European context.

[Peresada] Both East and West of the continent are now demonstrating a desire for mutual understanding, trust, and rapprochement. To all appearances, the long period of confrontation, known as the "cold war," is now coming to an end. In this connection, how do you see Europe in the immediate future?

[Delors] I think that it would be possible to create the possibilities for strengthening exchange consistently and in a reasonable, concrete form primarily within the CSCE framework.

As is well known, the Helsinki Agreement has three cardinal aspects: disarmament, which is now in train and must be continued; human rights, to which everyone is now paying great attention; and economic cooperation, which has good prospects. We must work consistently on this basis. I hope that the forthcoming Paris summit meeting of CSCE participants will be able to take the necessary step forward.

[Peresada] The agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation between the EC and the Soviet Union, which you just mentioned, recently came into force. How do you rate its importance and the prospects for its implementation?

[Delors] I have acquainted myself in detail with the first conclusions recently drawn by experts on both sides. I am amazed at how many possibilities we have. Not only for the development of trade exchange but also for cooperation between the EC and the Soviet Union. The only thing we have to avoid—as the USSR has accords on cooperation with many individual countries—is duplication, and we must also concentrate on the main issues. I think that the agreement is a good basis for helping the Soviet Union to incorporate its economy into the world economy. If the agreement needs to be expanded in the future, then we shall do that.

[Peresada] You are going to visit our country. It will be the first visit by an EC Commission president to the Soviet Union. What is the purpose of the visit, and what do you expect to come out of it?

[Delors] You cannot have a good knowledge of the political and economic situation in any country without meeting its leaders. Personal acquaintance and dialogue allow you to gain a better understanding of what is happening. I need to do this in order to fulfill my tasks. In this particular instance they consist in beginning implementation of our agreement and preparing a report for the Council of Europe—the community's highest authority—on the possibilities for our helping perestroyka. So I will be going with Commission Vice President Andriessen, who is directly responsible for foreign relations. In the course of the visit we hope to learn a great deal and, in our turn, explain what the EC represents today, what it would like to become, and how it intends to determine its place in the "greater Europe" of the future.

Lukyanov Receives European Parliament Chairman

LD1807124390 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—Soviet parliament chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov received in the Kremlin today visiting European Parliament Secretary-General Enrico Vinci.

In welcoming the guest, Lukyanov noted with satisfaction that the USSR Supreme Soviet and European Parliament made a meaningful contribution to fostering relations between the USSR and the European Community. The European Parliament's desire to help increase cooperation and promote mutual understanding between Eastern and Western Europe inspire the respect of the Soviet people.

Lukyanov emphasised the particular importance of consolidating the positive tendencies in relations among European peoples, helping deepen the Helsinki process, and preparing a new CSCE summit. "Much has still to be accomplished and members of the European Parliament will find in people's deputies of the USSR interested and reliable partners," Lukyanov said.

Vinci thanked the Soviet parliament Secretariat for the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and familiarise himself with the Perestroyka reforms and the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Shevardnadze Visits With France's Mitterrand

LD1807141190 Moscow TASS in English 1356 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Paris July 18 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was received here today by French President Francois Mitterrand.

They agreed that the Soviet Union and France have made a great political and intellectual contribution to the improvement of the inernational climate and have long-standing multilatral ties. They can and should cooperate and play a dynamic role in building a new Europe.

Current European realities and trends permit setting longterm goals for Soviet-French relations. The understanding and support Soviet perestroyka has found in France is very important in this respect.

They discussed the European diplomatic agenda for the coming months. They noted that the meeting of heads of state and government of CSCE countries, scheduled for the end of 1990, will be a very important event.

Shevardnadze conveyed greetings from President Mikhail Gorbachev to Mitterrand. The two statesmen highly assessed recent talks between the Soviet and French presidents in Moscow and contacts between them.

Returns to Moscow 18 Jul

LD1807165390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, left Paris for Moscow today. At the airport he was seen off by senior officials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sweden Places Conditions on Hijacking Trial

LD1807162190 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—There is every reason to believe that the Soviet court trying a 17-year-old, who has hijacked an airliner to Stockholm, will take into account conditions set by Sweden as it agreed to extradite him to the USSR, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS today.

He was commenting on Tuesday's return to Moscow of Dmitriy Semenov, who commandeered an Aeroflot plane to fly to Sweden on June 9.

The Swedish side agreed to extradite Semenov on condition that he would be tried only for the hijacking and nothing else. A Soviet Civil Aviation Ministry Official, Anatoliy Bondarev, told reporters yesterday that Semenov would be tried also for "illegal border crossing".

Asked about the discrepancy today by TASS, Bondarev said that original criminal proceedings instituted against Semenov in his native Belorussia were based on two clauses in its criminal code, providing for punishment for "a hijacking and illegal border crossing".

Bondarev said that in his interview with reporters on Tuesday he had been guided by this initial information because he had "not been briefed in detail about the understanding reached on the issue between the Swedish and Soviet sides".

Swedish Hijacking Policy Cited

PM1907101790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Zubko: "Criminal Will Answer to Our Court"]

[Text] Stockholm—It seems that the 14 days envisaged for the handover of skyjacker Dmitriy Semenov to the Soviet side were not needed. He was handed over to representatives of the Soviet authorities 17 July, i.e. five days after the Swedish Government's decision.

And so the Swedish odyssey of 17-year-old Dmitriy Semenov has evidently ended. He must now answer to a Soviet court for the crime he committed—hijacking an airliner with 120 passengers and crew members on board and putting their lives in serious danger. Sweden's

Internal Affairs Ministry made a statement in this connection in which it pointed out that, in handing Semenov over, it proceeds from the premise that he will be tried in the USSR only for hijacking the aircraft and for nothing else.

But the whole affair of aircraft hijacks to Sweden is not yet over. First, because two other Soviet citizens who hijacked aircraft are awaiting a decision on their fate. Incidentally, local newspapers have reported that 14 Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputies have asked the Swedish authorities... not to extradite A. Mikhaylenko, hijacker no. 2. Second, the very fact of Semenov's extradition has elicited an ambivalent response here in Sweden. True, the street demonstrations were small in terms of the number of participants, and these consisted mainly of former Soviet citizens. But Carl Bildt, chairman of the opposition Moderate Coalition Party, entered into polemics with the government and put these grievances to the cabinet of ministers: Why was the extradition question not discussed in the Swedish Parliament's Foreign Policy Committee? Acting Prime Minister L. Hjelm-Wallen declared in response to this:

"The government usually consults with the committee on questions of great significance. But this does not apply to this case. It in no way changes the government's foreign policy course...."

Opponents of Semenov's extradition cited his extreme you as a reason why he should not be punished severely. Well, youth is an important circumstance, and I believe that the Soviet court will take it into consideration. The hijacker's youth was also discussed at a session of the Swedish Government. Here is what L. Hjelm-Wallen said about this:

"We had to take both sides of the question into account. At the session we took note of the fact that Semenov is a young boy, but at the same time we cannot overlook what he did. And he committed a very serious crime, jeopardizing 120 human lives. For a crime such as skyjacking the skyjacker is liable to be extradited...."

I believe that two circumstances influenced the government's decision. One is the changes occurring in the Soviet Union. The other is the fact that the whole series of hijacks that has been undertaken has, as it were, distilled for the country's population the essence of the problem of air terrorism and elevated to the third or even fourth degree the danger to which not only hundreds of passengers but also people on the ground, i.e. Swedes themselves, are subjected. Here is what the Stockholm newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET (right-wing, but serious and very well informed) writes in this connection: "The government must do everything possible to promote a successful struggle against skyjackers. This is an international task. Skyjackings are a form of international crime and terrorism, which have claimed many human lives. This is a direct threat to Sweden too. When a hijacker forces an aircraft to overfly Swedish territory and proceed to a Swedish airport, not only the passengers but also residents on the ground are put in danger.... There is only one means that will render skyjackings unnecessary and pointless. This is to extradite the criminals."

Restrictions on Armenians in Turkey Noted

NC1707221190 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Lately, following the death of the patriarch of the Armenians in Turkey, Archbishop Shnork Galustyan, the Turkish Government took yet another step to limit the already restricted rights of the remaining Armenians there by depriving the community of the election of its patriarch. According to the decree issued by the Turkish Government and handed to the Armenian patriarch on 20 April this year by the Istanbul governor, the procedure for the people to elect the patriarch is invalidated. The right of election is given to the district councils, and the candidate must be approved by the government and should enjoy the trust of the Turkish republic. The aim of this is to make the Armenian community completely disintegrate. According to Turkish figures, it now numbers 50,000.

Even without that, our community, which has dwindled over the years, has never been able to enjoy almost any of the rights given to non-Turkish minorities by Turkey under the Lausanne treaty and other international agreements. On the contrary, existing rights have been gradually reduced. In the meantime, the loud preaching by the Turkish press and government about the well-being and rights enjoyed by the Armenians has never ceased. However, the destruction of Armenian historic monuments, churches, and schools reveals the real Turkish policy. The authorities used to close churches on the pretext that they were a threat to safety while all along refusing to issue permission for repairs.

Under the international treaties cited earlier, Turkey guaranteed rights to national minorities. However, the Armenian community is effectively prohibited from teaching Armenian in its own schools. Only a limited number of hours each week are slated for the teaching of Armenian. Compared to the 32 Armenian schools in 1960, now there are only 20 schools in Turkey, and these are under the effective control of their Turkish vice-principals.

In accordance with Islamic law, the Armenian religious, charity and educational establishments, known as vakifs, have been deprived of their most elementary rights since 1967. They are forbidden to purchase or receive new lands in the form of donations or bequests. In effect, the Turkish Government refuses to grant title deeds to the public organizations of the Armenian community. Actually, a far more ridiculous situation exists in this area: In 1936 the state's vakif administration allowed the Armenians to donate lands to their own vakifs. The state had recognized the legality of the donated lands and had issued title deeds. However, a new law in 1970 stipulated that national minorities, in this case Armenians, had had

no right to obtain real property since 1936. The Turks demanded that lands acquired since 1936 should be returned to the former owners or heirs. Since these people were no longer living,these properties passed either into the possession of the general directorate of the Turkish vakifs or to the state. The Turkish Government is unwilling to rescind this law. A year ago the Turkish parliament refused to debate a draft law allowing national minorities to own lands, receive donations, and acquire new lands. [passage omitted]

Our Armenian community in Turkey faces many problems touching all aspects of their lives. The powers of the patriarch are also restricted. The Turkish Government refuses to recognize the Armenian patriarchate as a social, moral and religious establishment, and the patriarch as the representative of the Turkish-Armenians before the government. In order not to infringe upon the Lausanne treaty, the Turkish Government has neither confirmed nor denied the status of the patriarch and is aiming to render the Armenian community's constitution unworkable. They recognize the patriarch as merely the religious leader of the Armenians. They prevent him from performing services in historical Armenian churches and from training new churchmen. St. Khach Seminary, which used to train priests for the patriarchate, was closed down by a government decree, and today it is an ordinary school. The authorities prohibit the church from new construction on its own lands.

Difficulties abound in the educational field as well. Armenian parents are prevented from sending their children to the school of their own choice. The schools must also prove the child is of Armenian origin. Yet, on identity cards ethnic identity is not mentioned, and Armenians are described as Christians. Strict control is imposed on the 20 schools. A Turkish vice-principal is appointed in each school, and he is the real principal of the school. Without his permission the Armenian principal can do nothing. In many schools the Turkish Education Ministry refuses to confirm or postpones the confirmation of the new Armenian principals appointed by the community. Active candidates in particular are rejected. Artificial difficulties are also raised in appointing Armenian language teachers. [passage omitted]

This is in brief the situation of the Armenians in Turkey, a country which everywhere speaks about freedom and democracy and which both sees itself in the rank of civilized countries and has the pretense to enter the European Parliament.

Envoy Andropov Meets With Portuguese Officials

LD1907062190 Moscow TASS in English 0609 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Reshetilov]

[Text] Lisbon July 19 TASS—There should be no delay in creating mechanisms for cooperation in the Mediterranean area to strengthen stability and security in the region, said Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro.

He met Soviet Ambassador at Large Igor Andropov, here on a two-day working visit.

The Portuguese minister described the Mediterranean as a region in which there is a serious threat to peace. "This is why it is essential to take urgent measures to promote the establishment of an atmosphere of stability, cooperation and security in the area," he said.

According to the minister, this will be promoted by the representative international conference on the problems of the Mediterranean, to be held in Palma de Mallorca in September-October this year.

Andropov also held talks with high-ranking representatives of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry. He discussed problems of the Mediterranean and prospects for cooperation in the region.

Politburo's Frolov Receives British Ambassador

PM1907111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Meeting at Editorial Office"]

[Text] On 18 July, I.T. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of PRAVDA, received R.Q. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the USSR, at his request. There was an exchange of opinions on the work of the 28th CPSU Congress and its final documents and a discussion of questions of the CPSU's role in renewing Soviet society. The conversation touched on problems of international life.

Greek Naval Frigate To Visit Sevastopol

PM1807131190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] In accordance with the agreement which was reached, the Greek Navy's frigate Limnos under the flag of Fleet Commander Rear Admiral N. Vasiliu [name as transliterated] will pay an official visit to Sevastopol port from 17 through 21 July.

Latin America & Caribbean

Official Meets El Salvador Foreign Minister

LD1807210390 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow Jul 18 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Ministry Latin American Department Head Yuriy Pavlov met

Salvadoran Foreign Minister Manuel Pacas in Washington on July 14, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS.

This was the first meeting between the two countries' official representatives and was held on the initiative of the Salvadoran side.

The representatives focused on the situation in and around Salvador. They agreed that a peace settlement must be reached in Salvador as soon as possible. The Soviet side supported the beginning of a dialogue between Alfredo Cristiani's government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front leadership.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Soviet side noted the importance of such contacts and believes they are in the line with the international community's efforts, aimed at stopping military confrontation. In this respect, the Soviet Union is interested in the successful continuation of those meetings aimed to achieve peace and stability in the region, in conformity with agreements reached by Central American presidents.

Castro Reacts to CSFR Embassy Situation

PM1707144790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Cables of the Day: Cuba, Mongolia, Bulgaria": "F. Castro Statement"]

[Text] The problem of Cuban citizens' illegal squatting in the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] Embassy in Havana does not concern the Cuban Government and should be resolved by the Czechoslovak authorities, Fidel Castro said here.

The situation that has taken shape at the Czechoslovak Embassy, he said, was caused by Jan Domok, the country's charge d'affaires ad interim in Cuba, who now wants the Cuban side to settle the question of the 12 citizens who have sought refuge in the CSFR Embassy. If European states want to receive the criminals and vagrants, let them give them visas; Cuba is willing to let them to leave, F. Castro stressed.

PRENSA LATINA reported that the Cuban leader emphasized during a conversation with journalists that the government still cleaves to the policy of protecting foreign embassies and allows people who have received the relevant visas to go abroad.

Cuban Foreign Ministry Comments

90UF0329A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 3

[TASS report: "Reaction of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs"]

[Text]—Havana, 11 July (TASS)—The Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana "exceeded its authority" when it received Cuban citizens on the territory of its compound, it says in a statement from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations circulated here.

The PRENSA LATINA information agency reports that last Monday five "members of counterrevolutionary groups and former political prisoners who had committed acts against the Cuban Government" entered the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana and requested "protection," justifying this by saying that they were being persecuted for their political activity.

The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations report notes that the Cuban Government will "not conduct negotiations" on the question of the departure of these citizens from the embassy. If the five Cubans decide to leave they must do so "without any conditions."

The temporary Czechoslovak charge d'affairs in Cuba, Jan Domok, "with whose knowledge" these citizens entered the territory of the Czechoslovak Embassy, reported this to the Cuban authorities only after information about it was disseminated by information agencies and "counterrevolutionary radio stations operating in Miami." It is emphasized in the Ministry of Foreign Relations report that it is well known that over the past 30 years such incidents in foreign embassies in Cuba have been used as occasions for "anti-Cuban campaigns in the press."

Places Responsibility on Embassy

PM1807115790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Cuban Foreign Ministry Statement"]

[Text] Havana, 13 Jul—The Cuban Foreign Ministry is placing responsibility on the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] Embassy in Havana for the situation that has developed in connection with Cuban citizens penetrating the territory of this diplomatic mission. A statement by the Cuban Foreign Ministry circulated here reports that on Thursday five Cuban citizens entered the residence of J. Domok, CSFR charge d'affaires ad interim in Cuba. In the past few days a total of 19 Cubans have taken shelter in the embassy and the residence of the head of the diplomatic mission. The CSFR charge d'affaires ad interim asked the local authorities to force the people taking shelter in the residence to leave it. "In this way, Mr. Domok is assuming the right to specify when the authorities should intervene and he is asking them to employ measures of compulsion against Cuban citizens, which may result in unpredictable consequences," the Foreign Ministry statement says.

The Cuban Government's position remains unchanged: The authorities do not intend to hold talks on the 19 people leaving the embassy and the residence of the

CSFR charge d'affaires ad interim, the Cuban citizens must leave the diplomatic mission "without any conditions."

"None of the 19 people is at present under investigation or the object of persecution," the document stresses. "However, in the past most of these citizens have had criminal convictions, or convictions for antisocial behavior and vagrancy.

Komplektov Receives Cuban Envoy 12 Jul

PM1607150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] On 12 July V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, received J.R. Balaguer, ambassador of the Republic of Cuba in Moscow.

28th CPSU Congress

Final Version of CPSU Statutes Published

PM1807131790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

["CPSU Statutes as Ratified by the 28th CPSU Congress"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a political organization which unites citizens of the USSR on voluntary principles for the implementation of program goals based on panhuman values and the communist ideal. Creatively developing the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, utilizing the achievements of progressive social thought, and upholding internationalism, it sets as its goal the creation of humane, democratic socialism in the country and the guaranteeing of conditions for the free, all-around development of man. The CPSU expresses and defends the interests of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and other social strata committed to the socialist choice, and strives to secure civil accord and the consolidation of the multiethnic soviet society.

The CPSU builds its work on the basis of the program and statutes. The party and all its organizations operate within the framework of the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of union and autonomous republics, and Soviet laws.

I. Party Members, Their Rights and Obligations

1. Any citizen of the USSR who has reached the age of 18, who acknowledges the party program and observes the party statutes, who works in one of its primary organizations, and who supports the party materially may be a member of the CPSU.

2. All party members are equal. A CPSU member is entitled: to put forward and freely discuss questions of the party's domestic and foreign policy and intraparty life, to participate in the formulation of decisions, to enjoy the party organization's political support and protection in his public activity, to elect and be elected to party organs, to receive information about their work and to give appraisals, to criticize any party organ and any communist, to submit applications and proposals to any party body and receive a reply from it, and to participate in the work of a party organ when his proposal or the question of his activity or behavior is under discussion.

A communist is entitled to participate in the work of social organizations and movements whose activity is structured in accordance with the Constitution and Soviet laws. A CPSU member may not belong to other parties.

3. A CPSU member has a duty to enhance his political and cultural standards, to propagandize the ideas of the party, to struggle to attain its program goals and safeguard the party's vanguard positions in society, to strengthen the friendship of the peoples, consistently to pursue the CPSU's political line in labor collectives and among the population, to fulfill party decisions, to pay his party membership dues, to set an example in labor, and to comply with the rule of law and the norms of public morality.

4. Admission to membership of the CPSU takes place on an individual basis on the applicant member's request. The decision on admission to CPSU membership is made by the primary party organization's meeting and is final. At the primary party organization's discretion, the applicant CPSU member may have to serve a trial period of up to one year and may have to be sponsored by two party members.

A single party card is valid in the CPSU, and the procedure for registering party members is laid down by the CPSU Central Committee.

A communist is registered either at his place of work or at his place of residence according to his own wish and at the primary organization's consent.

A CPSU member who has actively worked in the party for at least 30 years can, by a decision of the primary party organization, be awarded the honorary title "CPSU Veteran."

If a party member cannot fully participate in party life for reasons of health or age, the primary party organization is entitled on the basis of his personal application to relase him from regular work and from payment of his membership dues.

5. Membership of the CPSU is terminated by the primary party organization at its own initiative or on a higher party organ's suggestion as a consequence of the expulsion of a party member from the CPSU for actions and conduct incompatible with the requirements of the CPSU Statutes.

Party membership is also terminated on the basis of a party member's application for voluntary withdrawal from the CPSU; the said application is examined by the primary party organization.

A decision on admission to membership of the CPSU and on expulsion from the party is considered valid if more than half of those registered with the given organization of communists, have voted for it.

For violations of party discipline and the norms of public morality, measures of party education and influence may be applied to party members in the form of a declaration of reproof or a reprimand.

A person expelled from the party has the right to appeal to party control organs. An appeal is examined within not more than two months of its receipt.

II. Intraparty Democracy

6. The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of ideological community and party comradeship, of the principle of democratic centralism which ensures self-management in party life, the combination of the interests of the party and individual communists and the power of the party masses with conscious discipline.

Freedom of expression of opinion, the comparison of different views and platforms, and open criticism and self-criticism are guaranteed in the party. Within individual organizations and in the CPSU as a whole, debates and referendums may be held on topical questions of social and party life. They are held at the initiative of leading and executive bodies, and also at the demand of party organizations united at least one-third of the members of the relevant organization.

7. All CPSU organizations, beginning with primary organizations, are autonomous. They are autonomous as to the structure of their internal life and activity. Their decisions, provided they are not in conflict with the party's program aims and are adopted within the framework of powers granted by the CPSU Statutes, may not be countermanded by higher organs, with the exception of decisions on personal cases. In the event of differences of opinion, any one of these organs is entitled to address the primary party organizations of the communists directly, or to hold a referendum in order to resolve the disputed question.

8. The work of party organizations and party organs is built on the principles of collectiveness and personal responsibility, ruling out subjectivism and autocracy.

The general meeting, conference, or congress are the leadership organs in the party. They are legally constituted [pravomochny] provided they are attended by more than one-half of party organization members or elected delegates, or by no less than two-thirds of such members or delegates in the case of report and election meetings. The party leadership organs elect executive organs (bureaus, committees) and control organs (control commission).

Party organs can form standing or ad hoc commissions on the main areas of work, and also use other ways of involving communists and other citizens in their activity.

9. Party organizations, and elected party organs operate with glasnost, ensuring—in line with party decisions—the openness of party meetings, conferences, congresses, and sittings of executive and control organs, the participation of the party press in them, the publication of draft documents, stenographic reports, adopted resolutions, and other materials. Party committees and primary party organizations systematically inform communists and higher party organs about their activity. A communist is entitled to attend meetings of the bureau or party committee of his primary party organizations. Members of an elected party organ have free access to meetings of organs that are accountable to them, and also have the right to make use of documents available to the party organ and its apparatus.

10. Leadership, executive, and control organs in the party are elected. They are elected by secret ballot. Any number of candidates may appear on the ballot paper. At election time party members have the unrestricted right to nominate any candidate, including themselves. Candidates are elected when they have obtained more than half of the votes of the CPSU members participating in the voting at the meeting, conference, congress, or plenum of the party committee or control commission.

Delegates to rayon, city, and okrug (without rayons) party conferences are elected in primary organizations. Elections of delegates to city and okrug (with rayons), oblast, and kray conferences, congresses of union republic communist parties, and the CPSU congress involve the compulsory nomination of candidates by primary party organizations, as a rule by a direct vote by communists by party districts.

The procedure for the election of party committees and control organs, and of delegates to conferences and congresses is laid down by the relevant party committee on the basis of decisions by primary and local-level party organizations.

Primary party organizations have the right to propose candidacies for membership of superior party organs, which are then considered by the conference or congress that forms these organs. Party committees and control commissions can also be formed via the direct delegation of representatives by lower organizations, which have the right to recall their representative.

11. Members of elected party organs at raykom [rayon party committee] level and above are elected to the same post for no more than two consecutive terms. A party member cannot belong to more than two party committees or control commissions. The composition of executive or control organs of the party can be renewed or reelected wholly before their term expires. This question is examined if demanded by party organizations uniting at least one-third of the members of the relevant organization or if individuals or all the members of the elected organs voluntarily resign.

Secretaries of party committees at all levels and control commission chairmen are elected, being simultaneously elected members of these organs, at the relevant meetings, conferences, and congresses or, at delegates' discretion, at plenums of party committees and control commissions. They are accountable to the corresponding party committee or control commission and can be registered with any party organization with the exception of party apparatus organizations.

12. Party committees and control commissions are accountable to the party organizations which have formed them. Every member of an elected organ reports on his work to the party organizations that elected or recommended him.

13. When elaborating decisions, party organizations and their organs are obliged to consider all viewpoints. A decision made by the majority is binding on everyone. The minority has the right to support its own positions at party meetings, conferences, and congresses, at meetings of executive and control organs, or in the party's mass media, to present co-reports, to record a minority view in the official record, and to demand a repeat examination of disputes in their organization or place them before superior organs.

In party committees and control commissions and their bureaus and presidiums, in the event of any disagreement, a draft decision is resubmitted for repeat examination and adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds.

Decisions by congresses, conferences, and meetings are binding on party organizations. Decisions by committees and bureaus at the preparatory stage are discussed by the party organizations which they affect, and, after adoption, are binding.

14. The party's elected organs establish for the duration of their term of office a working apparatus which is subordinated to them and provides mainly information, analytical, sociological forecasting, and consultative backup for their activity. The party apparatus is established on the basis of primary party organizations' recommendations. Party apparatus personnel are covered by labor legislation.

15. Party organizations and committees are authorized to publish newspapers, journals, bulletins, and propaganda, reference, information and other material out of their own funds or in cooperation with other organizations, and to establish editorial offices and radio and television studios for this purpose. The party mass media are organs of party organizations and committees and their leaders are elected at the relevant party meeting, conference, congress, or party committee plenum. The central party media are obliged to publish statements and appeals at the demand of oblast, kray, and republic party organizations, while the local press is obliged to publish corresponding primary organization documents.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

16. The CPSU is built along territorial and workplace lines. The basis of the party is provided by primary organizations which are set up at communists' places of work or residence and are united along territorial lines. The party's structure also includes rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and autonomous republics' republican party organizations, united within Union republic communist parties.

At communists' initiative councils of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, party veterans' councils, and other forums for uniting communists on the basis of common interests or problems can be organized and operate. Without having the status of primary party organizations, they discuss, proceeding from the CPSU program directives, various questions in order to define their positions, and submit proposals and drafts for consideration by party committees at any level.

The creation of factions which have their own internal discipline is not permitted within the CPSU, but this does not limit communists' right to unite around platforms in the course of debates.

Primary Party Organizations

17. Primary party organizations are created if there are at least three CPSU members by a decision of their meeting and are registered by the relevant party raykom or gorkom [city party committee].

A primary party organization may create party groups and shop organizations within itself. By a decision of the primary party organization, they may be granted the rights of primary organizations on questions connected with CPSU membership.

In the light of the specific tasks and conditions of their activity, primary party organizations autonomously resolve questions of admission to the party and termination of membership of the CPSU, the definition of their structure, directions and methods of work, regularity of and procedure for holding meetings, political actions, and financial and economic activity, and form mutual relations with soviet and social organizations.

Primary party organizations propagandize and implement the party's decisions, perform the party's ideological, political, and organizational functions in labor collectives and in their territory, exert influence on the resolution of economic and social tasks, and uphold social justice.

Primary party organizations have the right to elaborate draft documents during the preparation for party congresses and conferences and party committee plenums and to express their attitude on the decision of any party organ, which is obliged to give a substantive answer to it. They can submit proposals to recall from the composition of party organs at all levels communists registered with them or recommended by them for these organs.

18. For day to day work, the primary party organization's meeting (conference) elects a party bureau (committee) and its secretary for two-three years and, at communists' discretion, a control (auditing) commission. In party organizations with fewer than 15 communists, the party organization secretary and his deputy —and in party groups, the party group organizer—are elected for a period and in a manner prescribed by the meeting.

Rayon, City, Okrug, Oblast, Kray, and Autonomous Republics' Republican Party Organizations

19. Rayon and city party organizations directly uniting primary organizations are the pivotal structural link of the party.

The rayon or city party conference elects the rayon or city party committee for five years and also the control commission. An extraordinary party conference may be convened by decision of the party committee, at the proposal of the relevant control commission, or at the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the organization's members.

In the light of primary organizations' opinions, the rayon or city party committee elects the raykom or gorkom bureau at its plenum.

Party raykoms and gorkoms keep a record of communists, coordinate the activity of primary party organizations, join with them in organizing work on the implementation of party policy and decisions in labor collectives and citizens' local neighborhoods, present specific socioeconomic, cultural, and other questions for scrutiny by the public and the organs of power, and help to implement them.

20. Autonomous republics' republican, kray, oblast, and okrug party organizations conduct work to implement party policy within the autonomous republic, kray, oblast, or okrug, and ensure the execution of superior party organs' decisions and resolutions adopted by them.

The autonomous republic republican, kray, oblast, or okrug party conference elects the corresponding party committee and control commission for five-year terms. Extraordinary conferences are convened by decision of the committee, at the proposal of the control commission, or at the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the total number of the organization's members.

Taking account of party organizations' opinions, conferences, and also party committee plenums, which are convened as and when necessary, elaborate and propose to organs of state power and the population programs for solving political, ethnic, social, economic, ecological, and cultural-moral problems in the region. They examine questions of intraparty life, cadre work, the party organization's budget, and publishing activity.

Autonomous republics' republican, kray, oblast, and okrug party committees elect bureaus at their plenums, autonomously determine the structure of their organization, and allow the largest primary party organizations to exercise the rights of party raykoms on questions of CPSU members' records.

21. The control commission of the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and autonomous republic republican party organization elects the commission presidium. The control commissions monitor the execution of leading party organs' decisions, decide questions associated with the observance of party discipline and the norms of public morals by communists, protect the honor and dignity of party members, hear appeals by them, bring to task those guilty of suppression of criticism or abuses, and monitor the implementation of the party budget and the economic activity of party institutions. The control commission is subordinate to the organ which has elected it and operates autonomously and in conformity with regulations ratified by the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, or autonomous republic republican party conference.

Union Republic Communist Parties

22. Union republic communist parties are autonomous. On the basis of the CPSU's fundamental program and statutory principles, they elaborate their own programs and normative documents, decide their own political, organizational, cadre, publishing, financial-economic, and other questions, and pursue the party line in the sphere of state building and the republics' socioeconomic and cultural development. Union republic communist parties maintain ties with other parties and social movements, including those abroad.

Fundamental decisions by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo affecting Union republic communist parties are examined with the participation of their plenipotentiary representatives. In the event of disagreement with a decision that has been made, a Union republic communist party central committee has the right, without complying with such decision, to demand that disputed questions are discussed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum or a joint CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum.

CPSU Organizations Within the USSR Armed Forces

23. The activity of party organizations within the USSR Armed Forces is built on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and of documents submitted by an all-Army party conference and ratified by the CPSU Central Committee.

Party work within the USSR Armed Forces is effected through primary party organizations and elected party organs. They exercise their influence on the life and activity of military collectives through Army communists and work in close collaboration with military councils, commanding officers, military-political organs, and the corresponding territorial party organizations. The supreme party organ of the USSR Armed Forces is the all-Army party conference, which elects the party committee.

Communists in the Armed Forces can elect and be elected to elected organs of territorial party organizations. Delegates to rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic party conferences or union republic communist party congresses are elected at party meetings and conferences in military units and combined units according to the norms of representation laid down by territorial party committees.

The election of delegates from Army and Navy party organizations to CPSU congresses and to all-Union and all-Army party conferences takes place in accordance with the CPSU Statutes.

Note: Party work in KGB Troops, Internal Troops, and Railroad Troops is built along lines analogous to those in the Armed Forces.

Supreme and Central Organs of the CPSU

24. The congress is the supreme organ of the CPSU. Regular congresses are convened by the CPSU Central Committee at least once every five years. The Central Committee's decision to convene a congress, the agenda, and the representation norms are published no later than three months before the congress. The Central Committee publishes draft documents on the basic questions to be submitted to the congress.

Extraordinary (emergency) CPSU congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative, at the proposal of the CPSU Central Control Commission, or at the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the total number of communists, and also of three or more Union republic communist parties. Congresses are convened within two months and are considered legally convened if the majority of Union republic communist parties are represented at them.

In the event of the Central Committee failing to convene an extraordinary (emergency) congress, the organizations demanding that it be held can form an organizational committee exercising the rights of the party Central Committee as regards convening an extraordinary (emergency) congress.

25. The CPSU congress:

—hears accountability reports and reports by the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, and other organs and individuals elected by the congress, adopts resolutions on them, and makes an assessment of their work;

—adopts, revises, and amends the party program and statutes;

—lays down the party line in the sphere of party building, ideological activity, and the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy;

—elects the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission;

—elects the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and his deputy, simultaneously electing them members of the CPSU Central Committee;

—elects the chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, simultaneously including him in the composition of the Central Control Commission and the CPSU Central Control Commission Presidium.

26. In the period between congresses the CPSU Central Committee convenes all-Union CPSU conferences to discuss pressing questions of the party's policy and practical activity.

A conference has the right to hear reports by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission concerning their work, to partially renew their composition (up to one-third in the period between congresses), to adopt other mandatory decisions for the party in the form of CPSU program documents, and to introduce amendments to the party statutes.

27. In the period between congresses and conferences the CPSU Central Committee:

—organizes the implementation of CPSU congress and conference decisions;

—elaborates and submits to Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the content of domestic and foreign policy;

—directs the activity of CPSU party groups (communist factions) in union representative organs;

—elaborates and implements CPSU cadre policy;

—creates party institutions and enterprises and monitors their activity;

—collaborates with sociopolitical organizations in the country and represents the CPSU in relations with foreign parties.

28. In order to decide political and organizational matters in the period between plenums the Central Committee elects the Central Committee Politburo, the number of whose members is determined by a CPSU Central Committee plenum. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo includes the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, his deputy, and the first secretaries of union republic communist party Central Committees.

The Central Committee Politburo's work is led by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo sends decisions to party organizations on its behalf. The Politburo submits decisions on the most important political issues for discussion by primary party organizations and subsequent ratification by a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The Central Committee Politburo annually accounts for its activity to a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The Central Committee elects the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, which is led by the deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The Secretariat organizes the execution within the party of the decisions of congresses, conferences, the Central Committee, and its Politburo, and directs the work of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

29. Standing commissions are set up within the CPSU Central Committee on the main avenues of its activity. They are formed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum from among Central Committee members and other

Communists ratified as advisers. The commissions are headed by CPSU Central Committee secretaries.

30. The CPSU Central Control Commission is guided in its activity by the CPSU Statutes and by provisions ratified by a party congress. It elects at its plenum its presidium.

31. The CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission hold at least two plenary sittings a year and, if necessary, joint sittings.

CPSU Central Committee members can participate in the work of CPSU Central Control Commission plenums and members of the Central Control Commission can participate in the work of CPSU Central Committee plenums on a nonvoting basis [s pravom soveshchatelnogo golosa].

A party member cannot be simultaneously a member of both the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission.

IV. Communists in Soviets, State Organs, and Public Associations

32. Party organizations and committees do not permit mixing of functions with state and economic organs, and pursue the party's policy line through the communists working in them.

33. The CPSU struggles for political leadership in society through free elections to soviets of people's deputies and other forms whereby Soviet citizens express their will. Party organizations elaborate and publish their election platforms, recommend communists for nomination as candidate people's deputies, and help them to organize their election campaigns.

Party organizations can enter into election agreements with other sociopolitical organizations and formations operating on the basis of and in accordance with the Constitution and can support candidate deputies nominated by them who are not CPSU members.

34. At congresses and sessions of Soviets of People's Deputies, communists can unite in party groups (communist factions) for the term of the soviets in order to coordinate their activity and to implement the will and mandate of the voters. Communists are not permitted to create in soviets groups or factions independent of leading party organs but acting on behalf of the CPSU.

Party groups (communist factions) collaborate with corresponding party committees, obtain assistance and support from them, and take their decisions and recommendations into account.

Party groups (factions) can elect a bureau or chairman for the purposes of their current work.

35. The party cooperates with social forces standing on positions of democracy and social justice. It builds its relations with trade union and other social organizations and mass movements on the basis of political collaboration and cooperation, of respect for different points of view.

Party groups (communist factions) analogous to the groups (factions) in soviets can be set up at congresses and conferences convened by social organizations.

36. In their work with young people party organs and primary party organizations rely on the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League], cooperate with other youth organizations with socialist orientation, give all possible assistance to their activities, and involve them in elaborating and implementing the CPSU's youth policy. The relationship between party and Komsomol organizations is built on the principles of political partnership, ideological commonality, recognition of the Komsomol's organizational autonomy, and mutual respect and trust. The party sees the Komsomol as the immediate reserve for replenishing its ranks.

Members of youth organizations' elected organs have the right to participate in the examination of youth policy questions at the corresponding party committees.

37. Primary party organizations and party committees can recommend communists and nonparty people to specific sectors of state, economic, and social activity. Using political methods, they help them to get elected or appointed to suitable office, give them support, hear communists' accountability reports on their work, and make public any conclusions or recommendations arrived at in this process.

V. The CPSU's Monetary Funds and Property

38. The activity of the CPSU and its organizations is carried out using financial, material, and technical resources provided by party income.

The CPSU's monetary funds are built up from party membership dues, revenues from publishing, production, and economic activity, voluntary donations by communists and individual citizens, and other contributions which are not contrary to current legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members are as follows:

Incomes of up to R70 rubles—10 kopeks
R71-100—20 kopeks
R101-150—30 kopeks
R151-250—1 percent of income
over R250—2 percent of income

Working communist pensioners pay their party membership dues separately on their pension and on their salary.

39. The CPSU's budget, its structure, the amount of contributions to it from local party organizations' revenues and of subsidies to them, and the accountability report on the party budget's implementation are ratified by a party Central Committee plenum and are notified to communists.

Funds for the upkeep of the CPSU Central Control Commission and other control organs are determined at joint plenums of corresponding party committees and control commissions.

All party organizations are autonomous in controlling their budgets, resolving structural, staff, and production-economic matters, and creating, reorganizing, and closing down periodical publications. Budgets and accountability reports on their implementation are ratified at party committee plenums. Profitable economic activity by party committees, which does not run counter to the interests of political work, is encouraged.

40. The party's property constitutes a partywide asset. Facilities owned by the CPSU include buildings, installations, equipment, stock, property held for cultural, educational, and health care purposes, monetary funds, enterprises, party publishing houses and the periodicals and printing houses under their jurisdiction, and other property necessary for the party's activity.

Party committees exercise efficient management (possession, utilization, disposal) of property held by party organizations. The CPSU Central Committee, Union republic communist party central committees, local party committees, and CPSU enterprises, institutions, and organizations enjoy the rights of legal entities and can delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions. The rights of legal entity can be enjoyed by primary party organizations in accordance with existing legislation.

Up to 50 percent of the total membership dues received are used to finance primary party organizations' activity.

In order to resolve questions of financing the activity of party organizations and the distribution and redistribution of monetary funds, raykoms, gorkoms, and party committees with the rights of raykoms set up financial commissions whose members include primary party organization secretaries.

Local party committees and control commissions annually inform communists about the state of the party budget and the expenditure of funds.

Appendix:

The following normative and methodological documents are elaborated on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and ratified at a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission:

Instructions on the procedure of elections in the CPSU and recall from the composition of elected organs;

Instructions on CPSU membership records and party statistics;

Instructions on the maintenance of records in party organizations and committees;

Instructions on the maintenance of records of party membership dues and the financial-economic activity of party organizations;

Instructions on the work of party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces;

Regulations on the status of primary party organization secretaries;

Regulations on "CPSU Veterans";

Regulations on the holding of referendums and debates within the party.

A single party card is valid in the CPSU, and the procedure for registering party members is laid down by the CPSU Central Committee.

A communist is registered either at his place of work or at his place of residence according to his own wish and at the primary organization's consent.

A CPSU member who has actively worked in the party for at least 30 years can, by a decision of the primary party organization, be awarded the honorary title "CPSU Veteran."

If a party member cannot fully participate in party life for reasons of health or age, the primary party organization is entitled on the basis of his personal application to relase him from regular work and from payment of his membership dues.

5. Membership of the CPSU is terminated by the primary party organization at its own initiative or on a higher party organ's suggestion as a consequence of the expulsion of a party member from the CPSU for actions and conduct incompatible with the requirements of the CPSU Statutes.

Party membership is also terminated on the basis of a party member's application for voluntary withdrawal from the CPSU; the said application is examined by the primary party organization.

A decision on admission to membership of the CPSU and on expulsion from the party is considered valid if more than half of those registered with the given organization of communists, have voted for it.

For violations of party discipline and the norms of public morality, measures of party education and influence may be applied to party members in the form of a declaration of reproof or a reprimand.

A person expelled from the party has the right to appeal to party control organs. An appeal is examined within not more than two months of its receipt.

II. Intraparty Democracy

6. The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of ideological community and party comradeship, of the principle

of democratic centralism which ensures self-management in party life, the combination of the interests of the party and individual communists and the power of the party masses with conscious discipline.

Freedom of expression of opinion, the comparison of different views and platforms, and open criticism and self-criticism are guaranteed in the party. Within individual organizations and in the CPSU as a whole, debates and referendums may be held on topical questions of social and party life. They are held at the initiative of leading and executive bodies, and also at the demand of party organizations united at least one-third of the members of the relevant organization.

7. All CPSU organizations, beginning with primary organizations, are autonomous. They are autonomous as to the structure of their internal life and activity. Their decisions, provided they are not in conflict with the party's program aims and are adopted within the framework of powers granted by the CPSU Statutes, may not be countermanded by higher organs, with the exception of decisions on personal cases. In the event of differences of opinion, any one of these organs is entitled to address the primary party organizations of the communists directly, or to hold a referendum in order to resolve the disputed question.

8. The work of party organizations and party organs is built on the principles of collectiveness and personal responsibility, ruling out subjectivism and autocracy.

The general meeting, conference, or congress are the leadership organs in the party. They are legally constituted [pravomochny] provided they are attended by more than one-half of party organization members or elected delegates, or by no less than two-thirds of such members or delegates in the case of report and election meetings. The party leadership organs elect executive organs (bureaus, committees) and control organs (control commission).

Party organs can form standing or ad hoc commissions on the main areas of work, and also use other ways of involving communists and other citizens in their activity.

9. Party organizations, and elected party organs operate with glasnost, ensuring—in line with party decisions—the openness of party meetings, conferences, congresses, and sittings of executive and control organs, the participation of the party press in them, the publication of draft documents, stenographic reports, adopted resolutions, and other materials. Party committees and primary party organizations systematically inform communists and higher party organs about their activity. A communist is entitled to attend meetings of the bureau or party committee of his primary party organizations. Members of an elected party organ have free access to meetings of organs that are accountable to them, and also have the right to make use of documents available to the party organ and its apparatus.

10. Leadership, executive, and control organs in the party are elected. They are elected by secret ballot. Any number of candidates may appear on the ballot paper. At election time party members have the unrestricted right to nominate any candidate, including themselves. Candidates are elected when they have obtained more than half of the votes of the CPSU members participating in the voting at the meeting, conference, congress, or plenum of the party committee or control commission.

Delegates to rayon, city, and okrug (without rayons) party conferences are elected in primary organizations. Elections of delegates to city and okrug (with rayons), oblast, and kray conferences, congresses of Union republic communist parties, and the CPSU congress involve the compulsory nomination of candidates by primary party organizations, as a rule by a direct vote by communists by party districts.

The procedure for the election of party committes and control organs, and of delegates to conferences and congresses is laid down by the relevant party committee on the basis of decisions by primary and local-level party organizations.

Primary party organizations have the right to propose candidacies for membership of superior party organs, which are then considered by the conference or congress that forms these organs. Party committees and control commissions can also be formed via the direct delegation of representatives by lower organizations, which have the right to recall their representative.

11. Members of elected party organs at raykom level and above are elected to the same post for no more than two consecutive terms. A party member cannot belong to more than two party committees or control commissions. The composition of executive or control organs of the party can be renewed or reelected wholly before their term expires. This question is examined if demanded by party organizations uniting at least one-third of the members of the relevant organization or if individuals or all the members of the elected organs voluntarily resign.

Secretaries of party committees at all levels and control commission chairmen are elected, being simultaneously elected members of these organs, at the relevant meetings, conferences, and congresses or, at delegates' discretion, at plenums of party committees and control commissions. They are accountable to the corresponding party committee or control commission and can be registered with any party organization with the exception of party apparatus organizations.

12. Party committees and control commissions are accountable to the party organizations which have formed them. Every member of an elected organ reports on his work to the party organizations that elected or recommended him.

13. When elaborating decisions, party organizations and their organs are obliged to consider all viewpoints. A decision made by the majority is binding on everyone.

The minority has the right to support its own positions at party meetings, conferences, and congresses, at meetings of executive and control organs, or in the party's mass media, to present co-reports, to record a minority view in the official record, and to demand a repeat examination of disputes in their organization or place them before superior organs.

In party committees and control commissions and their bureaus and presidiums, in the event of any disagreement, a draft decision is resubmitted for repeat examination and adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds.

Decisions by congresses, conferences, and meetings are binding on party organizations. Decisions by committees and bureaus at the preparatory stage are discussed by the party organizations which they affect, and, after adoption, are binding.

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At communists' initiative councils of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, party veterans' councils, and other forums for uniting communists on the basis of common interests or problems can be organized and operate. Without having the status of primary party organizations, they discuss, proceeding from the CPSU program directives, various questions in order to define their positions, and submit proposals and drafts for consideration by party committees at any level.

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23. The activity of party organizations within the USSR Armed Forces is built on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and of documents submitted by an all-Army party conference and ratified by the CPSU Central Committee.

Party work within the USSR Armed Forces is effected through primary party organizations and elected party organs. They exercise their influence on the life and activity of military collectives through Army communists and work in close collaboration with military councils, commanding officers, military-political organs, and the corresponding territorial party organizations. The supreme party organ of the USSR Armed Forces is the all-Army party conference, which elects the party committee.

Communists in the Armed Forces can elect and be elected to elected organs of territorial party organizations. Delegates to rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic party conferences or Union republic communist party congresses are elected at party meetings and conferences in military units and combined units according to the norms of representation laid down by territorial party committees.

The election of delegates from Army and Navy party organizations to CPSU congresses and to all-Union and all-Army party conferences takes place in accordance with the CPSU Statutes.

Note: Party work in KGB troops, internal troops, and railroad troops is built along lines analogous to those in the Armed Forces.

Supreme and Central Organs of the CPSU

24. The congress is the supreme organ of the CPSU. Regular congresses are convened by the CPSU Central Committee at least once every five years. The Central Committee's decision to convene a congress, the agenda, and the representation norms are published no later than three months before the congress. The Central Committee publishes draft documents on the basic questions to be submitted to the congress.

Extraordinary (emergency) CPSU congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative, at the proposal of the CPSU Central Control Commission, or at the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the total number of communists, and also of three or more Union republic communist parties. Congresses are convened within two months and are considered legally convened if the majority of Union republic communist parties are represented at them.

In the event of the Central Committee failing to convene an extraordinary (emergency) congress, the organizations demanding that it be held can form an organizational committee exercising the rights of the party Central Committee as regards convening an extraordinary (emergency) congress.

25. The CPSU congress:

—hears accountability reports and reports by the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, and other organs and individuals elected by the congress, adopts resolutions on them, and makes an assessment of their work;

—adopts, revises, and amends the party program and statutes;

—lays down the party line in the sphere of party building, ideological activity, and the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy;

—elects the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission;

—elects the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and his deputy, simultaneously electing them members of the CPSU Central Committee;

—elects the chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, simultaneously including him in the composition of the Central Control Commission and the CPSU Central Control Commission Presidium.

26. In the period between congresses the CPSU Central Committee convenes all-Union CPSU conferences to discuss pressing questions of the party's policy and practical activity.

A conference has the right to hear reports by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission concerning their work, to partially renew their composition (up to one-third in the period between congresses), to adopt other mandatory decisions for the party in the form of CPSU program documents, and to introduce amendments to the party statutes.

27. In the period between congresses and conferences the CPSU Central Committee:

—organizes the implementation of CPSU congress and conference decisions;

—elaborates and submits to Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the content of domestic and foreign policy;

—directs the activity of CPSU party groups (communist factions) in Union representative organs;

—elaborates and implements CPSU cadre policy;

—creates party institutions and enterprises and monitors their activity;

—collaborates with sociopolitical organizations in the country and represents the CPSU in relations with foreign parties.

28. In order to decide political and organizational matters in the period between plenums the Central Committee elects the Central Committee Politburo, the number of whose members is determined by a CPSU Central Committee plenum. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo includes the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, his deputy, and the first secretaries of union republic communist party Central Committees.

The Central Committee Politburo's work is led by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo sends decisions to party organizations on its behalf. The Politburo submits decisions on the most important political issues for discussion by primary party organizations and subsequent ratification by a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The Central Committee Politburo annually accounts for its activity to a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The Central Committee elects the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, which is led by the deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The Secretariat organizes the execution within the party of the decisions of congresses, conferences, the Central Committee, and its Politburo, and directs the work of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

29. Standing commissions are set up within the CPSU Central Committee on the main avenues of its activity. They are formed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum from among Central Committee members and other Communists ratified as advisers. The commissions are headed by CPSU Central Committee secretaries.

30. The CPSU Central Control Commission is guided in its activity by the CPSU Statutes and by provisions ratified by a party congress. It elects at its plenum its presidium.

31. The CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission hold at least two plenary sittings a year and, if necessary, joint sittings.

CPSU Central Committee members can participate in the work of CPSU Central Control Commission plenums and members of the Central Control Commission can participate in the work of CPSU Central Committee plenums on a nonvoting basis.

A party member cannot be simultaneously a member of both the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission.

IV. Communists in Soviets, State Organs, and Public Associations

32. Party organizations and committees do not permit mixing of functions with state and economic organs, and pursue the party's policy line through the communists working in them.

33. The CPSU struggles for political leadership in society through free elections to soviets of people's deputies and other forms whereby Soviet citizens express their will. Party organizations elaborate and publish their election platforms, recommend communists for nomination as candidate people's deputies, and help them to organize their election campaigns.

Party organizations can enter into election agreements with other sociopolitical organizations and formations operating on the basis of and in accordance with the Constitution and can support candidate deputies nominated by them who are not CPSU members.

34. At congresses and sessions of Soviets of People's Deputies, communists can unite in party groups (communist factions) for the term of the soviets in order to coordinate their activity and to implement the will and mandate of the voters. Communists are not permitted to create in soviets groups or factions independent of leading party organs but acting on behalf of the CPSU.

Party groups (communist factions) collaborate with corresponding party committees, obtain assistance and support from them, and take their decisions and recommendations into account.

Party groups (factions) can elect a bureau or chairman for the purposes of their current work.

35. The party cooperates with social forces standing on positions of democracy and social justice. It builds its relations with trade union and other social organizations and mass movements on the basis of political collaboration and cooperation, of respect for different points of view.

Party groups (communist factions) analogous to the groups (factions) in soviets can be set up at congresses and conferences convened by social organizations.

36. In their work with young people party organs and primary party organizations rely on the Komsomol, cooperate with other youth organizations with socialist orientation, give all possible assistance to their activities, and involve them in elaborating and implementing the CPSU's youth policy. The relationship between party and Komsomol organizations is built on the principles of political partnership, ideological commonality, recognition of the Komsomol's organizational autonomy, and mutual respect and trust. The party sees the Komsomol as the immediate reserve for replenishing its ranks.

Members of youth organizations' elected organs have the right to participate in the examination of youth policy questions at the corresponding party committees.

37. Primary party organizations and party committees can recommend communists and nonparty people to specific sectors of state, economic, and social activity. Using political methods, they help them to get elected or appointed to suitable office, give them support, hear communists' accountability reports on their work, and make public any conclusions or recommendations arrived at in this process.

V. The CPSU's Monetary Funds and Property

38. The activity of the CPSU and its organizations is carried out using financial, material, and technical resources provided by party income.

The CPSU's monetary funds are built up from party membership dues, revenues from publishing, production, and economic activity, voluntary donations by communists and individual citizens, and other contributions which are not contrary to current legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members are as follows:

Incomes of up to R70 rubles —10 kopeks
R71-100—20 kopeks
R101-150—30 kopeks
R151-250—one percent of income
over R250—two percent of income

Working communist pensioners pay their party membership dues separately on their pension and on their salary.

39. The CPSU's budget, its structure, the amount of contributions to it from local party organizations' revenues and of subsidies to them, and the accountability report on the party budget's implementation are ratified by a party Central Committee plenum and are notified to communists.

Funds for the upkeep of the CPSU Central Control Commission and other control organs are determined at joint plenums of corresponding party committees and control commissions.

All party organizations are autonomous in controlling their budgets, resolving structural, staff, and production-economic matters, and creating, reorganizing, and closing down periodical publications. Budgets and accountability reports on their implementation are ratified at party committee plenums. Profitable economic activity by party committees, which does not run counter to the interests of political work, is encouraged.

40. The party's property constitutes a partywide asset. Facilities owned by the CPSU include buildings, installations, equipment, stock, property held for cultural, educational, and health care purposes, monetary funds, enterprises, party publishing houses and the periodicals and printing houses under their jurisdiction, and other property necessary for the party's activity.

Party committees exercise efficient management (possession, utilization, disposal) of property held by party organizations. The CPSU Central Committee, Union republic communist party central committees, local party committees, and CPSU enterprises, institutions, and organizations enjoy the rights of legal entities and can delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions. The rights of legal entity can be enjoyed by primary party organizations in accordance with existing legislation.

Up to 50 percent of the total membership dues received are used to finance primary party organizations' activity.

In order to resolve questions of financing the activity of party organizations and the distribution and redistribution of monetary funds, raykoms, gorkoms, and party committees with the rights of raykoms set up financial commissions whose members include primary party organization secretaries.

Local party committees and control commissions annually inform communists about the state of the party budget and the expenditure of funds.

Appendix:

The following normative and methodological documents are elaborated on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and ratified at a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission:

Instructions on the procedure of elections in the CPSU and recall from the composition of elected organs;

Instructions on CPSU membership records and party statistics;

Instructions on the maintenance of records in party organizations and committees;

Instructions on the maintenance of records of party membership dues and the financial-economic activity of party organizations;

Instructions on the work of party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces;

Regulations on the status of primary party organization secretaries;

Regulations on "CPSU veterans";

Regulations on the holding of referendums and debates within the party.

Ryzhkov Meeting With Congress Delegates Viewed

PM1807185590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Moscow Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Dialogue with Delegates"]

[Text] Meetings continued in the Kremlin between government leaders and groups of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. The leading topic of discussion was the practical questions of the transition to a regulated market.

N.I. Ryzhkov had a frank and mutually absorbing talk with leaders of rayon and city soviets and their executive committees. Attention was focused on the activity of the executive authorities whose primary cells are today charged with many new obligations. Problems are arising in connection with the formation of municipal property, ecology, the development of the social sphere, primarily with the construction of roads and housing and the piping of gas to the countryside. The resolution of these problems is frequently hampered by the fact that new relations are still only just taking shape with other local and higher state organs and with enterprises.

Specific assignments to the ministry and department leaders taking part in the meeting were given for some questions on the spot, at the meeting. But not everything can be resolved that quickly. For instance, the procedure for forming local budgets for 1991 at Union level has already been determined and enshrined in legislation. But the creation of republican organs has not yet been completed and for that reason it is not yet totally clear locally who the localities can really count on. The executive committee workers were briefed on the measures the government is undertaking for the practical enhancement of the role of the soviets and the transfer to them of the authorities' powers associated, in particular, with the use of means of production and natural resources, and on how it is proposed to build relations among all components of executive power from top to bottom.

A meeting the next day with leaders of industrial enterprises did not end until after midnight. A constructive exchange of opinions took place in a spirit of genuine partnership between the directors and the government (practically the entire USSR Council of Ministers Presidium and a number of ministers and state committee chairmen were present at the meeting). Many of the same questions were discussed there from the viewpoint of labor collectives. Economic planners from Saratov and Bobruysk, Kharkov and Moscow, Kostroma and Lugansk and from other cities made many valuable suggestions, expounding their view of the program for

making the transition to market relations. They touched on a wide range of problems: both general economic problems—for example, the practice of denationalizing property and demonopolizing the economy, price formation, and the use of new forms of management—and more particular problems, albeit ones of considerable importance—let us say, the speediest satisfaction of need for construction materials.

The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers also had a meeting with a group of delegates from Bryansk Oblast. Questions connected with eliminating the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station were examined exactingly. The participants in this meeting also made a number of specific proposals, including on organizing healthy relaxation for children, equipping the oblast's medical establishments with modern diagnostic and other equipment, and improving the food supply and the consumer goods trade. Sharp criticism was leveled at leading organs in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, which, in the opinion of the congress delegates, have ducked out of resolving Bryansk Oblast's urgent problems and fail to organize and coordinate the all-around assistance which various ministries, departments, and regions of the republic must give to the affected rayons.

The most urgent problems of the organization of northerners' labor and everyday life were raised in N.I. Ryzhkov's thorough discussion with delegates from Murmansk Oblast party organization. It was particularly emphasized that, when the transition is made to a market, people living and working under complex natural climatic conditions cannot be allowed to be without the state's care and attention. It is proposed to provide for special measures in the government's action program for 1991-92 to resolve the food, social, ecological, and other questions in northern parts of the country.

Article Views Congress Atmosphere, Results

PM1807114190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Otto Latsis article: "Impressions, Facts, and Ourselves. From the Notebook of a Delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] **Impressions**

This thought struck me on the eighth day of the proceedings: The impressions, mood, and atmosphere of this unusual congress are one thing, and the actual result, the "dry residue" is quite another. During the first few days a black stormcloud kept on overshadowing the main themes of the congress. Businesslike discussion would seem to have begun, but then another hysterical monologue would erupt at the microphone in the auditorium, a few hundred people would support it with a vigorous ovation, and we were off: "Resign!", "Call to account!", "Condemn!"

Some of the delegates sincerely saw this sort of behavior as a triumph of democracy. People who first rose to involvement in politics on the crest of the wave of perestroyka and who have not accumulated experience failed to notice that a small, well organized group was skillfully manipulating naively democratic sentiments for clearly antidemocratic purposes. But in the excited crowd of many thousands it was no wonder that you sometimes heard even what was being carefully concealed. Jammed on an escalator on my way to the buffet, I heard a voice right behind me say: "Right, now let's show approval of Ligachev, and we'll flunk Yakovlev, of course." His colleague replied: "But then we ought to immediately raise the question of expelling him from the party."

Some people came to the congress to confer about the affairs of the party and the country and the fate of perestroyka. And some came to seize power in the party and put an end to perestroyka. And some came simply to show their worth. And at first it was not clear who had the edge, because a vocal minority is always more audible than a silent majority, and the decisive elections had not yet taken place. And before the elections sociologists did not publish the results of their poll showing that the delegates rated Yakovlev in second place (after Gorbachev), while Ligachev's rating was considerably worse.

The alarm eased slightly after M.S. Gorbachev firmly said: What is it you want, a split? Just think for a moment. And the congress, on reflection, abandoned the intention to "give grades" to the Politburo members. But the frontal assault on the main directions of perestroyka that had been opened by Ye.K. Ligachev's precongress speech in Belgorod and was confirmed by his speech at the congress continued. And the main question remained: Would he attempt to storm the post of general secretary? He did not attempt it. This became clear on the eighth day of the congress. It was then, on the day of the election of the general secretary, that I sensed, not intellectually, but with my whole skin, so to speak: The weather has changed. The stormy wind had been gusting—suddenly it abated. The supporters of a conservative volte-face could not withstand a frontal attack—they turned aside.

And on the day when the deputy general secretary was elected it suddenly became clear: Ligachev was fighting alone, he had no serious support. The results of the election strengthened this impression. In the votes at the congress on various major and minor matters, according to my observations, there were approximately 1,200-1,800 supporters of the conservative choice. And if fewer than 800 people voted for the indomitable defender of "principles," then not even all the conservatively inclined delegates supported him. I can find only one explanation for this: They needed him not for himself, but as the only strong figure offering hopes of ending the policy of perestroyka. As he had not made this attempt, they had no need of him.

But even after all the main issues had been decided, there were many episodes that left an unpleasant aftertaste. For instance, there was the statement by the delegate from the Altay who wanted the general secretary to devote less time to building the all-European home and more to our Soviet home. What chance did he see of separating the former from the latter? Does he seriously believe that the USSR president visits Washington with the affairs of the state of Kentucky more on his mind that those of the Altay? There was no explanation. And the "slow-handclapping" of unwelcome speakers continued—the hallmark of this congress. And the quest for the organizers of the provocation against A.N. Yakovlev remained fruitless (indeed, was the quest actually carried out?). And the pitch of emotions—not always noble emotions—did not abate until the final hour, until the results of the Central Committee elections were summed up. But maybe that is how things ought to have been? This was the first congress in over 60 years at which decisions made in advance were not ostentatiously formalized, but a political struggle took place. But if you cast aside the foam and assess the very essence of the political process—what are the real results of the congress?

Facts

The congress adopted a program statement and instructed that a new party program be prepared on the basis of it. For purposes of comparison, here are just a couple of extracts. From the new edition of the third program, adopted four years ago: "After adopting the third program at the 22d congress in 1961, the party mounted tremendous work in all spheres of communist building. Soviet society scored great successes in developing productive forces, economic and social relations, socialist democracy, and culture and in shaping the new man. **The country entered the stage of developed socialism.**" From the program statement of the 28th congress: "The essence of the policy of perestroyka lies in the transition from an authoritarian-bureaucratic system to a society of humane, democratic socialism." The difference is obvious.

New statutes which create opportunities for the democratization of party life have been adopted.

The membership of the CPSU Central Committee has been reduced from the 477 (members and candidate members) elected by the 27th congress to 412. It was originally proposed to reduce it still more drastically, approximately by half, but at all stages of the selection process up to and including the plenary session of the congress the number of candidates put forward by the delegates increased. Of the current Central Committee members just 56 (a little over one-eighth) were members of the former Central Committee. Of the 24 Politburo members just two (the general secretary and his deputy) were members of the former Politburo and 13, over half, were not even members of the former Central Committee.

Time will tell whether the party's top organ works well with this membership, but one thing is clear: We have a fundamentally new Central Committee. New in membership, which is quite important in itself if you recall that the Central Committee elected by the 27th congress was increasingly reluctant to support perestroyka as it deepened—this was openly displayed at recent plenums. And also new in terms of its social and official composition. We were accustomed to the bulk of Central Committee members being obkom [oblast party committee] secretaries, ministers, Central Committee apparatus officials, top military leaders. Now only a small proportion of the people elected by the congress belong to these categories. And no members of the government, not even its chairman, were elected to the Politburo. The new approach toward forming the Politburo and the new allocation of duties among Central Committee secretaries confirm that the departure from the concept of the "state party" is being completed here, at the level of central organs.

Among others, the congress adopted a resolution "On the CPSU's Policy in Implementing the Economic Reform and Switching to Market Relations." It adopted it despite the stubborn and extremely vigorous attempts of some of the delegates and guests to prevent this at all costs. There was an attempt to change the title and throw out the allusion to switching to the market, there were amendments that watered down the essence of the resolution, there was a demand, which the congress met, that the dissenting opinion of the minority be put on record. There was a sharp political struggle, one result of which, at any rate, is not in question: No one will now be able to say that the party has not discussed the problem of switching to market relations and does not approve this switch.

Those are a few facts that can be approved or disapproved, but can certainly not be denied. I admit when I drew up this list of the real results of the congress for myself, it actually slightly puzzled me. We had been expecting and fearing something else. The openly prepared attack by the opponents of perestroyka, their vocal pressure and not always honest methods, their rather good organization along with obvious errors by the supporters of of democratization—all this had aroused serious fears before the start of the congress. And all this had happened. But there was no turning back—a new step forward was taken.

So V. Shostakovskiy's statement sounded all the stranger. Doubly strange. First, in my view, it is not justified by the results of the congress, which instead of the expected success for the conservatives moved in the direction of democratization. Second, I simply cannot understand the essence of the appeal contained in it: To leave, but not to leave. The explanation soon followed—both at the congress and at the press conference with the participation of V. Shostakovskiy and his supporters: It is a question of a departure procedure ensuring a division of property. In this connection S. Sulakshin, a

participant in the press conference, proclaimed two goals: to weaken the CPSU and to "return plundered" property to the people.

Let us suppose that in fact one day some court on an as yet unclear legal basis awards some of the party's property to V. Shostakovskiy's supporters. Let us suppose that somehow it is established that a part of this property was illegally obtained by the party. Let us suppose that the supporters of the breakaway section of the Democratic Platform do indeed hand over all the property which they inherit to the people and themselves begin to work without offices and publishing houses, to earn everything from scratch. Will the people grow rich as a result of this? We cannot establish now how big the unknown part of the unknown part of the property that S. Sulakshin is hoping for will be. The value of all party property is known, it was disclosed to the congress. Everything accumulated by millions of communists over the decades amounts to a little over two one-thousandths of the country's national wealth. And the party's fixed capital amounts to less than two one-thousandths of the country's fixed capital. Its monetary contingency reserves are equivalent to the country's national income for less than three days. No, much as you might like, you cannot bolster the people's well-being with this. So for the sake of what is the cohesion of democratic forces that emerged at the congress being smashed? I suppose this move was prepared in advance, back before the congress: If the conservatives carry out their schemes, we will stage a "fine walkout." But the "fine" gesture did not come off, and after the failure of the conservatives the speech by some of the "democrats" cannot be interpreted as a blow to antiperestroyka forces. Objectively it is a blow to the center, which has just made a move toward further democratization. Those are the facts; I leave it to readers to assess them.

Ourselves

Ourselves is our social consciousness, as reflected by the congress. And above all the important portion of it represented by our economic consciousness. I will begin with just one episode. On the second day of the congress during the election of the commission to prepare the resolution "On the Transition to a Regulated Market Economy" Yu. Abramov, secretary of the party committee of the Krasnogorsk Mechanical Plant, proposed that the title of the resolution be amended to exclude the mention of the market since the congress had not yet discussed and recognized the "unequivocal and incontestable nature of this path of economic development." An astonishing logic was revealed in this episode: Ignorance constituted an argument. And the congress accepted this proposal by a majority of votes, after which it required considerable effort despite everything to secure the adoption of a resolution confirming the line of switching to the market. But that was not the end of the affair. Later, when the chairman proposed giving a hearing to Academician Abalkin, quite a large proportion of the delegates voted against. Calculation (taking into account the total number of delegates) shows that at least several hundred of the delegates who did not want to give a hearing to Abalkin were the same ones who voted against the resolution on the market. Apparently a case of "I don't know, and I don't want to know." V. Lobach, first secretary of the party gorkom [city party committee] and chairman of the city soviet from Lisichansk, came out with an even better remark: Since Abalkin's opinion is well known, he should not be included in the editorial commission. Indeed, how convenient: That is not my opinion, so there is no point in listning to it.

A frenzied desire for a miracle could be heard in the speeches of those who demanded alternatives to the market. After all, supporters of the market make no secret of the fact that the upcoming transition promises considerable difficulties and discomforts. Probably they are even going a bit far, forgetting to mention the advantages of the market system—not only economic but also social advantages. We also say little about the country's enormous reserves and the potential for countering inflation. A critical examination of the program for the transition to the market proposed by the government could have been made from this viewpoint, as the Supreme Soviet did. Of course, one can only approve of the government's determination to end the 60-year experiment on ourselves and at long last recognize the objective economic laws that are today recognized not only by the capitalist world but also by East Europe, China, and Vietnam. But the proposed specific scenario for the transition is still a long way from perfect.

However, there was no discussion of this at the congress. They continued to channel the debate into a discussion of the question of whether the Earth rotates on its axis—that is the only possible assessment of the scientific level of some speeches. They fiercely demanded alternatives to the market—so the stores are full, the goods are of the very best quality, they are cheap, and people don't have to overexert themselves at work. Whoever works and whoever does not work—so everyone has every possible guarantee. And an alternative was promised, and its author was named: Prof. A. Sergeyev. And he was given the floor—it is especially important to note this because, in their speeches from every conceivable platform, he and his supporters never tire of claiming that they are not allowed to speak. Though he was not a delegate, he was allowed to speak, although scarcely one-tenth of the delegates who had asked to speak spoke in the debates.

But he mounted the rostrum. And he said: "When a guy's pants wear out in a particular place, he does not take them off straight away, he carries on wearing them until he gets some new ones. But we have forcibly torn the old economic mechanism off our economy, yet to this day no one can really say when we will have the new clothes, or even what will replace the old pants. Whether it will be a Scottish kilt, or an Indian sari, or only a bow tie." (Laughter, applause.) No, the whole speech was not a demonstration of wit. There were also mentions of "the key provisions of Marxism-Leninism," "class betrayal,"

and, the favorite theme of the day, the shadow economy. The only thing that was missing was analysis of the country's economic situation and the slightest attempt to analyze real processes. And there was no alternative program either.

Never mind, it is annoying, of course, that he got carried away with oratorical devices and missed the opportunity to develop his program from a rostrum that the whole country can hear: the rostrum of a plenary session of the party congress. Maybe as a specialist he simply could not bring himself to set out his complex ideas to a broad audience? After all, there was also provision for the work of sections, which met "according to interests." There, among the knowledgeable, he could unfold his program at the "Socioeconomic Policy" section! Thank goodness, the congress secretariat saw to matters, delegates received transcripts of all the sections, they also learned of those speeches which they did not hear. I open the transcript and I read: "When a guy's pants wear out..." And so on and so forth, all the same old witticisms and incantations, merely at a bit greater length. And the same brilliant lack of real analysis and real alternatives to what others are proposing.

The congress included almost 80 delegates in the commission to prepare the resolution on socioeconomic policy. Delegates of all sorts of ranks and titles, of different professions, of different views, and from different regions. Yu. Abramov, who had proposed changing the title of the resolution. V. Tyulkin from Leningrad, a fierce supporter of A. Sergeyev. L. Golyas from Tolyatti, the author of what was indeed an alternative idea—not an alternative to the market, but a different path of transition to it. Workers, academicians, plant directors, party committee secretaries, ministers. They diligently studied all proposals, insistently asked people to submit all alternative proposals, and discussed everything that was submitted. And eventually Commission Chairman N. Ryzhkov told the congress with every justification: "There is no concept for stabilizing the economy without a switch to market relations." Once again A. Sergeyev fought his way to the microphone and complained that his ideas were being ignored. In a rather tired, quiet voice N. Ryzhkov replied that Sergeyev's proposals had been examined and he had spoken out repeatedly, including at the congress. And he added: What Sergeyev is proposing "is very familiar to us, for we lived for decades according to that system." The audience responded with applause, although the remark had been made without any bombast. Let us say for the sake of truth that Sergeyev was also applauded—many people applaud him, he is a good speaker.

It remained only to vote. And 2,655 delegates—1,736 more than had supported the market version eight days previously—voted for the commission's proposal to approve the title of the resolution containing once again a mention of the line of switching to the market. While 1,508 voted against. But when on the final day of the congress the question arose of reflecting the minority opinion in the documents, the number of people voting in favor had declined by another 300. I think that even the remaining people were retaining their negative attitude toward the switch to the market more out of ignorance than out of conviction. It is all the more annoying that there were so few opportunities for calm discussion of real problems: All too often what prevailed was the atmosphere of a rally where an apt and felicitous remark overcomes even the most sensible views.

Just when will we tire of rallies and begin simply to discuss our affairs?

Unofficial Congress Impressions Report Published

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["Impressions from the Congress" reprinted from the unofficial congress newspaper "13TH MICROPHONE"]

[Text] **The Floor As Seen by the Presidium**

Mikhail Gorbachev:

My view of the floor? The same as that of the rest of the country.

The same worry, anxiety, demands. And yet the country and those on the floor don't see eye to eye. The country perhaps has greater desire to move forward, not to hesitate, but to press on with the changes.

Givi Gumbaridze:

Wow! I would like all the people on the floor see what is seen from the platform. Many delegates would perhaps then have acted differently. From the platform we see groups which constantly and noisely react to what is said by the speakers. Noisy reaction follows when some of the ideas proved unacceptable. I would rather like to see a gathering who are united in trying to understand what was being said by Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze. Failure to understand what they were saying will land us again in the same abyss.

The Presidium As Seen by the Floor

Boris Yeltsin:

The impression is that members of the presidium don't care. They make no attempt to stop speakers reeling off reports of what they've done, no desire to alter the atmosphere. What is patently obvious, though, is over organization. All the moving along according to the old scenario.

Once again is it not likely that a Sverdlovsk delegate would soon be given the floor. Why? Sverdlovsk is unpredictable.

The congress is drifting to the right. With silent approval from the presidium. So far there's not a flicker of hope.

Anatoliy Sobchak:

I think the presidium could have lent the congress more democracy and dynamism had it accepted proposals made by some delegates on making parallel reports by members of the different platforms. But that could have charged the atmosphere, something the presidium quite obviously would like to avoid. Still, all the tensions are yet to come when it's time to discuss the drafts of the programme statement, the CPSU rules, candidates to the party's elected bodies. There will start a tough and uncompromising struggle, on which the quality of the future party will depend. So let's reserve our assessment of the presidium for later on.

Anatoliy Denisov:

The presidium? It's the usual kind. Like all of us they have to listen to the many extremely reactionary speeches that put us back many decades. I want to address the congress to say that under no condition should it be allowed that control of the congress be taken over by those who prefer to use slogans, to call to build on our land a fortress of socialism, rather than to grow grain.

Newspaper Confiscated

PM1807145690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 28, 22-29 Jul 90 p 7

[Yegor Yakovlev article: "Scanning Three Issues of the Most Partisan Paper"]

[Text] "13TH MICROPHONE" is a newspaper wholly written and created by and for the delegates to the 28th Party Congress. It is being typeset and printed by the Moskovskaya Pravda Party Publishing House. Perhaps, this is the only labour watch in honour of the current congress. Do you remember any similar publication? I don't.

Nevertheless some delegates to the congress have received the "13TH MICROPHONE" with distaste and obvious irritation. Isn't it because these four pages, the format of a factory newspaper, cannot be drowned in hand clapping, hissing and foot stamping? It is impossible to deal summarily with them the way the aggressive majority of the hall dealt with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, or with people's start—in the genuine not the official sense—Mikhail Ulyanov.

Nevertheless everything was done to make sure that the "13TH MICROPHONE" should not reach congress delegates.

Any absurdity needed legal substantiations according to Lenin: juridically correct, but a mockery is substance. To bring out the "13TH MICROPHONE"—this job was undertaken by a group of delegates in creative professions—there was a need to register the group itself as was correctly noted at the congress' Secretariat. But the applications requested registration, submitted to the Secretariat in due form, disappeared. And the second one, again written and signed by many delegates also vanished without a trace. Where? Members of the Secretariat made a helpless gesture: not a single paper of ours had been reported missing.

As a result, the first issue was labeled contraband. Therefore the Secretariat decided to deep the second issue away from the congress. Not with its own hands, of course. The printing of the second issue, which delegates-enthusiasts carried on thier own shoulders, was confiscated at the threshold of the Palace of Congress by a KGB officer named Velichko. Who told him to do this? The staff member of an organization which dislikes jokes answered simply: "The Secretariat of the congress." The guards tried to remove even the several copies of the issue which we had on us. But they gave him these attempts when they realized that this couldn't be done without searching delegates.

As it befits a classical detective story, it had a happy ending. With a day's delay the second issue reached the delegates. The group was registered.

So what's the matter if the outcome was favourable? The point is that the most important issues, discussed from the congress rostrum, being with episodes of little importance—such as that with the "13TH MICROPHONE."

We deliberated on how to return its erstwhile prestige and respect to the party. And we don't care a bit as to what each of us looks like in this case. The same as those who staged a "scandal in a respectable family" by trying to keep the paper away from the congress.

We are prepared to learn to argue. But it's amazing: so far no one has brought to the "13TH MICROPHONE" even one little item which would vindicate positions opposing those already published.

We foam at the mouth about depoliticizing the Army and the KGB: some insist on this, others maintain that this must not be done but when KGB officers start "dealing" with delegates to the congress, not even waiting till it ends. I have no desire to debate this issue.

Finally, on unity between words and deeds, practically every speaker calls for stepping up the struggle against crime. And at the same time we are being vigilantly guarded by 200 or 300 (who will count them?) KGB officials. Only a party colleague has a right to check my party membership card or my party mandate as a delegate. Isn't it possible to find in Moscow young party members to check out documents not worse than the guards trained in this and hired evidently, with our party membership dues?

Political & Social

People's Deputies Announce CPSU Departures

LD1807143590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow—At a news conference here today USSR People's Deputy Academician Ryzhov, who is in the

Interregional Group, made a statement about leaving the ranks of the CPSU. The aim of this step, in Ryzhov's words, is to promote the more active development of the process of democratization of society. Journalists were told of their withdrawal from the ranks of the CPSU by USSR people's deputies Stankevich, Bocharov, Logunov, Yablokov, Tikhonov, and Yemelyanov.

Eight Moscow Soviet deputies also announced they were leaving the ranks of the CPSU and joining the Democratic Platform.

President Council Scheduled to Meet 20 Jul

LD1907101690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 19 Jul 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] An INTERFAX correspondent has learned that a session of the Presidential Council of the USSR is to be held on Friday 20 July. The draft of a new Union treaty will be examined at it. This document will then be submitted for discussion at a session of the country's Supreme Soviet which is planned to open at the beginning of August. A package of top-priority measures for the transition to a market economy will also be discussed at the session [of the Presidential Council].

Draft Union Treaty To Be Examined 20 Jul

LD1807214590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2051 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The INTERFAX agency reported today that the draft of the new Union treaty will be examined by the Presidential Council on Friday [20 July]. It is planned to submit the draft for examination by the Supreme Soviet afterwards.

CPSU Control Commission Publishes Regulations

PM1807153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

["Regulations on CPSU Central Control Commission"]

[Text] 1. The CPSU Central Control Commission is elected by the party congress with a view to the exercise of control by communists and party organizations over the activity of the party central organs and their apparatuses. The commission is guided by the CPSU Statutes and this regulation, is independent in its activity, and is subordinated to the CPSU Congress and conference.

2. The CPSU Central Control Commission:

—exercises control over the fulfillment of the CPSU Program documents and CPSU Statutes and the decisions of party congresses and conferences and over the observance of humaneness, collegiality, glasnost, and other democratic principles in the activity of the CPSU Central Committee and its executive organs, appeals against their decisions if they do not accord with program and statutory provisions or existing legislation, and takes steps against bureaucracy, subjectivism, and arbitrariness in party policy, and against the suppression of criticism and abuses;

—promotes the consolidation of the unity of party ranks and party comradeship and the enhancement of the authority and independence of primary party organizations, defends the communist's rights, and sees to it that the minority's right to defend its position is not infringed in party organizations and elected party organs and that the decisions which are taken are fulfilled by all communists;

—controls the execution of the CPSU budget and audits the financial and economic activity of the CPSU Central Committee and its institutions, printed organs, publishing houses, and enterprises;

—verifies in the CPSU Central Committee and in its executive organs and apparatus, institutions and enterprises the observance of the established procedure for examining appeals from party organizations and letters and statements;

—examines the appeals addressed to it from a party organization or from communists, submits proposals to eliminate the shortcomings revealed, demands explanations, and, in accordance with the CPSU Statutes, takes to task any communist who by his actions undermines the party's prestige. A CPSU Central Control Commission decision on an expulsion from the party is brought to the notice of the relevant primary party organization and if it has objections is examined a second time with the participation of representatives of this party organization, after which it is deemed to have been adopted;

—examines appeals against decisions of the Union republic Communist Party Central Committees and their respective control commissions on expulsion from the CPSU and on sanctions;

—renders methodological aid to the control commissions of the Union republic communist parties, republican party organizations of autonomous republics, and kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon party organizations, and analyzes the practice of party control.

3. The CPSU Central Control Commission is elected with a membership determined by the party congress. Communists elected to the CPSU Central Control Commission cannot at the same time belong to the CPSU Central Committee or be workers in its apparatus.

Plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Control Commission are held as necessary but no less than twice a year and also at the demand of one third of the members of the Central Control Commission.

4. The CPSU Central Control Commission elects at a plenum from among its members the CPSU Central

Control Commission presidium, including the deputy chairmen of the CPSU Central Control Commission, and creates, from the ranks of Central Control Commission members and other communists approved as advisers, permanent commissions and control groups and other organs and determines the powers of the Central Control Commission presidium and the organs it creates.

Every year the Central Control Commission Presidium submits a report on its activity to the CPSU Central Control Commission.

5. The members of the Central Control Commission take part with a voice but no vote in the work of CPSU Central Committee plenums and commissions while the CPSU Central Control Commission and his deputies take part in sessions of the Politburo and other CPSU Central Committee executive organs.

6. The CPSU Central Control Commission performs its work openly and regularly informs party organizations of its activity and the decisions it has taken are published in the party press. Central Control Commission members report regularly in party organizations.

7. The CPSU Central Control Commission uses party budget funds to maintain the apparatus necessary for its work and provide material and technical backup for its activity. Funds for the maintenance of the CPSU Central Control Commission are determined at joint plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

8. Differences arising between the CPSU Central Control Commission and the CPSU Central Committee are resolved by conciliation commissions created on the basis of the principles of parity and also at joint plenums and sessions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the CPSU Central Control Commission Presidium. A joint decision is deemed to have been adopted if at least two thirds of the votes of members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission are cast for it during a separate [razdelnoye] vote.

9. The CPSU Central Control Commission adopts resolutions on questions within its competence and compiles acts on the basis of audits and brings them to the notice of the CPSU Central Committee and the leaders of the audited institutions and enterprises, which must report to the CPSU Central Control Commission on the measures they have taken.

CPSU Central Control Commission members have the right to make use of all party documents.

KGB Searches for Mass Graves in Moscow

LD1807112190 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—"The USSR State Security Committee (KGB), the Moscow and Moscow region KGB departments conduct, simultaneously with work to rehabilitate the victims of the repressions of the 1930s-40s and early 1950s, a search for their graves in Moscow and the Moscow region," a KGB spokesman told TASS.

"Information has recently been received that the Donskoye and Vagankovskoye cemeteries have such graves on their territory and that the area of Butovo may also have a mass grave.

"However, more accurate information about specific places where the repressed were buried has yet not been obtained.

"Necessary identification measures are being taken for this purpose, including the questioning of the local population and former security police (NKVD) staff. The results will be presented to the Moscow Public Prosecutor's Office.

"Versions about the burials of innocent victims in other parts of Moscow and the Moscow region are also studied.

"The Moscow City Council was informed about the information received."

'Democratic Platform' Members Criticized

90US1122A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by historians N. Zolotarev and V. Shapko: "Those Who Are Prompting Dissociation"]

[Text] We would like to take issue with those who do not accept a number of basic principles of restructuring in the party recorded in the draft new CPSU Rules. We refer primarily to the position of party members grouped around the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU."

They reject the system of power which has taken shape in our country as a result of deformations in the building of socialism, the conversion of the CPSU into the nucleus of this system, and the statization of all social structures, and they oppose the preservation of the party's monopoly position in society and the state. We also hold to positions of categorical rejection of all that is negative which has come from the remote and comparatively recent past.

They maintain that without having changed the position of the CPSU in society and without having restructured the party itself on a democratic basis, it will be impossible to ensure the transfer of all the fullness of power to the soviets and implement fundamental restructuring in society. To this premise, as to a number of proposals of a democratic nature pertaining to party building, there is no objection either. The party has for almost two years been working on establishing the sovereignty of the soviets and has itself been reorganizing for activity under the conditions of a separation of party, state, and economic functions, and subsequently with the presence in society of other political parties. It is to this that the new propositions in the draft CPSU Rules are geared.

How is the renewed party conceived of? The authors of the "Democratic Platform" see it as their strategic task to accomplish by means of the democratic reforming of the CPSU "a transition from the totalitarian model of the party to a modern democratic model of a parliamentary-type party within the framework of a multiparty system." Let us leave aside for now the question of how and in what such a parliamentary party would manifest itself, according to their ideas, in social and political life. To judge by the document, this is not entirely clear to the authors themselves either.

In their opinion, the arterial path of the party's democratization is demarcation of the radical and conservative wings in its ranks. Demarcation is conceived of as a process of ideological and organizational struggle conducted in two stages. At the first, different platforms, groups, and factions are formed in the party. At the second, the demarcation culminates in these platforms and factions becoming the basis for the emergence of several political parties offering different models of socialism and ways of achieving them. The CPSU would thus disintegrate and cease to exist, and other parties of a formally socialist orientation would be formed in its place. There are many in the CPSU, we think, who are opposed to such "democratization".

Before uniting it is necessary to dissociate—these words of Lenin's, which have become a catch phrase, are now being repeated increasingly often. Not that often, however, is attention called to the fact that Lenin saw as the desired consequence of dissociation not the division but the consolidation of the party ranks and their cohesion on the program platform which determines the principles of the party's development and its activity. It is this that we also want today because only a strong, cohesive communist party may be a guarantor of the success of perestroyka.

Of course, the departure from the party of those who are defeated in ideological struggle and who persist in their rejection of the positions of the majority could be inevitable. But given any outcome of dissociation, the party should remain in the formation of revolutionary forces and continue to carry its own banner. Why condemn it to self-liquidation if some unstable persons leave it?

But perhaps the radicals are counting on winning the argument with the conservatives and, when the latter are left in a minority, expelling them from the party, thereby acquiring the right to represent the renewed CPSU? Let us suppose this is what happens. What would the internal arrangement of such a party be? If we put together the fragmented pronouncements of our opponents and their statutory efforts, quite a definite picture emerges. This would be a party completely divorced from its historical roots and the social base which has taken shape; a party which has forfeited its ties to the working masses and which has subordinated its organization entirely to parliamentary activity, and work with people, to the requirements of electoral struggle. It is to such a result that realization of the proposals concerning abandonment of the work- place-territorial basis of party composition, elimination of the local party authorities, and finally elevation of the CPSU's parliamentary faction to the position of a particular party body independent of the Central Committee and subordinate only to the congress could lead.

Yes, our party has put itself in an equal position with other social and political organizations which are emerging and which will emerge as a multiparty system takes shape in the country. Like all of them, the CPSU will struggle for political leadership in society at free elections and via other forms of expression of Soviet citizens' pleasure. This is already recorded in the draft party rules. However, such a change in the party's position by no means presupposes that the CPSU should distance itself from participation in the solution of the urgent problems which the country is experiencing and withdraw its structures from the work place and public and state organizations. We cannot make an absolute of the tasks of political struggle in the period of elections to the soviets and make the CPSU a community of politicians divorced from the day-to-day life of the people and having no calling other than election maneuvers. This would also damage the CPSU's parliamentary activity, not to mention its work as the ruling party in the state. It is obvious that it is essential to keep and consolidate our party at the front line of socialist renewal everywhere reforms are being implemented and restructuring processes are under way.

Statements are being heard to the effect that accomplishing a fundamental democratic reform of the party—from either the top or the bottom—is impossible. After all, the CPSU is, we are being assured, a basically totalitarian party which has never had democratic experience. We emphatically disagree.

Our opponents maintain that virtually throughout its whole history the Bolshevik Party has operated under conditions (underground activity, the war, the Stalin times, the social stagnation period) which could not have failed to have imparted to it the nature of an overly centralized, hierarchically composed paramilitary organization. Outwardly such a conclusion appears convincing. That is the question: What kind of party was created?

Everyone who evaluates the historical path of the CPSU objectively knows the components from which Lenin designed the model of a workers' party in Russia. The main, fundamental component was, as Lenin put it, real, not toy democratism. It was on this basis that our party was created, accepting all that was progressive and democratic which had been produced by the experience of the Russian workers' movement and international revolutionary social democracy.

Democratism was not only declared but really established in party life as soon as the least opportunity for

this emerged. We recall 1905 and Lenin's article "Reorganization of the Party," which proposed a number of important measures pertaining to the development of intraparty democracy. The Bolsheviks began to implement these measures in an atmosphere of the first democratic liberties wrested from tsarism by the people's revolutionary struggle. We recall the year 1917 when, at the high water of mass democratism which inundated the country, the Bolshevik Party also was transformed, revealing increasingly fully its inherent democratic potential.

We recall the start of peaceful building following the civil war. Now many people are criticizing the well-known resolution of the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress "Party Unity," which allegedly did away with all shoots of intraparty democracy. Ignoring the historical dependence of this document, critics are reluctant to notice that in the same period the party, while protecting itself against a split, accomplished a transition from extreme organizational centralism born of the war situation to the all embracing democratization of its internal life, electivity, glasnost, and the enlistment of the communists in decisive participation in all-party affairs.

We are told: These periods were short-lived. But does this detract from their significance? It was at that time, at moments of abrupt historical changes, when each day was the equivalent of years of tranquil development, that the party acquired important experience of a restructuring of its life and activity on a genuinely democratic basis. And however the vicissitudes of fate have fractured and deformed the character of the party, this experience has not vanished without trace.

Minister Sees 'No Grounds for Optimism' on Crime

PM1807084790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by V. Prokopenko: "V. Bakatin: '"There Are No Grounds for Optimism..." A Kind of "Report on Work Done" Was Heard Yesterday During a Briefing at the USSR MVD"]

[Text] Crime in the country is still rising but the rates of growth have dropped appreciably—14.6 percent on average for the country over the last half year against 32.1 percent for the same period last year. More than 1,263,000 crimes have been recorded—an increase of 160,800 on the first half of last year. "The growth rates will drop before the end of the year," Vadim Viktorovich predicted, "but there are, regrettably, no grounds for optimism. The backlog of unsolved crimes is outstripping the increase in crime."

There have been a few fundamental changes in the work of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]: The minister confirmed that with the abrogation of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution the CPSU Central Committee does not supervise the activity of law-enforcement organs.

The policy of reinforcing the sovereignty of republic internal affairs ministries is clear. An accord has been secured with the Russian government on separating the functions of the USSR MVD and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] MVD. Similar agreements are being elaborated with Estonia and Latvia.

The USSR MVD no longer wants to guard all manner of establishments and offices. Some 10,000 of the 80,000 people engaged in this work will transfer to keeping order on the streets in the near future.

Their persistence in drawing public attention to the problem of increasing crime has borne fruit. An ordinary militiaman's wages have risen by 40 rubles [R] on average since January, and as of May officers are to obtain another R70-80. The Law on the Soviet Militia went through on the first reading, and an amendment was adopted regarding the use of electronic equipment in practical investigation work. Our country now has 5,000 more investigators.

The USSR MVD has received 6,600 automobiles and 4,500 walkie-talkies. Labor collectives have transferred R[illegible].8 million since last October. Their enthusiasm has somewhat waned since January—only R70.2 million has been paid.

"But that is not enough," V.V. Bakatin warned, "We are short on more than R150 million. In any country where market relations are already developed the crime rate is generally ten times what it is in our country. We must expect an even greater rise in crime and must, consequently, spend more money on combating it."

Crimes Against Foreigners Increase in Moscow

LD1807162590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1115 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—In the first six months of this year, 429 crimes were perpetrated against foreign citizens in Moscow, Yuriy Fedoseyev, acting head of the capital's crime squad, announced at a briefing today at the Main Administration of the Moscow Militia. He pointed out that this was 103 crimes more than in the same period last year.

The crime squad spokesman reported that crimes against foreign citizens were predominantly crimes against property—burglaries, street thefts, thefts from cars... but, according to him, cases of grave crimes have also been recorded—one rape, a number of robberies, including several with violence.

Analysis shows, Yuriy Fedoseyev noted, that in Moscow crimes are perpetrated mainly against three categories of foreign citizens. He reported that the greatest number of illegal acts were committed against foreign students studying in the USSR who, according to crime squad figures, themselves provoked them in many cases. For instance, they bring video equipment and computers

into the USSR, and in their attempts to sell them at a profit they get in contact with dubious elements. Or else they conduct operations connected with the sale of foreign currency at "black market" prices. It is usually during such deals that the crimes are committed.

The two other categories, Yuriy Fedoseyev said, comprise tourists and foreign citizens living in Moscow for a long time (officials of various foreign missions, firms and joint enterprises). The overwhelming majority of crimes against these two categories of foreigners are crimes against property.

The capital's crime squad spokesman also announced that in the first half of 1990, foreigners in Moscow committed 65 crimes. They included two murders, robbery, rape, a number of thefts of state and personal property, and cases of malicious hooliganism.

Council of Ministers Decision on Antiques Trade

LD1907090390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1435 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—With the aim of preventing the illegal export from the USSR of works of art and antiques manufactured before 1945 and representing considerable artistic, historical or other cultural value—icons, church utensils, objects of religious worship, works of painting, graphics, sculpture, furniture, carpets, objects of decorative and applied art—the USSR Council of Ministers has decided that trade in them henceforth will be conducted only at art exhibition salons and at special secondhand shops of state commerce.

In connection with this, cooperatives and joint enterprises being set up on USSR territory with the participation of foreign organizations and firms, and international associations and organizations will not have the right to engage in the buying and selling of the above-mentioned works of art and antiques.

The Councils of Ministers of Union republics are instructed to make a list of cities in which it is advisable to create specialized secondhand shops and also, jointly with union ministries of culture, trade and finances, to work out and confirm rules for the secondhand trade in works of art and antiques.

Bill on Public Associations Discussed

LD1707225390 Moscow TASS in English 2249 GMT 17 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Aladinskiy]

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS—The bill on public associations, adopted by the Soviet Parliament in its first reading last spring, furnishes a legal basis for the multiparty system taking shape in the Soviet Union.

While the USSR Supreme Soviet is on holiday, lawyers continue to work on the text of the bill, preparing it for the second reading.

"I regard the bill as an immense step towards the realisation of the political rights and freedoms of citizens, particularly if compared with current legislation, which was drawn up under Stalin," Dmitriy Shutko, leader of the public organisations problems group of the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, told TASS.

Under the document, the lawyer explained, no preliminary consent by appropriate state agencies is required to establish a public association. Founders hold a congress or a conference, elect leading bodies, adopt a charter and then register the association.

"For the first time the freedom of association, which all emancipatory movements in Russia championed—from the Decembrists to the Social Democrats—is beginning to be exercised in the Soviet Union in practice," he emphasised.

At the same time, Shutko believes, a number of provisions should be added for more precise definition. In particular, he said that "the minimum number of founders of all-Union political parties should be raised in order to prevent the disorganisation of the country's social life."

The bill-provided number of founder—not less than 1,000—is too low and does not accord with the practice of Western countries where a larger membership is needed to register a party, Shutko said.

For the same reason—in the interests of social stability—"the legal act should directly ban the establishment of so-called local parties, as is done in the legislation of many countries."

Collective membership should also be limited, Shutko said. Some parties may have a small membership but have powerful sponsors, due to which they will find themselves in a position of strength, the lawyer emphasised.

Multiparty System Restoration Reviewed

PM1607163890 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 28, 10-16 Jul 90 pp 10-11

[Article by Professor Anatoliy Butenko: "After Seventy Years of Autocracy. A Multiparty System: Real And Decorative"]

[Text] We are, in fact, restoring a multiparty system, not creating it anew: it existed after the October revolution, but was soon destroyed by Lenin and Soviet power. A multiparty system, which involves the participation and competition of different political parties in managing societal affairs, is a natural prerequisite of a socially-differentiated society, one of the most important

methods of using different interests and pluralistic opinions for the progress of society. The history of class society is an impressive monument to the multiparty system, which has always exhibited, with all its ups and downs, inexhaustible viability and efficiency. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the multiparty system reached the peak of its evolution in capitalist society where the acuteness of class antagonisms and conflicts has always been manifested in the emergence and disappearance of various socio-political associations and entities, in the confrontation of different political parties and their coalitions, in the establishment and dissolution of inter-party blocs and alliances.

When they destroyed multiparty system here, neither Lenin nor the Bolshevik party at large offered any theoretical arguements. In fact, no such arguments could have been possible. With the growth of political awareness of the lower depths of society and the broadening of democracy, which was recognized as the true form of the power of the people, one had every reason to expect a new upsurge in political pluralism and the multiparty system, not their curtailment and eventual destruction.

Thus, post-October Russia failed to implement what was a pressing necessity. The multiparty system was destroyed in 1918, and the unavoidable and objective pluralism of economic and political interests was forced into a rigid framework of a one-party system of administration, which was the most convenient system both for the authoritarian power and Josef Stalin's totalitarianism later.

The 70-year Communist Party autocracy, which alienated working people from power and concentrated power in the hands of the party apparatus, demonstrated that the rejection of the multiparty system, which is one of the most improtant gains of civilization and a shared human value, leads to the suffering of innumerable victims. When there is no struggle of opinions and state functioning is based on armed force and violence, no state committed to the rule of law can be possible. Caesar said law and arms cannot cohabitate.

The current turning to a multiparty system is a result of tye evoution of pluralism. In fact, the multiparty system is the open and most advanced formed of political pluralism. Consequently, acceptance and simultaneous rejection of the multiparty system is absurd. If political pluralism is not manifested in the political life of a country through the multiparty system, it happens due to antidemocratic laws which present political pluralism from manifesting itself in its most advanced form.

One question, naturally, arises: Since the Communist Party has shed its monopoly on power, political pluralism is developing, and various socio-political organizations and assocations are permitted (these are popular fronts, various alliances and about thirty newly established political parties), does this not mean that Soviet society is already living under a multiparty system?

In my opinion, it does not, although I am convinced that both the leadership of the CPSU and its conservative critics are prepared to declare that a multiparty system has alerady appeared in this country. The following reasons are offered to substantiate this declaration.

First The CPSU does not have a monopoly on ideology and politics any more. As a result of glasnost, various political views, opinions and ideas have appeared. Necessary prerequisites for a pluralism of opinions, which is the basis of a real multiparty system, have already been created after the state stopped suppressing dissent and allowed the establishment of informal public organizations.

By the way, these progressive moves by the architects of perestroika meant serious losses for the Communist Party itself: pluralism of opinions and the emergence of informal public organizations have created serious difficulties for local party bodies. The development of informal movements and their criticisms levelled at local party bodies confronted the latter with a situation similar to what a multiparty system really is, although these local party bodies continue to receive instructions and directives from the centre, that is they continue to live in the manner of one-party rule. I believe that this situation, for which the leadership is responsible, is the reason why the party's authority has sunk and the ranks of party functionaries have been confused. This is also a brilliant example of the main drawback of perestroika: the gap between demolition of the old system and construction of new relations and mechanisms.

There is no need to remind one how many problems arise when one has to act under conditions of a multiparty system, pretending it does not exist. All parties and organizations which are competing with the communists obviously have an advantage: they can publicly analyze and criticize the programme and actions of the CPSU, while their own programmes, principles and actions remain outside of criticism, since officially they do not exist. One simply cannot oppose that which does not exist. In fact, these parties are not a mirage and are already scoring more and more points in their opposition to communists in various republics and regions of the country, who were instructed by the centre to ignore other parties because it was the centre that continued to rule as if other parties and movements never existed.

Second After the abolition of Articles 6 and 7 of the Soviet Constitution, which sealed the Communist Party's monopoly on power, another objective circumstance appeared, which allows us to say that a multiparty system already exists in this country. I have in mind here the actual formation and registration of political parties and associations.

Nonetheless, I believe all this is still not a reason to recognize the existence of a real multiparty system in the Soviet Union, because one must remember that a multiparty system can be **real** and can be **decorative**. In many

countries of "real socialism," for instance in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the multiparty system was purely decorative: several political parties and socio-political organizations did exist, but the Communist Party dominated the political scene, while the other parties served as a disguise for the political monopoly of the communist Party (called the Polish United Workers' Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). This decorative (non-existent?) multiparty system failed to protect people, did not prevent the construction of Stalinist socialism in those countries, and crumbled when pushed by the popular masses.

It is obvious that we do not need a decorative multiparty system, although some forces in this country intend to breed as many impotent political organizations as possible in order to preserve the status quo.

We will be able to speak of a multiparty system in this country only when this system starts acting as a real motor of social progress. A real multiparty system is such an organization of socio-political life in which at least two political parties compete in the political arena, which are compatible in their voice and authority, and whose socio-political programmes are original and different. One of the main and most important features of all multiparty system is the opposition of socio-political programmes, competition of these programmes for people's votes, competition as a form of political parties' struggle to receive a popular mandate for the implementation of their programmes as state policies, and alternation of political parties at the helm.

Some readers may consider this a heresy, especially remembering Moscow's dogmatic crusade against Eurocommunism, when political parties' alternation and the rejection of the concept of the proletarian dictatorship was labelled "pure revisionism." It may be useful to recall that the concept of alternation of political parties, that is, of possible changes in the Communist Party's standing in society, was originally developed by Lenin. Considering possible moves of an emerging multiparty system, Soviet style, assessing the prospects of cooperation and competition of different political parties supporting Soviet power, Lenin wrote in July 1917: "In their class composition, the Soviets were organs of the movement of the workers and peasants, a ready-made form of their dictatorship. had they possessed full state power, the main shortcoming of the petty-bourgeois groups, their chief sin, that of trusting capitalists, really would have been overcome, would have been criticized by the experience of their own measures. **The change of classes and parties in power** (italic by A.B.) could have proceed peacefuly within the Soviets, provided the latter wielded exclusive and undivided power."

One can easily imagine how much anger would have been caused as a reaction to these words by today's proponents of one-party rule, had they not been uttered by Lenin.

Thus, so far we do not have a real multiparty system, and a multiparty system is only taking shape. today two ways are most probable:

A split in the CPSU into two or more large political parties of socialist orientation, powerful enough to compete with each other and advocating their visions of socialism and the ways to implement their concepts and ideas; gradual and lengthy development of the existing small parties and informal organizations into large political parties capable of countering the CPSU or its successors with an alternative programme of non-socialist development which goes beyond the Communist Party's concept of perestroika and renewal of socialism.

Naturally, there is no need to make haste, but sooner or later society's choice will be made. Personally, I have no doubts that the 28th congress of the CPSU will demonstrate along which way the Soviet multiparty system will develop.

Success of New INTERFAX Agency Reported

PM1807145490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 28, 22-29 Jul 90 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Kiselev citing INTERFAX chief editor Mikhail Kommissar: "Independence Means Objectivity, Says Mikhail Kommissar, Chief Editor of INTERFAX News Agency"]

[Text] Suddenly a "new baby" is showing its obstinacy. In blessing the birth of INTERFAX agency with its signature, the administration of the USSR Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting was sure to open yet another channel of strictly verified and finely measured information for foreign readers and listeners. But then, quite unexpectedly, INTERFAX flatly refused to sort, according to political and other time-serving considerations, its correspondents' reports on the events taking place here in the USSR. The agency staff believes that the information it receives needs to be made public as promptly as possible, and without comments so that readers themselves can form their own opinion.

The new agency has been established by Radio Moscow and the Soviet-French-Italian joint venture Interquadro, which has invested the initial capital. At first INTERFAX was orientated towards foreign correspondents accredited in Moscow, transmitting daily by telefax several reviews of flash news in Russian, English and Spanish, preparing three thematic weeklies on crucial events in the USSR and exclusive interviews with prominent statesmen and public figures. Censorship was not yet abolished in the country, but INTERFAX immediately refused to submit its materials for preliminary visa.

As a result, the number of subscribers is steadily growing. BBC employee Alexei Mayorov said: "We willingly use information by INTERFAX. Its work meets world standards."

"We are not out for sensation," says Mikhail Kommissar. "Our task is to objectively present the event."

For example, long before publication they knew that an open letter to Soviet communists exists in the depths of the apparat of the CPSU Central Committee, which subsequently aroused such a tempestuous response. But they also knew that no final decision has been passed on this letter and therefore refrained from making a preliminary report.

But the agency circulated the summary of the precongress party platform a few days before Mikhail Gorbachev acquainted the party's Central Committee with this document. In the same way INTERFAX anticipated the official statement at the USSR Supreme Soviet on the impending reform of transition to a market economy, enumerated the whole package of documents, drawn up under the guidance of Leonid Abalkin, Deputy Prime Minister.

All leading foreign media started their reports with a sensation and, for the first time, they were in Soviet and not Western interpretation. At the same time Mikhail Kommissar was giving explanations in the Kremlin offices, saying he was ready to answer for likely mistakes, but guaranteed the authenticity of published information. Formerly such documents were kept in great secrecy unless they were made public from the highest rostrum. Thank God, the times are changing.

More and more frequently the leading media refer to INTERFAX, all facilities of which are accommodated in several small rooms of Radio Moscow. The gigantic TASS, controlling every word, is obviously losing in many positions.

According to Mikhail Kommissar, at first TASS ostentatiously didn't pay any attention to its potential rival. Then it made attempts to rebuff it, and later offered to buy for hard currency the information prepared by the independent agency. Being turned down, it began to deny some of the INTERFAX reports. But this only added popularity to the new agency, in keeping with the laws of competition.

Local Soviet Challenges Arctic Atomic Test Plan

PM1707102390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Viktor Filippov: "Will the Secrets of the Northern Test Range Be Revealed?"]

[Text] Naryan-Mar—A session of the Nenetskiy Okrug Soviet has appealed to the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets regarding the "Novaya Zemlya" Test Range.

A report on the possible transfer of underground nuclear tests to the polar archipelago of Novaya Zemlya runs counter to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe advanced by our government. It has provoked a wave of public protest. In view of this, at the end of May the military departments allowed a group of people's deputies from the Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug into Novaya Zemlya for the first time since the test range was opened in 1954. "Unfortunately, they received us as tourists who should only know about the achievements," one participant in the visit observed.

Despite the information published in local newspapers that the radiation situation is safe for the inhabitants of the polar region, the negative attitude to the test range has not changed. For this reasons the Nenetskiy Okrug Soviet session have appealed to the parliamentarians of Russia and the country as a whole. In particular, it considers it essential that the plans for the use of the "Novaya Zemlya" nuclear test range be published and compensation be introduced for those who live in the zone of its influence. The people's deputies are concerned that the military departments have turned the Arctic archipelago into a zone which is not subject to the organs of Soviet power and are insisting that the settlement soviet be restored there.

Satellite Television System Set Up in Moscow

LD1707214590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today the first satellite television system in the Soviet Union for collective use was installed in Moscow:

[Correspondent B. Kostenko] This is one of 100 television aerials that will be set up in each republic. And the whole project is called: Satellite television across the USSR. Town soviets, schools, universities and in the future private subscribers will get such receiving sets. This system wil give television viewers in our country the opportunity to receive television programs from the United States, as well television stations from West Europe. The entire project has been implemented thanks to the initiative of the USSR Fund of Social Inventions and the noncommercial U.S. public organization, Fund of the 22d Century.

[A.T. Easton, president of Fund of the 22d Century, speaking in English with Russian translation sumperimposed] Our purpose is to get together a united society on a global scale, with the aid of advanced technology, and in particular satellite telecommunications.

[Kostenko] It turns out that foreign television, in particular U.S. television, has direct access to the flats of the citizens of Russia.

[G.P. Alferenko, chairman of the USSR Social Inventions Fund] I think that is normal. That means that if we hear other voices, we shall achieve our own internal voice, we shall realize who we are in this world, we shall see the variety of people, the variety of societies, the variety of types. That is a normal, integrated mankind.

Economic

Altay Seminar Views Chemical Pollution Problems

PM1807111390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] An all-Union seminar of ecologists has ended in the Altay. It discussed measures to prevent air pollution at coking and chemical industry enterprises. Ecologists and production specialists from the coking and chemical industry were seeking to resolve seemingly insoluble problems—how to combine the seemingly incompatible—the economy and the ecology. Ways of resolving this problem were outlined at the seminar. [video shows seminar participants being addressed, followed by vast coking complex belching smoke]

Draft Decision Aims To Boost Small Business

PM1907095190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with D. Levchuk, chief of the secretariat of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, by V. Romanyuk; place and date not given: "Small Enterprise Enters the Market. USSR Council of Ministers Has Elaborated a Draft Resolution on Measures To Create and Develop Small Enterprises"]

[Text] In this way a qualitatively new step has been taken toward creating and developing a market environment and the market itself, D. Levchuk, chief of the secretariat of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform commented. Until now everything that has been done to switch to the so-called economic model of management has been merely a switch from some forms of state management to others.

We were trying to switch to market relations and economic methods of regulation on the basis of the old economy, in conditions of monopolization of production. When it is thrown into a market environment, the command system can respond only by destroying itself—disrupting production links, weakening delivery discipline, reducing production volumes... accompanied by uncontrolled growth in prices and incomes. It seems to me that a "two-layer" economy must be retained during the transition to the market: One layer contains strong elements of administrative management in order to maintain stability, and the other is a market environment where administrative regulation in the form of a mandatory state order, quotas, and edict-based prices is impermissible.

[Romanyuk] Where are small enterprises supposed to find their niche?

[Levchuk] In their aggregate small enterprises must create the new market environment and normal competitive market relations. In industrially developed countries they provide half the aggregate gross product or more, and over half the increase in new jobs. Thus small enterprises embody tremendous economic potential and ramified structures without which a normal market cannot function and perform its role as regulator. And, an equally important point, they contain a new quality: flexibility and mobility, and they are geared to new technologies in conditions of commercial risk. We constantly lament the lack of incentives for the growth of technical progress, but small enterprises eagerly take up innovations—even in conditions of heightened risk—leaving the mass production of them to the giants. Thus do large and small forms interact in the economy.

[Romanyuk] So what promotes small business?

[Levchuk] The viability of small enterprises is determined by the freedom and simplicity of their creation, the lack of administrative coercion, tax breaks, and a market mechanism for price formation. All this is embodied in the draft resolution. Imagine you have no centrally allocated output, you produce what you like, and you sell to anybody you want. In addition to everything else the state creates a system for the support of small enterprises.

[Romanyuk] Financial benefits?

[Levchuk] Those are part of it. Profits channeled into construction, reconstruction, and the renewal of equipment and technology are not subject to taxation. The depreciation allowance for the restoration of worn-out equipment is increased by 30 percent for small enterprises, which increases their interest in technical progress. I will say more: For the next six months (until the start of 1991) they enjoy total relief from taxes on profits. This break extends to small enterprises for the production and processing of agricultural output, the production of consumer goods, the production of construction materials, and the performance of construction and repair work and to small startup [vnedrencheskiy] firms for the first two years of their work. I think that all these incentives create good starting conditions for the development of small enterprises. We have before us all the example of the cooperative movement: some 200,000 cooperatives in two years. But we are entitled to expect more of small enterprises: There is every chance of expanding their share of the production of output and services from the present four percent to 20-25 percent in two years. Their share may be even higher in the production of consumer output.

[Romanyuk] But won't such enterprises be categorized as second-class in the legal respect—alongside the giants which still control the domestic market?

[Levchuk] No. Immediately after registration they are entered on the list and receive the right to open accounts in a bank, some of them in the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity. This is very important. Various

forms of ownership operate in market conditions—state, joint-stock, leased, private—and every enterprise is entitled to expect equal conditions for creation, windup, taxation, and price formation.

[Romanyuk] Can I create my own enterprise? Can I hire workers?

[Levchuk] Of course. Small enterprises can be created on the basis of both state and cooperative ownership and ownership by citizens. The basic parameters according to which an enterprise can be ranked as a small enterprise are defined: first, the number of workers, second, the volume of output sold (or size of turnover). In industry and construction the number of workers must not exceed 200 and the annual volume of output sold must not exceed R10 million. In other sectors (except local industry and the services sphere) the number of workers is up to 50 and the volume up to R5 million per year. As for local industry and the services sphere, up to 25 workers and a volume of sales (or services) of up to R1 million are permissible here. Retail trade and public catering have been removed from this group—the very smallest enterprises are usually created here. Questions of the relations between the enterprise owner and the hired personnel and of the social protection of people in conditions of a market economy have not yet been fully studied.

[Romanyuk] Until now small enterprises have been economic exotica in our country. The USSR Union of Small Enterprises includes a little over 1,000 collectives, but in order to become a real force, small enterprises must run into hundreds of thousands, millions of ventures. How long will this take?

[Levchuk] Not all that long. In principle there must be as many small enterprises as the market economy requires. There are almost 20 million in the United States, 9 million in Japan, 12 million in India. There is provision everywhere for state support for small business, which usually reacts sharply to changing market conditions, hitches in component deliveries, and delays in settling accounts.

[Romanyuk] That is "over there." What about in our country?

[Levchuk] For instance, a system of state insurance of the commercial risk of small enterprises is being introduced—this did not exist at all before. The future will also see the emergence of nonstate structures which will help soften the impact of unfavorable factors. Moreover, support may be expressed in the form of the provision of information and expert assessment of small enterprises' plans. There is also a need for centralized finance in the form of benefits and subsidies, including nonrepayable ones.

[Romanyuk] But the USSR Ministry of Finance will say: There is no money! And it will be right.

[Levchuk] All the same, there will be centralized capital investments left over. And to channel them into developing small enterprises would be the most effective form of investment. In the United States, for instance, women's enterprises are being given incentives through preferential credit and subsidies. We too may have our own priorities—consumer goods production, development of the social infrastructure. This is the very time to recall the local budget, too. Local soviets are faced with an alternative: either levying as much tax as possible on small enterprises, or allowing them to develop in preferential conditions and ultimately receiving far more money for local needs. They have just as much potential as the center on this matter. After all, they will dispose of 23 of the 45 percent of profits levied as tax.

[Romanyuk] But taxes begin with income. And if small enterprises remain poor relations in planning and supply organs, as cooperative workers once were, it is hard to expect success. Even given financial support and tax breaks.

[Levchuk] In this case the administrative system must act as donor to the growing market sector and reallocate some of the centrally allocated resources. Moreover, instructions have been issued to the USSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction] and to the machine building complex regarding the elaboration on a competitive basis of designs for standard buildings and installations for small enterprises—employing standardized construction modules, compact machines, and small-capacity equipment. There will be a need for a broad network of small wholesale bases and intermediary organizations to sell their output. The market sector, in which small enterprises will become dominant, will be able to exert pressure on the administrative-state system, forcing it to "privatize itself" ["aktsionirovatsya"] like the Kama Truck Plant and to reduce the share of state orders and administrative regulators in general.

[Romanyuk] But who is going to manage the development of small enterprises in the country?

[Levchuk] The creation of a new organ lies within the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As yet just a handful of us deal with this problem in the state apparatus—in the State Commission for Economic Reform, in the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]; a subcommittee was recently set up in the Supreme Soviet. But in the United States there is a Small Business Administration under the government with a central apparatus of 1,000 people in Washington and another 30 branches around the country. In addition to state organs, public associations and associations of small enterprises can play an important role.

Ultimately dynamically developing small enterprises will make it possible to build the market not within the administrative-edict system but "on clear ground" unencumbered by departmental barriers and various prohibitions. The idea of parallel money circulating in the market looks entirely feasible here. The market sector

could thereby more easily integrate into the world economy and the "market" money could become convertible.

Agricultural

Agricultural Developments Reported for 15-17 Jul

LD1807043290

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 15-17 July, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

15 July

An excellent harvest has been grown in Stavropol Kray this year. The first trainloads of grain have already left for Bashkiria and Chelyabinsk, Amur, Bryansk, and Leningrad Oblasts. (0100)

Plowing of winter fallow has begun in Kazakhstan. Harvesting of grain already is in progress in five oblasts of the republic. (0100)

16 July

The harvest of early grain crops will start in a few days in Amur Oblast, but many farms and procurement centers are not ready for it. There is a very acute shortage of gasoline, gas oil, soft roofing materials, slate, and conveyor belts. Farmers in the oblast are appealing to the Ministry of Grain Products and the country's railwaymen to speed up the supply of equipment and materials. (0100)

West Siberia—An alarming situation has developed in the preparation of harvesting equipment in the Altay. A thousand combines and even more reapers are laid up. It is not some substantial component, but humble bearings that are to blame for this. Perhaps it has been decided that the country doesn't need Siberia's grain! (0100)

17 July

According to the figures of zonal and all-Union scientific research institutes, a grain harvest above the average over recent years is possible this year. This was said in an interview with a TASS correspondent by (Viktor Stepanovich Velukho), academician of the V.I.Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences. A higher grain harvest is expected in the majority of the grain-producing regions: the Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, the central black-soil oblasts, the Volga basin, and the non-Chernozem zone of Russia. On the best farms, the first yields of winter barley and winter wheat are reaching 50-60 quintals per hectare. The conditions for growing grain crops are somewhat worse in the regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan where there has been a lack of mositure. A shortfall in the harvest as a result of drought is also possible in Belorussia, in the south of the Ukraine, and in the southern rayons of Moldavia. The main task now arising is to gather in promptly everything that has been grown. (0900)

Dzhambul Oblast—200,000 tons of grain have been delivered to grain reception enterprises to date. (Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Russian 1400)

Alma-Ata Oblast—More than 190,000 tons of grain have been threshed to date. (Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Russian 1400)

Grain Harvest Applauded

LD1807133890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Harvesting of grain is being conducted by farms in 12 Union republics. Grains and pulses have been harvested from an area of over 11 million hectares. This is less than a year ago. The changeable weather is hampering things. Almost everywhere threshings are fairly high. The people of Russia are especially gladdened by the harvest: from each hectare they are now threshing over 39 quintals, which is 10 quintals more than was the case last year. Finally, Kuban farmers have also gotten close to optimal threshings: they are harvesting 52.2 quintals on average per hectare; that is how Krasnodar Kray farmers have been rewarded by their huge areas of black soil. Threshing is going well in Stavropol Kray and on the Don. From the arid steppes of the Ukraine there are also reports of a good harvest, although there the grain crops are scorched. It can also be said that in Kazakhstan grain is ripening well. In brief, the country's farmers have worked excellently this year. They have also been helped by the weather. There is grain in the fields and now machine operators are doing everything possible to gather it with the least possible loss. The farmers should be helped by the whole Soviet people, especially by the collectives of the grain elevators, industrial enterprises, and of course the railroad workers. Grain depots in the south of the country are crammed full and the grain must be sent as quickly as possible to the central and northern areas. Grain is also coming in from abroad.

Saratov Enterprises Resist Harvest Draft

PM1907103590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula under the "Alarm Signal" rubric: "Grain Harvest Disrupted"]

[Text] Will the grain be harvested? That is the question for Saratov Oblast's crop farmers now. The point is that the hard work of harvesting is about to begin, but it is still not clear whether the oblast will allocate the people to gather what is local terms is a rich crop. The problem arose immediately after battalions from the Odessa, Carpathian, and Volga-Urals Military Districts as well as from the Navy arrived in the oblast with exactly what the oblast asked for by way of motorized vehicles. However,

this year—and the Defense Ministry informed the local authorities about this well in advance—the oblast has to provide three-fourths of all the drivers.

On this premise the military commissariats set about drafting unit-assigned reservists. That's where it all began....

"The directors of many industrial enterprises have begun to utterly sabotage the draft," Major V. Oshkin, a staffer at Saratov Oblast military commissariat, told me over the telephone. "Workers have been told to hide, tear up their summons, and invent all manner of ailments in order not to get involved in harvesting the grain. Enterprise leaders have avoided meeting us in every way possible. This is all since the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] adopted the decision to allocate the requisite number of drivers. It has only proved possible to draft 2,300 of the requisite 7,100 people."

I succeeded in talking with Lieutenant Colonel M. Ayrapetyan, chief of staff of the operational harvesting group, over the telephone.

"We arrived here 2 July," Mikhail Grigoryevich said. "Some 20 people from our operational group have been waiting since then for harvesting gangs to be formed."

While I was cabling in this report, the district political directorate was told that it had only proved possible to draft 20 of the unit-assigned reservists throughout the day of 16 July. More than half of the 5,000 trucks that have arrived in the oblast are still idle.

There is also another problem lurking behind this. As we can see, on some occasions the authorities are powerless, the administrative-edict system is forced to come into play again, and recriminations instead of thanks are once again directed at the Army.

Roundtable Meeting Considers Peasant Issues

904F0194A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Roundtable discussion at PRAVDA editorial office with representatives of the peasantry, moderated by I. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and editor in chief of PRAVDA; reported by A. Andreyev, A. Stroyev, and V. Shvetsov; date not given: "A Field of Hope"]

[Text] **As has already been reported, a meeting with representatives of the peasantry was held at the editorial office of PRAVDA. The following took part: N. Aristov (Moscow Oblast), delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress and chairman of the imeni Michurin kolkhoz [collective farm]; V. Amosova (Ryazan Oblast), head of a leasing collective of cattle breeders; farmer N. Artamonov (Smolensk Oblast); I. Borovenskiy (Poltava Oblast), first secretary of Reshetilovskiy Rayon Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress; V. Vilchinskiy (Vinnitsa Oblast), chairman of the Druzhba kolkhoz; V. Goroshko (Brest Oblast), chairman of the imeni Gorkiy kolkhoz; Zh. Iskakov (Tselinograd Oblast), member of a peasant farm; machinery operator M. Mandrakov (Smolensk Oblast); G. Sych (Altay Kray), brigade leader from the Razdolnyy sovkhoz [state farm] and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress; and O. Tkachuk (Moscow Oblast), leader of a brigade of cattle breeders. V. Lyubitskiy, member of the PRAVDA editorial board and editor of the department of letters and the study of public opinion, took part in the conversation.**

The discussion was moderated by I. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and PRAVDA editor in chief.

To Restore Authority

[Frolov] All of us know well that the victory of the October Revolution was ensured to a great degree because the peasantry followed the Bolsheviks. The success of perestroyka also depends to a great degree on the renaissance of rural areas. We would like to hear your opinions on how the party can inspire the peasant masses today and reinforce its influence in the rural areas.

Let us look at the following issue. The critics of the party maintain that the acuteness of the foodstuffs problem in the country is the logical and unavoidable result of the actions of the party with regard to the peasantry. In your opinion, through what measures can the party reinforce the authority of its agrarian policy and prove the ability of the socialist system "to feed the country?"

The issues of land ownership, combination of various forms of economic operations, economic independence of the rural areas, management of the agroindustrial complex, mutual relations between the urban and rural areas under contemporary conditions, and the new role of rural party organizations have now given rise to much controversy. I believe that we lose a lot because we make some issues complex. We should always try to find the main link, whereas we pile things up and mix up at times entire mountains of issues. We make a decision, a certain period of time elapses, but there are no results. It is understandable that nobody can give us an unequivocal, fast-acting prescription; this should not be oversimplified. Nonetheless, it is necessary to select key, fundamental problems and find solutions which are understood by all people. I would also like to learn what your opinion is on these fundamental issues.

[Mandrakov] I believe that first of all we need to figure out what our present-day peasantry is. Why did the peasants follow the party in 1917? Because the communists promised them land. Now we are saying once again: We will give the peasants land and they will once again follow the party. However, the peasants of that time loved the land more than they did their wives. At present, as a rule, the peasants do not need land. What do they need it for? We want to be owners of our own labor rather than of land. So far we have been hired workers rather than peasants, like in industry. What difference does it make whether I work on my own land

or on common land as long as the state buys my products at monopoly prices? What will the ownership of land accomplish for me?

Meanwhile, the policy of the party has taken the same path: Supposedly, the peasants hunger for land; they should be given land. Look at the new laws on leasing, on ownership, on land. We, the peasants, could see from the very beginning that these were stillborn laws. They are saying: We should think up mechanisms in order to implement them. Really? What mechanisms are these? After all, a still-born child will not be helped by applying a poultice.

[Frolov] What do you propose?

[Mandrakov] I believe that we should not place our main bet on either state or individual private property. We should only count on collective property. I propose to insert an article in the Constitution to the effect that labor collectives—teams, brigades, cooperatives—are the main productive force in agriculture. Kolkhozes are to be turned into cooperatives of cooperatives. Such labor collectives are to be legal persons and are to have bank accounts. Actually, the kolkhozes are to supply and service them.

[Borovenskiy] This is what you think. Meanwhile, there are no collectives in some villages. There are no people! Social conditions need to be improved first in order for the people to appear. In this area the party should ensure that the entire complex of social issues is resolved by its characteristic methods. This issue should be made our point of departure.

[Goroshko] We are now faced with the question of how to develop in the future. After all the party has gone and we do not know where to, perhaps underground. Our agrarian structures have been destroyed. By whom? By perestroyka! After all, this is what the people have been saying lately: The period of stagnation is over and the period of disintegration has begun. We are not building anything. There is no agricultural machinery, and there are no supplies. The Agroprom [Agroindustrial Committee] is a miracle of sorts, a hybrid. In the body of the Union Agroprom we had a stepmother at the very least. Now we do not have even this. A commission—what does it accomplish?

The argument over whether kolkhozes or farmers are more important is an artificial one. After all, at present farmers are loners. Whichever way you slice it, they will only tender 100 to 200 head of cattle. But an operator at a good complex does 700 or 600! He has rotating schedules, days off, and leave....

We have also tried the leasing format on our land. It has been in operation for almost two years now. Productivity has increased by a factor of almost two, but the yield of products per unit of area is 20 to 30 percent lower. That is to say, we are just creating a modern-age botch job. It destroys land, the foundation of the life of humanity—humanity rather than the party!

We, the peasants, are fully in favor of the party. However, we are now asking: You led us for 70 years, and now you are on the sidelines? Why have you stepped aside, why are you not working? Who has made you give up power and work? If the communists have brought about the crisis, then let us get out of it, but not the way we are doing it now.

[Iskakov] They are now saying that the people are not following the party. This is just not true! It is just that the party functionaries themselves have stopped working and have withdrawn. To be sure, I was lucky: The first secretary of the obkom [oblast committee] helped me become a farmer. Despite being a nonparty member, I understand the current goals of the party well, even better than some communists. I am sure that the peasants will not abandon the Communist Party. The peasants do not need another party. After all, the party has done a lot of good things too. All we need to do is to get in gear again and move on.

[Aristov] I support Vasiliy Moiseyevich. At present, the self-removal of the party from leadership is the cause of many troubles. The party has begun to observe from the sidelines—exactly from the sidelines—how rural areas are falling apart. Of course, there are raykom [rayon committee] secretaries and other party leaders who have not withdrawn from helping the rural areas. They understand that if the party does not help in resolving economic issues it will become dozens of times more difficult. On the whole, I believe that the position taken at present is not the proper one. We should be firmer in spirit; we should fight to the end in order to correct what we were wrong about and to secure the results of what we have begun to do correctly.

[Vilchinskiy] I would like to discuss the proceedings of the Peasant Congress. Comrade Ligachev, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Commission and CPSU Central Committee secretary, spoke before us. He said that, supposedly, things are not that bad and that supposedly the mass media do not interpret certain things properly. I disagree with him. Perhaps he is getting information which is not completely precise because I believe that in many areas we have taken a step in rural areas from a critical situation to a catastrophic situation.

If we are to refer to the role of the party in this matter, many miscalculations have been made in the past. Now we are once again talking about the issues of the rural areas and about helping them. However, I believe that aid is not what we need. We should separate the functions that the state and the government need to perform and those that we, the peasants, need to perform. I know the experience of the people from Poltava, I have visited them. Indeed, a lot has been done; however these have been local measures. What we should have is a planned state system for the support and development of the rural areas.

I have read that a mere three percent of the delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress have been elected from the

peasantry. So, how is the peasantry supposed to support the CPSU? In all of this we keep asserting that the sphere of material production in the rural areas, the sphere of foodstuffs, should be on the cutting edge of perestroyka...!

Let us look at the elections of people's deputies to the local, republic, and Union soviets. In these soviets as well there are two to three times fewer peasants than there were in the previous period. Meanwhile, they needed the support of the party organizations more than anybody else. After all, they simply had no time to conduct their own propaganda.

Furthermore, the party has allowed many miscalculations to occur on the issues of care for the peasantry as well—in trade, health care, medical, consumer, and communal services. Let us reveal the statistics: What is the worth of services which the city folks in the small town of Khmelnik get, and what is the worth of services which the rural areas get? I am convinced that the difference is going to be a factor of three or four. Why? Don't the peasants need to have their hair cut, go to the bath house, receive treatment, repair household appliances, and so on? This difference in the living standards between the rural areas and the cities has also given rise to mistrust of the CPSU.

I believe that a renewed party, which is what it should become after the 28th congress, should take all of this into account, apologize to the peasantry, and make the impossible possible: Ensure that the rural areas become a priority in deeds rather than words.

[Sych] Many of the present-day difficulties occur because the party no longer governs, while the soviets to which it has transferred power still do not govern. However, if we examine this we may say with full justification that it is...party functionaries in the recent past who do nothing in the soviets. After all, a majority of obkom and raykom first secretaries have taken the posts of soviet chairmen on a noncompetitive basis. Who has come to head rural and settlement soviets? Heads of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and party committee secretaries. High salaries set for the soviet functionaries are lucrative. Salaries have now also become decent in our lease teams, but they depend directly on the final result, on the quantity and quality of our products—bread, meat, and milk. This is why we are entitled to expect the same returns from party and soviet functionaries: If you make good money, then you ought to work diligently.

What do we expect at present from the party and the renewed soviets? A clear-cut and honest agrarian policy as well as the elimination of absurdities and discrepancies between the rural areas, the state, and the city. For example, why are we forced to purchase mixed feed from the state at a price two times higher than the one at which we sell pure grain in return for it? Last year alone our sovkhoz lost about 2 million rubles [R] in profits due to this.

Purchasing equipment has become ruinous. The T-150 and K-700 tractors, which we cannot do without on the wide-open spaces of Altay, have become two times more expensive. We have also suffered losses in construction. Managers and supply procurement officials from the farms of Altay and Siberia scour the entire country looking for construction materials, but they are beaten to them by prompt cooperative members. They purchase timber and cement, and later foist it on kolkhozes and sovkhozes at three times the price. We have to take it; there is just no other way out.

We are also paying dearly for arbitrary management methods. For example, we had a hog-breeding complex worth R4 million foisted on us. Who is to build it? They brought prisoners, and you know what kind of work you can expect of them. They made us accept the structures which were barely slapped together. Before beginning the actual operation of the complex, we invested another R4 million in remodeling it.

[Question] Did the party organs make you accept it?

[Sych] Of course, the raykom. We now have R9 million of debt and we make annual payments from our profit at the expense of bonuses, housing construction, social, cultural, and service facilities.

[Remark] You pay in money; does the party pay in authority?

[Sych] This is how it turns out. I would ask that these proposals be referred to the government: to write off all the peasants' debts or postpone their repayment for 10 years at zero interest; to put prices for agricultural and industrial products in order; to revise the tax system; to give the rural areas—kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and the individual sector—construction materials in at least the same proportion that the rural population accounts for in the country—no less than 30 percent.

Farms Need Masters

[Borovenskiy] Several years ago our oblast party organization set the course for the social transformation of rural areas. At the time our rayon lagged behind the entire oblast. The first in a series of scientific-practical conferences on the social development of rural areas was prepared and held in our rayon. Within a year and a half we invested R14 million in rural construction. Previously, the rural areas lost 600 people annually on the average, whereas since 1985 the continuous growth of population has amounted to about 500 people annually. We have already given up the massive use of urban populace for field work. We have achieved 42 percent profitability. Compared to the previous five-year plan, the average annual output of products has grown by a factor of almost 1.5.

Three specific problems should be solved in order for us to be successful. The structure of farms is the first one. We have split 10 kolkhozes and thus saved 20 localities. We believe that for a village with 1,000, perhaps 1,500

hectares of arable land per farm which is a kolkhoz is the best variant. This is closer to the market, to self-management, and to the people. The split kolkhozes yield two, sometimes three times as much output as the old format did.

Contracts have not caught on in our rayon; leasing and farms have not developed extensively: This calls for material-technical supply and services, whereas both are on their last legs in our rayon.

[Remark] Given the current social standard of rural areas, no form of property will work....

[Borovenskiy] Absolutely correct. Social development is the basis of everything. We are connecting all kolkhozes to gas mains; next year, all villages will have gas. We are building roads, housing, veterans houses, youth cafeterias. Everything is done comprehensively.

[Remark] So, are we to hope yet again that a good raykom or obkom secretary will come and do everything?

[Borovenskiy] I did say in the beginning that the party should ensure that the problem is solved by its characteristic methods, in particular, to persuade the government and the planning organs to address the social development of rural areas everywhere rather than in individual regions!

[Aristov] All we do is talk about addressing the Foodstuffs Program. Let us look at this issue. All sectors have their own ministries. In the United States, the Department of Agriculture is considered to be a leading one. Meanwhile, we have undercut this. No, I am not demanding that we go back to the methods of command management of rural areas. However, who will ensure normal supplies for them?!

I would also like to refer to cooperation between the rural and urban areas. The point is not that we have supposedly fed the urban areas, and now they have to give us everything; this is not the point. However, in Moscow Oblast and especially in remote rayons, there is nobody to milk cows, there is no labor. We have a quota-based system of residence permits. People from republics with a surplus of labor would come here eagerly; however, we cannot issue residence permits to anyone. This is a clearly unreasonable policy.

[Goroshko] I would like to carry on the discussion of supplies. For example, we purchased 15 imported sets of harvesting equipment. All of them are parked and idle. There are no spare parts. No matter who I seek assistance from, all of them laugh and say: "Go find hard currency."

I repeat that we are not asking for something for nothing. We are prepared to double the production of both milk and meat in the next five years. However, give us counterdeliveries for this doubling. Here is the most characteristic example: In the last five-year plan we increased the production and sales of milk by a factor of two; meanwhile, this year we were allocated two times less motor fuel than five years ago! Is it really hard to understand that diesel fuel is the blood of a kolkhoz? What they are doing is slashing our veins....

[Frolov] Vasiliy Moiseyevich, my question is as follows. Could you, agriculturists, create a new management and supply structure yourselves and get together and set it up?

[Goroshko] Consider it created. A kolkhoz chairman is 80 percent a procurement agent. He who can arrange for more things in a day is a better chairman. How can we unite under the circumstances? He beats me to it, or I beat him to it. So we look for ins and outs on the sly. The most interesting thing is that we do find them. For example, our kolkhoz is allocated 20 tons of cement, but we use 2,000. If 20,000 bricks are allocated, we find 2 million. There is everything in our country. However, it is advantageous for someone to control all of this and make us kneel and bow to someone all the time. I repeat: The new structure should handle supplies only. Our duty is to produce output. In this case, you can hold us accountable.

[Amosova] I am certain that the Communist Party is capable of leading the peasantry. The peasantry will follow the party in the future as well if it senses a more profound interest in resolving the accumulated problems. Having switched to lease contracting, our collective increased the milk yield of every cow by 1,000 kilograms within one short year. However, if only you could see the conditions we work in! There are no roads; all construction is done with our own resources; virtually no materials are still allocated for this. You cannot lure contractors to outlying areas; they prefer to build in the suburbs. Meanwhile, the school in our village is falling apart and the club is fit to be condemned. The village has no gas despite the fact that a gas pipeline runs nearby. The most annoying point is that the kolkhoz has funds for all of this; however, although we have money, we remain paupers. Is this not absurd? The peasants themselves also make decent money now but they cannot spend the money. The shelves of rural shops are bare.

If the party wants to draw on the support of the peasantry it should take into account the peculiarities of rural areas in the course of developing social programs. The work the peasants do is dirty—all day long you are exposed to dust, dirt, and manure. They have to wash their clothes more often. This is to say that there ought to be more washing machines in the rural shops. We have no tailors or dressmaker shops. It turns out that only a sewing machine may help us out. Why are passenger cars so much in demand in the rural areas? Because there is no public transportation in the villages and passenger cars are the only means of transportation between the disappearing and therefore increasingly remote localities. These are not the details of everyday life; this is big-time politics which the CPSU cannot fail to take into account.

Freedom of Choice for the Peasants

[Frolov] Therefore, what needs to be done in order for rural areas to embark on a new life, and for urbanites to feel these changes?

[Mandrakov] Give me and my collective independence—I will find both financing and materials. I will find everything through third parties and abroad.... I will sell meat and wheat and buy everything I need, however, only if the kolkhoz chairman does not make decisions for me!

[Goroshko] Everything needs to be looked at in comparison. For example, we are building a farmstead. The house has three levels, a cowshed for 50 cows, a pigsty for 100 hogs, and micro-mechanization. A farmer will not survive otherwise. We will spend R300,000 building this farm. Is this profitable? With the same 300,000 we can build three fattening facilities for 900 head of cattle; two operators take one fattening pen, service it easily—with days off—and manufacture 10 times the output for the same amount of money!

For three years now we have been requesting them: Take some land. Twenty of those willing have come forward and leased 3,000 hectares, temporarily however. We have already seen results. They work splendidly but they cut corners on technology, fertilizer, fuel, taking care of the crop, weed control, and so on. As a result, what goes on is just the plunder of the land. This is why I am certain that the first point of a law we are going to adopt in Belorussia will read: Temporary leasing of the land is forbidden. I agree that a tractor can be leased. A structure may likewise be leased—it has a definite service life. However land cannot be squandered!

[Iskakov] Still, leasing is a modern form. However, I agree that land cannot be provided for a year or two—either forever or not at all.

[Question] You said you had been helped. Could you tell us how in more detail?

[Iskakov] Last year we set up a family leasing group. There are 20 of us, the Iskakovs. They sold us cattle and implements. We obtained a loan of R517,000. All we need to be given now is freedom and regular, equivalent prices.

[Vilchinskiy] The issues of independence of the peasantry are not being solved. The peasants need to be emancipated and freed from all bonds. The dictate of the state has not stopped. A grain procurement campaign is coming around, and once again there is a decision of the executive committee to increase plans! What happens ultimately? No matter what the yield is, 40 or 60 quintals, kolkhoz members will still receive 300 grams per ruble and no more. Supposedly labor productivity grows; meanwhile, remuneration for labor in the field is one of the lowest in the national economy.

I have been a kolkhoz chairman since 1957; I have been a party member for 35 years. I will be with the CPSU for as long as I live, come what may. However, the CPSU should also stand up for us, the peasants. Meanwhile, at the time of a grain harvest our combine harvesters sit idle; and at sugar-beet harvesting time the machinery is idle for weeks. There is no diesel fuel. I recall the year 1944. Bombs were still falling, but tractors were already at work and motor fuel could be found! Three transcontinental gas pipelines now run through Vinnitsa Oblast; however, only 22 villages out of 1,500 have gas. We package it as if it were a sensation: French peasants use Soviet gas! What about ours?

I believe that taking care of the people is the main point as far as the authority of the party at present is concerned. Everybody from Moscow to the farthest outlying areas should grasp that all our wealth which has still been preserved comes from our mother, our land. The land gives us everything, including giant cities, subways, and spaceships. All profits are derived from the land. This is why the main task of the renewed CPSU is to protect the land and the peasantry. We would very much like this to be discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress and specific, clear-cut decisions to be made. It has already been said here that the party still should not withdraw from the economy, but rather stay in a different manner through the influence of the communists.

[Artamonov] When perestroyka began I became optimistic. We, the peasants, have always been with the party; this is why we were happy that the party did not shy away from changes. Why are we spinning our wheels now?

I agree that kolkhozes and sovkhozes are the main producers of farm goods. They should be preserved and they should be given complete independence. However, the genuine emancipation of the peasantry should begin from the grassroots; the peasantry should be given the freedom of choice. Let the peasants themselves—sovkhoz workers, kolkhoz members, lessees, or farmers—decide what they want to be. We cannot fail to reckon with the fact that auxiliary plots account for one-third of agricultural output in our country now. Additional output from the first farmsteads organized with tremendous difficulties will appear soon. The foodstuffs problem will be solved considerably faster and without the extensive investment of capital if we implement all forms of economic operations more vigorously. This is why it is necessary for the mechanisms of the implementation of laws to proceed in front of the "locomotives" of laws.

If the CPSU wants to retain its influence on the peasantry it should pay considerably greater attention to people on the land, to rank-and-file workers. There is no such attention at present and this is the main miscalculation.

[Question] Being a farmer, do you retain connections with the socialized economy?

[Artamonov] Yes, I have direct ties with a sovkhoz. I believe that a farmer cannot do without it, especially at first.

[Question] How do you participate in the social development of rural areas?

[Artamonov] Our main operation is to breed fish for sale in the ponds of the sovkhoz. My plan is to set up a recreation facility for sovkhoz employees and city people there.

[Question] However a school, a club, and a hospital also need help....

[Artamonov] If our farmstead survives and begins to turn a profit, we will make contributions to the development of the social sphere.

[Tkachuk] I would like to see more democracy and a greater preference for the working people in our Communist Party. We elected 28 congress delegates, but only five of them are rank-and-file working people; the rest are bosses. More rank-and-file communists operating machine tools and working the land should also be placed in the leading organs of the party.

I absolutely agree with Valentina Prokopyevna Amosova: The future of rural and urban areas hinges entirely on how the social sphere of the rural areas develops. Of course, housing construction calls for special attention. We should create conditions for the peasants, especially young families, to build homes and apartments for themselves. One's own house ties a man to the land more than anything else.

[Frolov] Thank you, Olga Ivanovna. Thanks to all the comrades who have taken the floor. At this time, before the congress, every word you say about the party, your every wish and proposal is extremely important. I agree with you in that the renewed CPSU should look for the new forms of work with the peasantry, and specific and effective approaches to solving all rural problems. I think that we will succeed in accomplishing this with your help. We should go back to the origins of the communist program: Develop the cooperation of rural and urban areas in every way possible and facilitate bringing them closer together. We should eliminate the grave violation of one more principle, that of freedom of economic operations for workers set forth by V.I. Lenin: "Dare not to give commands." And of course we should abandon idealism proclaiming that, supposedly, a lot can be achieved with poor equipment as well. No, the rural areas need to be reinforced.

We will endeavor to bring all of your proposals and critical remarks to the attention of the central organs of the party and the government. We wish you great success in your difficult labor.

Scientific

Further Coverage of Attempt To Repair 'Soyuz'

Cosmonauts' Effort Viewed

PM1907092990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Report by Petr Orlov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We will now go over to the flight control center. Petr Orlov reports:

[Correspondent] Literally a few minutes ago Flight Engineer Aleksandr Balandin, in accordance with accepted practice, was the first to leave the "Mir" station and is now working in open space.

We will now show you very briefly the route which Commander Anatoliy Solovyev and Flight Engineer Aleksandr Balandin have to take today.

Here on one of the screens at the flight control center you can see the very top of the module [video shows diagram]. The cosmonauts must descend to the transfer section and move on to the next module. From there they will begin to work on the thermal insulation of the "Soyuz TM-9" craft which has become detached.

This is an untrodden, untried route. The wires of the television camera will not reach. This is why we have no pictures today. Only late tonight will we receive pictures taken by the cosmonauts. This is why there is tension everywhere today. It is because the cosmonauts themselves will have to decide what is to be done with the thermal insulation.

Here you can see what they will have to do. This is precisely the type of thermal insulation that has become detached, exactly the same. It is not a question of the thermal insulation of the spacecraft but this kind of cover. [video shows thermal insulation material] It will either have to be replaced in the fasteners—no one knows why it has become detached—or it will have to be rolled back like an army blanket—which is how they describe it here—and tied back with string. This is the reserve option.

Regarding equipment the flight control center is entirely satisfied that all is well. The thermal insulation does not worry them. All the instruments are ready. Here they are. They look pretty daunting. [video shows correspondent picking up a pair of shears] This is what our cosmonauts have to work with in open space.

The main problem is that no one knows what state the fire-bolts [piropatrony] are in, which serve to blast off the landing module on descent. This is where they are located, precisely here. [correspondent points to diagram] This spot was covered by the thermal insulation. No one knows what it looks like there. The cosmonauts will be the first to know. They will report to ground control, and then further decisions will be made. This

will happen in approximately 90 minutes when the cosmonauts reach their workplace. We will keep you up to date in subsequent newscasts on the progress of work carried out by Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin in open space.

TASS Reviews Situation

LD1807211690 Moscow TASS in English 2103 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Filippov]

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The crew aboard the space orbital complex "Mir" and specialists in the mission control centre spent a sleepless night yesterday. Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin walked out in space to remove all doubts, caused by the damaged thermal insulation of the landing module, before their return to earth.

At 1706 Moscow time, the two cosmonauts left the orbital station through a hatch, taking with them a box with instruments and two special ladders designed on Earth and delivered to the "Mir" station by a ferry spacecraft.

They had to travel almost 20 meters along the board of the "Kvant" module to reach the spot they wanted to inspect. At every step they had to help themselves using mountaineering carbines.

It took them two hours to reach the docking module at which "Kristall", "Kvant-2", and "Soyuz TM-9" were docked. They rested when the complex was in the earth's shadow, fearing to lose their way in the dark.

Their concern was over three pieces of fabric measuring two by two meters and flapping in space. These bits of fabric threatened to obscure the view of the infra-red sensor of vertical orientation. The device is needed to orient the spacecraft before landing. The travel through the atmosphere and the exact touch-down spot depend on its smooth operation.

In addition, the cosmonauts were to establish to what extent, if any, the spacecraft's body and equipment were affected by the exposure.

The bulk of the time was taken up by videorecording and inspection of the spot. The bits of thermal insulation were folded and fastened by metal pegs so as to prevent them from getting in the way of optical appliances and the infra-red sensor of vertical orientation.

The cosmonauts returned inside the station when oxygen was already running out in their space-suit tanks. Another unpleasant surprise awaited them: The "Kvant-2" hatch lid would not close. They had to move into an air-tight sector where they could at last take off sweat-soaked space suits.

In the mission control centre, specialists are now considering the possibility of leaving the station door ajar. Some of them insist that the cosmonauts will have to take yet another walk in space one of these days.

Another Space Walk Probable

LD1807114390 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Excerpts] The Soviet space crew will probably have to take another spacewalk to close the porthole of the airlock. The ground control is inclined to that decision after analyzing the results of yesterday's operation outside the orbiting station "Mir", which lasted seven hours. [passage omitted]

A new mission will be launched to the station on 1 August and the old one will retrun on 9 August.

Docking Unit Can Only Undock

LD1807193190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] And now a report from the flight control center. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Petr Orlov] Today, after an analysis, the main danger seems to be somewhere else. The tools left in space can hamper future work. To all appearances, the time limits of the expedition will not be altered. But it seems that for the time being, the main docking unit of the station can only undock. To improve the situation—if this is the case—yet another spacewalk is most likely for the crew. This question is now being discussed in the flight control center and a decision is possibly due in the next few days.

Cosmonauts in Good Health

LD1907080690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] The long orbital flight of cosmonauts of the "Mir's" sixth main expedition continues. Today they are scheduled to photograph several areas of the earth's surface within the framework of the program for researching the earth's resources. A biological experiment in the "Svet" space greenhouse with the aim of studying higher plants in conditions of zero gravity has been also planned. During the day, cosmonauts will be tidying up equipment and the space suits which they have used to work in open space. According to the results of the medical supervision Anatoliy Soloviyev and Aleksandr Balandin are in good health.

Spending on Mars Program Criticized

PM1807145290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 28, 22-29 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Leonard Nikishin "Fact And Commentary": "Who'll Fly to Mars?"]

[Text] **USSR**

As declared by A. Gorin, department chief at the State Committee for Science and Technology, 33 million roubles have been allocated in 1990 for the scientific-technical programme Mars, including the work to prepare a piloted expedition to that planet. Another programme—Resource Saving and Ecological Clean Processes of Metallurgy and Chemistry—was given 25 million roubles. USA

As TASS reports, in spite of insistent calls for support by President Bush, the US House of Representatives opposes giving money for any more long-term space programmes including the building of a station on the Moon or a manned flight to Mars.

Nevertheless, we tend to be irreconcilable romantics at heart. It's no wonder the bright future was what was most important for us for so many years. The economy is cracking, the shop counters are bare, our agriculture is backward, our society is suffering from ethnic tensions—and still, we haven't given up on the flight to Mars. And even though its performance will cost a sum that is out of this world [according to US estimates—some 100 billion dollars], we have already started to spend the first millions. In a country where some half the population lives below the poverty level. It's one more abused file in our existence, a heritage of "great feats in space," which was so loved by Brezhnev propagandists.

But maybe we expect to find something of value on Mars, or expect to colonize it? Well, of course, not because the "red planet" is a deserted, lifeless world, where a person without a space-suit cannot live for even several seconds.

US Congressmen have, apparently, calculated well, and think it is a waste of money to spend even a dollar on it—this, in conditions of wealth, well-being and stability. But we continue to fly by inertia.

Maybe the USSR Supreme Soviet will nevertheless decide it's possible to leave the honour of exploring Mars to our descendants and that the 33 million roubles would be better spent if used for the needs of Chernobyl victims or to buy medicine?

'Resurs-6' Satellite Coordinates Detailed

LD1807104590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0847 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 July (TASS)—Another artificial earth satellite, "Resurs-6," was launched in the Soviet Union on Tuesday from the "Soyuz" rocket-carrier.

The satellite carries apparatus intended for variable-scale, multi-zonal, and spectro-zonal photography for continuing the study of the earth's natural resources in the interests of various branches of the USSR national economy and tackling ecological tasks, and for international cooperation.

The satellite has been placed in an orbit with the following parameters:
initial period of revolution, 88.9 mins;
apogee, 278 km.;
perigee, 194 km.;
orbital inclination, 82.3 deg.

The apparatus aboard the satellite is working normally.

At the end of the flight, the exposed film will be handed over to the USSR Main Administration for Geodesy and Cartography Priroda State Scientific Research and Production Center for processing and subsequent distribution of the information obtained to customers.

Military

General Shlyaga Assails Army Depoliticization

LD1807173690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1602 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 July (TASS)—"A fig leaf to cover the perfectly defined intentions of forces fighting for power in the country, to overpoliticize the Armed Forces and to incline them to their side," is how Lieutenant General Nikolay Shlyaga, recently appointed head of the main political administration of the Soviet Army and Fleet, appraised the idea of depoliticizing the Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Security Committee of the country. "Such an idea is simply amoral because it deprives military service, and military work to defend the motherland, of political meaning and high moral guidelines, and the servicemen themselves of political responsibility of the state," he stressed in an interview published today in the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

As the newspaper reports, Nikolay Shlyaga was born in 1935 and has been in the Soviet Army since 1954. After completing military vehicle college he was a platoon leader and then became a political staffer.

Recalling that depoliticization is frequently reduced to the elimination of political bodies, the general noted that objectively this leads to a reduction of educational work with people and a weakening of the moral potential of the collective of servicemen, and thus to a lowering of military preparedness. In his words, "not a single army in the world can permit itself this."

As stressed in the interview, the restructuring of the political bodies in the USSR Armed Forces is a component of military reform in the country. "We intend to separate the functions of party and political bodies and to give the latter the status of state bodies," said the general. "The serviceman, the individual and his political, military, moral, and legal education and his social protection should be at the center of attention. Our sociological and psychological services, the media, and cultural enlightenment institutions will begin to work for him."

At the same time Nikolay Shlyaga noted that in his view "a multiparty system cannot be introduced overnight by decree." "The only real political force, the most massive

and organized which enjoys absolute authority in the Army," he said, "remains the CPSU."

Government Aid in Housing Returning Troops Urged

PM1907091790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel A. Belousov under the "At the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees" rubric: "The Whole State's Concern"]

[Text] Problems arising from the the need to withdraw Soviet troops from East Europe and make provision for them on USSR territory were discussed 16 July at a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. Colonel V. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the committee who headed a group of USSR people's deputies that toured the Moscow, Kiev, Belorussian, and Baltic Military Districts and the forces groups 19-29 June, delivered a report.

It was pointed out that more than 123,000 servicemen are to be welcomed back from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by mid-1991 when the Soviet troops will have been completely withdrawn from these countries. Some 25,000 families need housing. The plan is initially to house officers' and ensigns' families mainly in prefabricated huts. Barracks, classroom buildings, and staff premises are being converted into hostels. There is underprovision of schools, kindergartens, and creches.

It will cost 100 million rubles [R] just to carry out the most necessary immediate work, and an overall area of 1.5 million square meters of housing—which will cost R600 million—have to be built to quarter officers and ensigns without apartments. The USSR Defense Ministry does not have that kind of money. In response to its request, the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to increase the ceiling for 1990 capital investments by R70 million, but this still has to be backed up with material and technical resources. Hitherto the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] has not allocated quotas for 1991, hence the plan for construction and installation work is already threatened with disruption. The USSR Gosplan has already delayed a decision on the question of transferring military construction detachments to the Defense Ministry from the national economy.

The housing problem is aggravated by the chronic failure of local organs of power to fulfill government resolutions on allocating housing to servicemen. Problems of selling property, materials, and equipment belonging to the USSR in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are also still unresolved.

Representatives of the USSR Defense Ministry, the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], the USSR Foreign Ministry, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other ministries and departments addressed the committee sitting.

L. Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, noted in conclusion that the Defense Ministry is unable to resolve the whole series of problems relating to the troop withdrawal. The committee decided to request the USSR Council of Ministers to elaborate and adopt an appropriate state program.

Atomic Submarine Withdrawn From Northern Fleet

LD1807224190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vasiliy Belousov]

[Text] Murmansk, 18 July (TASS)—As has already been reported, a year ago decompression of the first loop of a nuclear power plant occurred on an atomic submarine of the Northern Fleet during its return to base after a long voyage. The submarine was under the command of Yu. Kasatkin, captain first rank. In the extraordinary situation the crew managed to contain the source of the accident and bring the sub to the base. None of the crew was affected. After a thorough medical examination, they were all deemed absolutely healthy and have continued service on other ships of the fleet.

And what happened to the sub itself? It is still moored at the base. The radiation background on board is within normal limits. The sub, however, has been withdrawn from the fleet's combat strength. In the view of members of the commission who investigated the accident, it would be inexpedient to repair the sub as it has been in service for too long.

Rear Admiral A. Shevchenko said that sailors are now removing equipment from the vessel and carrying out operations for sealing the well decks of the reactor compartment. After that the sub, in a completely safe state, will be escorted to its stand [otstoy].

Baltic Republics

Preparatory Commission for Moscow Talks Meets

LD1807221490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2050 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The first meeting of the commission for political, juridical, and diplomatic preparations for negotiations with the Soviet Union has taken place at the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania. It was chaired by Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Bronius Kuzmickas. The members of the commission examined a draft protocol of the negotiations proposed by the government, and government proposals on the formation of the expert groups. It was decided, on the basis of these proposals, to form and submit for approval to the presidium of the Supreme Council, groups for the preparation of negotiations on political, juridical, and economic issues, communications and transport, citizens' rights, the status of the Soviet Armed Forces, the protection of state borders, and political and diplomatic relations.

Possibilities were discussed of forming a similar group for cultural needs.

Lithuanian Travel Restrictions Lifted

LD1807200190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1920 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] On the occasion of the USSR Government's lifting of the economic blockade on the republic of Lithuania, many citizens are asking the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry whether the limitations on entry into Lithuania from abroad, introduced during the blockade, are still in force.

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry announces that on 6 July this year the Consular Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry sent a circular to its consular services pointing out that the limitations on travel to Lithuania have been abolished for the period of negotiations between the USSR and the republic of Lithuania. Visas to Lithuania are being issued normally.

This was information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic of Lithuania.

Lithuania-Poland Border Post To Reopen

LD1807170890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1604 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Vilnius, 18 July (ELTA-TASS)—The frontier post at Lazdijai on Lithuania's border with Poland is to be reopened at 0900 on 21 July. An ELTA correspondent was given this information today by Lieutenant Colonel Vitaliy Ogorodnikov, chief of the "Vilnius" independent checkpoint of border troops of the USSR KGB.

Since mid-April this year, this frontier post has by a decision of the Soviet authorities been closed for the passage of private persons, and only freight vehicles have been passing through it. From Saturday Soviet border troops and customs officials at Lazdijai will work around the clock providing services for those crossing the border for personal purposes.

Yazov Letter to Landsbergis on Draft Reported

LD1807141490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The newspaper EKHO LITVY has published a letter from Defense Minister Marshal Yazov to Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman Landsbergis. It says that by ostentatiously disregarding the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligations local authorities by their decisions are effectively blocking the work of military commissariats in calling up citizens for active military service. Such actions lead only to further escalation of negative processes and facilitate such processes becoming more widespread. This cannot fail to reflect negatively on the republic's future, says the defense minister's message.

Lithuanian Leaders' Privileges Reported

PM1807135590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Dispatch by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "If You Have Joined the Leadership Yourself..."]

[Text] Vilnius—The entire Sajudis press is trumpeting most persistently about the bureaucracy of the party apparatus in the USSR, the immoderate incomes of former members of the republican government, and their dachas and other privileges.

But the question arises: Why does the local press try to keep quiet about how today's Lithuanian leaders are living? And since it is not forbidden to criticize, I shall try to cite a few facts. In the capital there is talk (and not just talk but samizdat leaflets) about how V. Landsbergis—using, let us call it the take-off of his career—has changed his four-room apartment of 78.13 square meters for a four-room duplex with an area of 120 square meters in an apartment block for members of the Composers Union. He lives there with his wife. Of course, rumors always become overgrown with cock and bull stories. How did the parliament chairman react to them? He spoke on the "Wave of Resurrection" television program and, referring to his heart trouble, said he had been obliged to move from the fifth floor.

Prime Minister K. Prunskiene is generous to herself and her children. The Lithuanian journal ZHENSHCHINA publishes a large publicity article devoted to the premier and her family. You learn from the article that she inherited from her grandfather not only her name but also her business technique of "what to buy and where best to sell." The esteemed Prunskiene, to judge by the article, still feels a "personal love for the forest" where she grew up. It was evidently this inherited trading

technique and love for the forest which impelled her, before she became prime minister, at the end of last year and early this year, to embark on a forestry deal which ended in scandal. Incidentally, this was described in detail by the newspaper VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI 13 February in the article "Spades Made of... Titanium." Now it would probably no longer write it.

The example of the "ideological inspirers" is contagious. For instance, V. Chapas, the present chairman of the Klaypeda city soviet, at meetings with his voters fulminated with blatant relentlessness against former apparatchiks and staffers of state and party organs: He said that the so and so's had lost all modesty, they had incredibly large salaries. Yet he himself, having obtained a lofty post, calmly signs the wages register on which the figure of R750 stands against his name. And that is not counting his deputy's fee. City Mayor P. Vasilyauskas is not offended, he is paid the same. Their deputies are paid slightly less—R650 each.

Positions of Independent Lithuanian Party Noted

90UN2310A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
19 Jun pp 2, 3

[Article by T. Bavykina: "'A Lithuania Without Democracy Is a Lithuania Without Independence'"]

[Text] At present, life itself is offering this variation of the slogan known to all with which the Communist Party of Lithuania went to the first democratic elections, as noted at the fifth plenum of this party's Central Committee held on 16 June in Vilnius. The slogan "a Lithuania without sovereignty is a Lithuania without a future" in all its formulations was borrowed by virtually all progressive forces of the republic. However, sovereignty itself and ways to achieve it are still interpreted and viewed differently. This is why a new variation of this slogan became the thrust of the report which the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, A. Brazauskas, delivered at the plenum, as well as the speeches of participants.

What prompted this new variation of the indisputable slogan which remains not only topical but popular? The changes in the structures of state power and priority directions for its activities which have occurred in the short period after the adoption of the Act on Independence—a period which has nonetheless been saturated with political events and battles. In the beginning of his report, A. Brazauskas noted that the communists have gathered for their first plenum after the declaration of the independent republic of Lithuania under difficult circumstances: The economic blockade and growing political tension make it the party's duty to mobilize and work with great responsibility, mindful of the good of the Lithuanian people.

At present, the political situation is so dynamic and changeable that it is very important not to become confused and to prevent the romantics or political adventurists from repatterning the system of values.

As they said at the plenum, it should be recalled that Sajudis, born as the embodiment of the aspirations of hundreds of thousands of people in Lithuania, also began with democratic slogans; subsequently the focal point of its activities shifted to achieving economic independence, drawing up and adopting a new constitution, and asserting the state sovereignty of the republic. The concept of independence has now come to the forefront.

Is this bad, does this fail to meet the expectations of the people? Only an insane person might risk speaking against the concept of freedom; freedom has always been and will always be the greatest value in the life of society and every individual. However, it is bad when in proclaiming the idea of independence, an absolute value, an entire people is actually held hostage to it. This is the worst kind of spiritual totalitarianism. The idea is being imposed unequivocally that democracy may be given up in the name of independence, and that solving socioeconomic and national problems may be postponed. The idea of independence is placed above democracy, above a rule-of-law state, and mainly above man, for whom all of this exists.

As was said at the plenum, it is necessary to state clearly and unambiguously that independence is not an end unto itself but merely a premise for democratization, for creating a rule-of-law state which are, once again, not ends unto themselves but effective and successful instruments for ensuring the priority of rights and freedoms of the individual and their reliable protection. Let us recall: The CPSU slogan "everything in the name of man, everything for the benefit of man" served for decades as a powerful ideological cover for an entirely unrestricted partocracy. The people will not be mislead another time by this or similar slogans yet again. Specific, effective political actions are needed which are directed at changing the situation of an individual in society so that he comes to feel that all reforms, both global and partial in nature, economic, political, and all other reforms—are for him, for his benefit.

Denouncing the people for being unable to give up their benefits even in the name of independence is a politically erroneous, not to say a reactionary, approach where values and priorities are deformed in it.

The entire civilized world has long abandoned dictates in politics; where dictate remains, policy is unsuccessful. It was said very fittingly that politics is the art of the possible. This means that compromises which ensure the reconciliation of the interests of various sides and thus an opportunity for their implementation are necessary. At present the Lithuanian Communist Party has many opponents. This cannot be avoided in the environment of a multi- party political system and the transformation of the party into a parliamentary party.

A system of political balances and plurality of opinions are conditions for the existence of any democratic state. However, those who now hold "unassailable" positions—to hold on, not to surrender, the price which the

"common working people" who may become the "common unemployed" tomorrow will have to pay is no object—use impermissible arguments in the polemics when they raise the issue of the lack of confidence in the Lithuanian Communist Party. If our views on attaining independence differ, A. Brazauskas asked in his report, do we have the right not to believe each other and, on top of that, gag the opponent? If the answer is in the positive, there is only one conclusion to be drawn: Political forces claiming a monopoly on the truth exist in the republic even now.

This means that the threat posed by the single-party system is not yet gone. The operation of the new state structures of Lithuania testifies to this. Meanwhile, a legal and ethical environment should be created which will forever prevent any political group in society from claiming the creation of a new "state religion." This is why, it was said at the plenum, the Lithuanian Communist Party believes that its most important task is to spare society the manifestations of the political dictate syndrome and make the emergence of a new state party impossible.

The Lithuanian Communist Party will never come out against independence; this is reflected in its program and statute; this is the orientation of all its members. However, independence is impossible without democracy, without the cooperation of all progressive political forces for the benefit of Lithuania and its people, without reasonable compromises between them, without actions to which the interests of the people are central.

This is why concern was expressed in many speeches at the plenum, and quite rightly so, about the fact that the Lithuanian Communist Party needs to represent its social base more clearly and express and defend its interests. However, for this purpose it is not enough to think properly or set proper priorities, important as it is to do both. It is necessary to have a program for specific actions, and these actions themselves are necessary; that is, flexible and effective tactics which are in line with the present time. It is a pity that in this area the party is late so far (generally, the plenum also indicated this). It appears that it is still easier for the party to live in the world of ideas than it is in the world of people. For this reason, general directions of work continue to supplant the setting of specific goals in priority spheres of activity.

The roots of difficulties and uncertainty regarding the position of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its current role in society are found in this sphere, and not only in the lack of democratic conditions for the existence and operation of the party. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to make no mistakes at all; however, mistakes which set things back for a long time and compel us to start things over again must not be made. One thinks that these very mistakes were made in the course of excessively straightforward interpretation of the idea of "depoliticizing" labor collectives, as a result of which their de-partization rather than depolitization occurred, which, on top of that, affected only one party, the Lithuanian Communist Party. Actually many primary territorial party organizations will have to be set up anew. All right, if only the lesson is learned. After all, there are only two possibilities: either you are a political force which is well aware of its place and role in society, or you are like a frail sailboat which lists in the lightest breeze and has difficulty keeping afloat.

The plenum indicated that at present the Lithuanian Communist Party is looking for ways to reflect the interests of various groups of the working people in its tactics to a greater degree, trying to find itself as a parliamentary party, and is attempting to reestablish connections with the people which have largely been lost, and not necessarily through its own fault.

After a discussion, the directives "On Priorities in the Lithuanian Communist Party Operations Under Current Conditions" were adopted, as well as the nationalities policy program of the Lithuanian Communist Party, which was published in our newspaper on 15 May of this year.

Conference on Soviet Power Opens in Lithuania

LD1807215490 Moscow TASS in English 2145 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius July 19 (TASS)—"The restoration of the Soviet power in Lithuania resulted from the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary wave that we call the 1940 socialist revolution in Lithuania," Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) chief Mikolas Burokevicius, who is also a Soviet Communist Party Politburo member, said today at the opening of the scientific and practical conference "50th Anniversary of the Soviet Power in Lithuania".

On June 21, 1940, the Lithuanian people's seim adopted a declaration on the establishment of the Soviet power in Lithuania. Soon after that, Lithuania joined the Soviet Union. Some politicians and historians consider those events as an occupation and forceful annexation. The conference was organised by the Ideological Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) and the Institute of Socialist and Political Studies.

Participant in the conference Simonas Gilis, who has been a Communist Party member for 58 years, shares the opinion that "there were economic and political preconditions to restore the Soviet power in Lithuania in 1940".

Estonian Miners' Strike Ends After Four Days

LD1807112790 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 18 Jul 90

[INTERFAX report from the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] In Kohtla-Jarve, in Estonia, a miners' strike has ended at the Akhtme mine. The miners, who began the strike four days ago, had made economic demands on the republican government, the town leadership and the Estonslanets association for a review of wholesale prices for the mined shale and an improvement in supplies of food and basics to the town. The Estonian minister of industry and power, (Jaktel), promised the miners that the government will carefully examine the matters they had raised and take account of them in examining the program for developing the republic's fuel and energy complex.

Further on Latvian Government Report

LD1807191490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0907 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Latvian government report presented by Anatolily Gorbunovs, Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, at the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga on 18 July—live]

[Excerpts] Highly esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies:

Permit me to present to you a report that has been compiled by the government and which is based mainly on the material that has just now been distributed to you. [passage omitted]

During the postwar years, many voluntary and economically groundless undertakings were implemented in the republic. Because of that, serious disproportions and structural deformations have come about in the national economy. Forced collectivization and the campaign for the liquidation of individual farms destroyed the material-technical basis of agriculture. [passage omitted]

The government of the republic of Latvia will organize the drawing up of legislative acts and mechanisms of management, which in interconnection with the predictions of national economic development and the planned distribution of state budget, will ensure a constructive fulfillment of the republic's principal tasks.

Permit me, after this introduction, to describe the principal directions in the government's further activity program, which are mentioned in the list of contents in the material distributed to you. First, the foreign policy aspects of the activity of the republic of Latvia.

The basic goal of the government's foreign policy activity is to ensure the de facto restoration of the independence of the republic of Latvia in conformity with the 4 May declaration of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet.

Our opportunities are determined by the actual international-legal status of the state of Latvia, recognition of the republic of Latvia in the countries of the world. International recognition of the government of the republic of Latvia directly depends on the extent to which the government of the republic of Latvia will realize sovereign power in the entire territory of the republic, including defense, guarding of borders, customs, state security, and external contacts.

These tasks must be tackled at the level of competence of the Supreme Soviet's government in the talks with the USSR.

The government of the republic of Latvia assigns priority significance to the relations with the USSR, because an international recognition of the government of Latvia in the Western countries is to be connected with a settlement of the relations between Latvia and the USSR, the recognition of state independence of Latvia by the USSR and establishing a system of equal rights treaties between both states, which must include the regulations for the states' mutual borders and their regimes, mutual economic relations, cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, mutual protection of human and citizens' rights, cooperation in the fight against crime and respect of mutual security interests, and also the status of the USSR military bases in the republic of Latvia. The principal task of Latvia's foreign policy in its relations with the USSR is to ensure by political means the inviolability of the state of Latvia. In connection with that and taking into consideration the geopolitical situation of Latvia, the government recognizes that the basic principle of the foreign policy of Latvia is neutrality. In its foreign policy activity the government will support and promote demilitarization and the trends of formation of a united Europe.

The government of the republic of Latvia regards the perfecting of economic relations with the Soviet Union as purposeful.

Taking into consideration the statement by the Soviet Government that the USSR will transform itself into a union of sovereign states, and that a majority of the Union republics have declared their sovereignty, the government will devote special efforts towards concluding treaties with the Russian Federation and other republics.

One of the more important instruments of the government's foreign policy is the permanent representation of the Council of Ministers of the republic of Latvia in Moscow, which must ensure to the republic of Latvia the necessary contacts with the USSR, the governments of the Union republics, and the diplomatic corps of foreign countries. The formation of trade centers in the larger Soviet cities is also envisaged.

A stabilization of the talks' mechanism with the USSR creates preconditions for the de facto recognition of the republic of Latvia on the part of the Western countries. The government of the republic of Latvia will promote the process of recognition by realizing an active foreign policy, by forming consular relations with foreign countries, by joining in as an observer and participant in the activity of various international organizations, and actively participating at various international conferences.

The government anticipates that it will be capable of ensuring its participation in the Helsinki-II conference in Moscow in 1991.

The government will develop existing contacts and establish new ones with foreign governments. Soon the government of the republic of Latvia will create preconditions for forming representative centers in Riga for the members of the Nordic Council, and will also open corresponding centers in those countries.

For the realization of political tasks in foreign countries, economic contacts will be used and the activity of the Foreign Ministry and of the foreign economic contacts' departments of the government will be coordinated. The government will also use bilateral and multilateral contacts, which have lately been established with foreign countries, and therewith the people's diplomacy will promote the republic's recognition.

The government will use the contacts with foreign country-Latvian organizations for supporting the foreign policy of the republic of Latvia.

By restoring traditionally close relations among the Baltic states, the government has promoted mutual recognition. By restoring Baltic unity, which was liquidated in 1940, the government has concluded a treaty of economic cooperation.

The government further envisages developing a juridical basis in political and economic relations with the neighboring countries, in order to form a stable political-economic union in the Baltic region. This union will assist the Baltic region in entering into the political, economic, and cultural circles of the world, and will ensure the formation of a united economic policy in relations with the USSR and other countries.

Soon representations of the republic of Latvia will be opened in Lithuania and Estonia.

Taking into consideration that the countries which are situated around the Baltic Sea have many uniting factors, the government of the republic of Latvia regards as necessary the forming of a regional community of the countries of the Baltic Sea basin, because the policy of the countries of northern Europe is also oriented toward the establishment of direct economic and political relations—toward cooperation with the Baltic states.

The experience of Latvia in relations with the countries of East Europe shows that there are similar positions in the world economic system. This must be used in the interests of Latvia. Also, the experience of those countries in political and economic reforms is important, and this has to be used in Latvia.

The support of the newly created democracies for Latvia's strivings for independence must be used in Latvia's foreign policy.

The government considers as necessary carrying out undertakings to move closer to the European Economic Community, and in the future integrating with it.

In searching for Latvia's place in the European and world market, the government of the republic of Latvia plans to establish contacts with the European Common Market's structures. Work in this direction has been started, the message of the heads of the three Baltic states has been submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council of Europe.

The government will study possibilities for ties with the developing countries, taking into consideration their development level and also the potential resources' base, and will also try to change the stereotyped preconception on the forms of cooperation between North and the South. [passage omitted]

Latvian Government Seeks Treaty With USSR

LD1907103490 Moscow TASS in English 1027 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga July 19 TASS—The Latvian parliament's commissions today began discussing a government economic programme, designed to advance the republic's independence claims.

The programme was suggested by Prime Minister Ivar Godmanis on Wednesday along with the draft of a treaty on relations between Latvia and the USSR.

The draft says, in particular, that the Soviet Union "recognises that the Latvian Republic has full legislative, executive and judicial powers on its territory".

Federal property in Latvia "shall, within a year, be handed over to the Latvian Republic", the draft says. It stipulates that Latvia will reciprocate by renouncing any claims on its property located on the territory of the USSR, which is the Latvian contribution to the common property of the Soviet Union.

No proposals for talks have, however, come from the Soviet Government yet.

Latvia's Rubiks Interviewed on Party's Future

PM1807124390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 2,3

[Interview with A.P. Rubiks, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by V. Khatuntsev; place and date not given: "'We Know What Lies Ahead of Us'"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Many PRAVDA readers have asked us to give more details in our newspaper about newly elected members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Responding to these wishes, we now begin publication of this kind of material. Today we talk to A.P. Rubiks,

member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Khatuntsev] Tell us, Alfreds Petrovic, how have communists in your republic responded to the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Rubiks] As you yourself understand, it is still too early to give a complete picture or an integrated perception. But, judging by responses and telephone contacts with comrades while the congress was in progress, it is possible to single out two, I would say, opposite views. One shows confirmation of the belief that the congress would be held in an atmosphere of consolidation and that there would be no split. But there are also people who had been expecting extraordinary events and decisions that would put everything in its place in a flash. So those people are disappointed. If we are going to take a realistic view, we should probably expect those feeling disillusioned—and the majority of them are not involving themselves in the life of party organizations or paying their dues anyway—to make it clear whom they are with. We must study the mood among them—which we will in fact be doing as part of the preparation for the final sitting of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, which is going to be held at some time in mid-August.

[Khatuntsev] What are the most important issues that have to be resolved at the concluding stage of the congress?

[Rubiks] First and foremost we have to work out our program directions, draft new statutes, and decide what tactical steps we are going to take as the situation in the republic's sociopolitical life reveals more and more new processes and trends. Life is not going to be easy for us, but we know what lies ahead of us.

[Khatuntsev] When you say "we," you mean...?

[Rubiks] There are now 162,000 card-carrying members in the party's rayon and city committees. We have lost something in the region of 15,000 people. So we should not talk of a split as such, although some party members have broken away. Being objective, I think that we will lose some more people yet. It is a time of choice and soul-searching. Everyone is going through this. Nevertheless, the Communist Party will remain an impressive political force, which is why the pressure on it is growing.

[Khatuntsev] In these difficult conditions, how do you see yourself fitting into the republic's sociopolitical life?

[Rubiks] One of the leaders of the People's Front once said that now it is not so important to physically destroy the Communist Party as to outlaw it. These are far-reaching plans. People will start to be afraid to be a member of our party and fear harassment and discriminatory measures against them. So there will be a decline in the influx of new forces. It is not very great even now, to be honest: Only 80 new members have been admitted since the beginning of the year, although I should point out that three-fourths of them are Latvians. Despite this, you often hear our opponents say that the Communist Party is alien to the republic's people.

How are we going to find our place in the future? A great deal depends on how the law on citizenship looks. You see, some people hold the view that only those born in Latvia before 17 June 1940, those who have lived in Latvia, or their direct descendants may be considered citizens of the Latvian Republic. Everyone else must make an oath of loyalty to the republic and undergo a probationary period as a citizen before they can become a fully-fledged citizen.

This means that if people join the CPSU and do not wish to change their citizenship, this will serve as grounds for terming the party a party of a foreign state and consequently one without the right to register and function. Moreover, the draft law contains a provision stipulating that the party's leading center cannot be outside the republic. That makes Moscow and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic a foreign country. As you can see, we have been placed in a very difficult situation and are now looking for new approaches. We are preparing the party in the moral and physical sense for work in extreme conditions.

[Khatuntsev] How, in this context, do you feel about the discussion that developed at the 28th CPSU Congress around paragraph 22 of the new statutes?

[Rubiks] I was a member of the working commission and the larger commission on the statutes, and my opinion is this: A debate has arisen over the rights and sovereignty of the Union republic communist parties. Many believe that the party must remain the same—a monolith—and that republic party organizations should virtually be territorial formations of the CPSU. Everything else, according to them, will lead to a split and collapse. In my view, however, the disputes over the first line are not guided by principle. In any event, it is the whole statutes that will be studied, rather than individual lines and clauses, during registration at local level. And, as I have already said, a paramount role will be played in this respect by the laws on citizenship in the various republics, their degree of sovereignty, and the extent of their dependence on the center. Precisely these questions will determine our stategy and tactics in the immediate future. A struggle is being waged, and if anyone finds comfort in the thought of the 18-month transitional period, they are deluding themselves. New state structures for the transition to a bourgeois Latvia with a pro-capitalist orientation will be formed during that period. It will be a bourgeois democracy—there will be no question of any socialist option. These trends must be considered realistically as they develop.

[Khatuntsev] But can communists somehow influence the processes of state reorganization?

[Rubiks] A total of 107 of the 201 Latvian Supreme Soviet deputies are members of the CPSU. However, only 58 communists are working in the "Equal Rights"

faction. Now, following the 28th CPSU Congress, we intend to question all our deputies, including those in soviets at other levels, to find out whom they are with, whom they are for, and whose side they are on. Because fighting against your own party while carrying a party membership card in your pocket is a luxury impermissible in political struggle.

[Khatuntsev] Political activeness has recently made itself particularly keenly felt in the Baltic republics on various historical dates. When is the next one?

[Rubiks] July 21 is the day on which Soviet power was restored in Latvia, and this year is the 50th anniversary. This date represents an occasion for mourning to some of our opponents, so all kinds of rallies are possible as well as obstacles in the way of our holding a central event in Riga: a session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Joint Council of Labor Collectives. We have requested that it be broadcast on radio. We have no dreams of being broadcast on television: We would obviously be turned down. Whatever, the anniversary will not pass unmarked.

[Khatuntsev] In conclusion, a few words about yourself....

[Rubiks] I am almost 55 and was born a Latvian in Daugavpils. I am married with two sons. I began my working life on a collective farm, then, after technical school, I worked as shift foreman at a plant. I later served in the Army and graduated from the Riga Polytechnical Institute as a mechanical engineer. I also graduated from the Leningrad Higher Party School. I worked in the Komsomol and was elected secretary of the republic Komsomol Central Committee responsible for propaganda. Then I began party work: in the party Central Committee apparatus and as first secretary of Riga's Leningradskiy Rayon party committee. I was minister of the republic's local industry and was mayor of the capital for six years.

[Khatuntsev] As far as I am aware, the title of USSR people's deputy was given to you in a difficult struggle....

[Rubiks] Yes, there were seven contenders in the electoral district, and they represented the most diverse political trends. The discussions were heated, especially as Riga's Leningradskiy Rayon, chosen by me, is not without its social and consumer problems. And who is the first person responsible? The mayor. But I got through the second round and won despite that. Of course, it gave me considerable experience of the competitive struggle which is so necessary today on the path we have chosen.

Latvia Fails To Deal With Draft Dodging

PM1807122590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Where's the Way Out?"]

[Text] Riga—A sitting of the parliamentary standing Commission on Defense and Internal Affairs headed by lawyer T. Yutdzis [name as transliterated] (Latvian People's Front faction) has examined the topical and acute question for the republic of young people's recruitment into and service in the USSR Armed Forces. Servicemen invited along from the interested departments—military commissariat personnel, military lawyers, and medics—voiced their attitude to the problem. During the discussion the following figure was cited, among others: This year something in the order of 1,000 young people of draft age have dodged Army service. This does not include those who have, under the law adopted in the republic, expressed a desire to perform alternative (labor) service. This also applies to at least 1,000 young people.

Incidentally, so-called labor service is badly organized. To be quite frank and precise, it is not organized at all. "The current law on alternative (labor) service is not functioning," people's deputies themselves were forced to admit at the sitting. At best a new version of it will be required in the near future. The speakers noted this. However, will this produce real results if law-enforcement organs and people's courts fail to react at all to cases of draft-dodging? Is the law not binding on them? Even their, so to speak, homegrown, as yet unique, law?

Now a word about something else. At present the people's deputies—and they are not the only ones—are agonizingly seeking a way out of the current deadlock situation which they have, incidentally, created themselves: The crime situation in the republic is continuing to deteriorate. The crime rate is high among young people. How can it be otherwise? Impunity breeds irresponsibility in very varied forms, including a devil-may-care attitude toward the laws. Is it not here that they should also seek one of the reasons for nonregulation relationships and cases of desertion at a number of Army collectives?

RSFSR

Silayev Comments on New Russian Government

LD1807210490 Moscow TASS in English 2055 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—"Even when I was a minister and deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union, I had no clear idea of the scale and depth of the Russian republic's problems and troubles.

"The republic had none of the essential attributes of independence," Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev said in an interview with the MOSCOW NEWS weekly.

Speaking about the situation in which the Russian Federation—the largest of the 15 Soviet republics—finds itself, Silayev said with bitterness that nearly R100 billion were deducted annually from the republic's income to the state budget, of which only 30 billion were returned to it.

Silayev spoke about the new republican government—some of its ministers have already been approved by the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Russian Federation.

"We expect our new ministers not only to be able to think in a new way but to approach problems in a new way. They must not command but regulate affairs and influence people," he said. "We are very sensitive to the age of the candidates. The younger a man is, the freer he is from stereotypes."

The prime minister said that the average age of the candidates already approved by the parliament is slightly over 47.

He said it was most difficult to find a candidate for minister of culture. He said one of the two or three candidates was Nikita Mikhalkov, a remarkable film actor and director.

It was also difficult to select candidates for minister of the interior. Silayev said the candidates will be identified after considering up to ten programmes submitted by would-be interior ministers.

Yeltsin Speaks to Russian Government

LD1707155390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We have just received a report that a conference took place today at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers in which the leaders of rayon, town, rural, and settlement soviets took part, having come to Moscow from various regions of Russia. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin set out the main issues now facing the government of the Russian Federation in strengthening the role of local soviets.

How are the main laws and decisions of the first RSFSR congress, the first session of Russian pepoe's deputies, being implemented? What should be changed in the structure of soviet authority in the localities? These are the main themes on which the participants in the conference have held a serious and concerned discussion. This conference is the first in the practical links between the Russian government and representatives of local soviets. [video shows Yeltsin addressing auditorium from podium]

Resolution Appoints RSFSR State Arbiter

PM1707153390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Appointing the RSFSR Chief State Arbiter," Moscow, RSFSR House of the Soviets, 14 July 1990]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] resolves:

To appoint Comrade Valeriy Vasilyevich Grebennikov as RSFSR chief state arbiter.

[Signed] B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated]Moscow, RSFSR House of Soviets, 14 July 1990.

Rayon Officials Resign From Party

PM1707131790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Zinovyev under the rubric "Direct Line": "Rayon-Scale Depoliticization"]

[Text] Ufa—Twenty-five workers of the Gafuriyskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department headed by its chief, M. Masagutov, Rayon Prosecutor Yu. Fakhretdinov, and Rayon People's Court Chairman M. Khannanov have submitted applications to leave the CPSU.

They mentioned as one of the main reasons prompting them to take this step is the constant interference in the affairs of law enforcement organs by R. Tamindarov, first secretary of Gafuriyskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon committee].

In conversation with me G. Mogushkov, chief of the Rayon State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate, said:

"I am sick of our first secretary's working methods. He demanded that I collect compromising material about people he disliked and in return promised me the post of chief of the Rayon Internal Affairs Department if I obeyed him. I serve the law and I do not want party functionaries to order me around. Incidentally, the present first secretary's predecessors acted in just the same way. The root lies in the very system of dependence on party organs, therefore I cannot remain in the party."

Rayon Prosecutor Yu. Fakhretdinov:

"Tamindarov is forever saying to me: 'I am making demands of you not as a prosecutor but as a communist.' The implication is that as a communist I am supposed to do the first secretary's bidding regardless of the law."

But Tamindarov himself assesses the situation that has been created in the rayon as follows:

"All these people (the personnel of law enforcement organs who have applied to leave the party—A.Z.) received their posts with the help of the party, but now that the political situation in the country has changed

they have decided they have to be outside the CPSU. Never mind, it's no problem if the party rids itself of people who exploit it in order to obtain posts."

Supreme Court Members View Needed Reforms

90UN2146A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 24, Jun 90 p 15

[Report on interviews with members of the RSFSR Supreme Court by A. Valentey and A. Nikolayev; place and date not given: "Without the Right to a Mistake"—first two paragraphs are EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN introduction]

[Text] A character in a well-known movie, Captain Zheglov, maintained that "a thief should be behind bars!" This was put in too straightforward a manner but the meaning of it was clear: Indeed, punishment should definitely follow a crime; the unavoidability of punishment is what we should proceed from in fighting crime. The measure of punishment should be determined only by the court on the basis of the most thorough examination of all facts.

As is known, a judge does not apprehend criminals himself, but he controls the administration of justice. He has no right to give in to emotions in his work. Our conversation with members of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Court G. Yerofeyev, V. Lizunov, V. Mukhin, and V. Cherkasov who have for years been considering criminal cases, frequently very complex ones, began with explaining these notions. The issue of modern-day courts—this is the topic which emerged in our conversation.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] The crime rate is up in our country. There is plenty of talk, including in the press, that economic crimes against the people have become more sophisticated, and that new types of crime have appeared, for example, racketeering. Apparently, judges also have new problems in conjunction with this. For example, how are the courts to regard crimes which have no precedent?

[Cherkasov] Indeed, if you read certain newspapers, you might get the impression that there are all kinds of "new" crimes. However, on examination, there is nothing new except the scale of crime.

For example, in Moscow the share of crimes against property in the overall structure of crime increased from 33.3 percent in 1986 to 48.4 percent in 1988. To be sure, petty theft dropped by 3.2 percent, but the theft of state property increased from 23.8 to 29.1 percent.

[Lizunov] Racketeering is not a novelty for us either. Racketeers are quite well "covered" by the criminal legislation in effect.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] As a rule, rank-and-file perpetrators end up in the dock, whereas "mafia fathers" get off lightly—they are parties to cases as... accomplices. The courts do not take into consideration videotapes, which are frequently the only "witness."

[V. Mukhin] Undoubtedly, criminal legislation is in need of a renewal.

However, the legislation in effect provides for penalties not only for perpetrators but also for the organizers of crimes. We should know this law and apply it skillfully and objectively, without allowing violations and unscrupulousness to occur. For example, my colleague G. Yerofeyev considered the case of the Yevstratov gang which has committed several murders. Despite the fact that the leader and organizer of the gang did not participate in the murders directly, he got a death sentence. As far as the use of videotapes as evidence is concerned, there is indeed food for thought here. For example, when I considered the case of Yakshiyants, who took children and a teacher hostage in order to hijack a plane to Israel, I had a videotape of his criminal actions. Seeing the tape was helpful in getting the most precise idea of the dramatic events which absorbed the attention of many people.

[Cherkasov] I also believe that the need exists to use sound and videotapes in considering cases. However, if we now acknowledge all sound and video recordings which we encounter in the course of court proceedings to be evidence, the judges will find themselves in an extremely difficult situation. After all, many of our courts do not have conditions for verifying the authenticity of recorded evidence.

[Yerofeyev] Recently, an avalanche of information on criminals and crime, as well as on the independence of judges, has appeared in the pages of newspapers and magazines and on the TV screen. However, what kind of independence can there be given the current material and technical facilities of the courts and the social standing of judges?

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] It is known that the salaries of judges were increased effective January 1990...

[Yerofeyev] Correct. However, lawyers are still marching in unison to embark on work in cooperatives; perhaps, salary increase is not the only point.

[Cherkasov] The question is: Who is coming to replace them? After all, professionals are leaving and for many of them this job has become their calling! Even diligence will not replace high professionalism. Radical measures are necessary.

[Lizunov] Court sessions are held in our country in all kinds of places—in basements, dormitories, and even... in day-care centers! There is a shortage of deliberation rooms, to say nothing of those for recreation. As a rule, there is not even a place to have a meal in the buildings of people's courts, despite the fact that sometimes one has to work from morning till late at night. What kind of respect can there be? Let us be frank: Our courts have

lost their prestige. This is why the people appeal to the newspapers and magazines for any reason at all.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] The attitude of the courts toward the mass media is an important issue. Can a newspaper article bring pressure to bear on a judge?

[Yerofeyev] No, a highly skilled judge is not particularly influenced by this though, of course, he has to go through unpleasant moments as well. Publications are possible. All that is necessary is that the accused not be mentioned even indirectly until everything is established and a sentence is handed down. Look, for example, at the case of the railway accident at Kamenskaya Station. We referred the case back for an additional investigation, and criminal charges were filed against people who had nothing in common with those mentioned in the first indictment. Therefore, it is better not to write in advance, and not to chase after sensations. At the very least, you need to think about the possibility of causing moral anguish through such a publication to a person who is innocent. This does not at all go along with the concept of a rule-of-law state.

[Mukhin] Prior to a sentence, all reports in the press should be in the nature of information. Comrade journalists, please be patient with your evaluations. It is another matter when the trial is over; I myself wrote about one of those cases in EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN. Another point: You should not invent things which did not happen. Here are just two examples. The first is an article in OGONEK concerning the sentence for Yakshiyants—15 years in jail.

So, the journalist wrote that the sentence was, supposedly, harsh, and that the audience was, supposedly, shaken by it. This did not happen. I say this as the presiding judge at that session.

Or look at an article in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. At issue was a man who was accused of killing a girl. He was sentenced to death. The RSFSR Supreme Court referred the case back for an additional investigation, and subsequently dropped it. The journalist was outraged by this decision, and to prove that she was right she wrote about details of the most cruel nature which, supposedly, had occurred. Naturally, such arguments may influence readers. But where did she get this information? Could she not just look at the criminal case file? The details she pointed out were not there. What kind of a "flight of fantasy" is this?

[Cherkasov] I believe that we should have meetings more often between court employees and judges, and journalists who specialize in such articles. After all, most of the journalists do not have law degrees. It would be interesting for the judges as well to learn how journalists work with particular types of material. After all, enormous amounts of material are accumulated in the courts and the procurator's offices which needs to be analyzed. Very many issues can be raised and covered on the pages of newspapers and magazines. Sometimes we are not in a position to do this. However, we are prepared to cooperate.

After all, there are layers of important issues which have almost not been touched. For example, the courts resolve to collect tremendous amounts of damages, millions of rubles, from the guilty parties. How are the sentences actually carried out as far as the seizure of assets is concerned? We may say that it is absolutely unsatisfactory. In this matter, a legal issue grows into not only an organizational issue, but an economic one as well.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] We agree. However, let us return once again to the appeals by citizens to the newspapers complaining about the decisions of the courts. After all, on the one hand, all of us are in favor of independent courts, while on the other hand, letters are referred from newspapers and magazines to the courts with "a request to respond to the author and the editorial office." Is this not an attempt to pressure the courts through an influential organ?

[Yerofeyev] Sometimes the penalty is reduced after such an appeal to the court by a newspaper, despite the fact that there are no sufficient grounds for this.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] However, should the operation of the courts not be controlled? After all, mistakes do happen.

[Cherkasov] There is such control, in particular, supervision by the procurator's office. Incidentally, some people are simply not aware of the mechanism of appealing court rulings. Let us use this mechanism, let us advertise and improve it.

[Mukhin] In this reference, I would like to point out that an entire wave of articles has now arisen in the press in which the authors call for humanizing the Criminal Code and for compassion for the violators of law. This is correct, and I am "in favor." However, let us not think about humanization in a lopsided manner, let us not forget about the victim. Let me give this example. Things have been stolen from you. The criminal has been apprehended but, alas, the valuables have not been found. Nobody is going to return them to you, the victim. As far as money, you will receive it from the criminal "in a trickle" over many years. Let us not forget that in all of this an investigator may call you in 20 or 30 times, even if you live in another city. This is why the victims frequently do not go to the militia: They are afraid of being "dragged back forever."

[Lizunov] At present, the victims' need for legal protection, and to this end greater knowledge, is critical. In this matter, EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN, with which we are already beginning to develop good relations, may be very helpful.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] We have unwittingly touched on an issue which, as we see it, is particularly important. At present, the issue of universal economic literacy has

been placed on the agenda. However, many of us still exhibit legal illiteracy. All of us need a comprehensive legal education as well!

[Mukhin] Here is one more thing I would like to say: Not only the fate but also the lives of the people depend on court sentences to a large degree. Through our joint efforts, we should help the judges improve the conditions of their work—the conditions which help them to better implement the principles of humanism and justice.

Radiation Contamination Reported in Shcherbinka

LD1807132290 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Report attributed to INTERFAX; from the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] A center of radioactive contamination has been discovered not far from the settlement of Shcherbinka, near Moscow. It has emerged that so much thorium has accumulated at the site of a garbage dump that it is simply not possible to eliminate it all at once, and radioactive contamination has already begun to spread from here to the ground waters. The oblast commission on extraordinary circumstances intends to research the entire region using aero- geophysical and land-based methods of radiation monitoring and eliminate the anomaly that has been discovered.

Novozybkovo Hosts Atomic Energy Seminar

LD1807153990 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Bryansk July 18 TASS—Three hundred Russian doctors coping with the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident came to Novozybkovo, in south-western Russia, for a seminar held under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Novozybkovo is the largest Russian settlement within the strict radiation control zone. In the town of 45,000 inhabitants, the average density of radioactive pollution exceeds 15 curie per square kilometer. In neighbouring regions, adjacent to Belorussia, this figure is several times higher. More than 110,000 people are to be evacuated from here to uncontaiminated territories. Overall, some 500,000 people live in the radioactive zone in Russia.

The IAEA seminar will discuss how low-intensity ionising radiation affects the human organism, and ways to diagnose and treat radiation-induced diseases. The Russian doctors will hear reports by specialists from France, the United States, Sweden, and Hungary.

The seminar will last three days.

Independent Trade Union Federation Plenum Opens

LD1807205190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1110 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—Participants in the plenum of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FITUR) which opened in Moscow today expressed readiness for constructive dialogue with the parliament and the new government of Russia. This trade union center, founded in the spring of this year, has already united 70 major industrial and regional structures which represent the interests of over 45 million trade union members.

As was noted in the report given by Igor Klochkov, chairman of FITUR, the many years of Russia's dependence on the diktat and arbitrariness of the Union ministries and departments has had a negative effect on the well-being of the working people of the largest Soviet republic. [passage omitted]

Noting the special concern being caused in the Federation by the process of the national economy's entry into market relations, Klochkov called for the holding of "roundtables" on this problem with the participation of representatives of the government, local executive authorities, and trade unions. It is only by conducting an examination at all levels—enterprise, region, and republic—of the mechanism for transfer to the market that it is possible to make the broad public understand the necessity of this step, and then, after holding an all-Russian referendum, to obtain nationwide agreement. [passage omitted]

At the same time, the participants in the plenum recognized that the Russian trade unions must more rapidly reform the former industrial and regional structures, many of which continue to have a propensity for centralism and command methods and are only slowly giving up their distributive functions and the habits of excessive paperwork.

The plenum is continuing its work. [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 18 July adds the following: "The TASS correspondent adds that Comrade Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, is taking part in the work of the plenum."]

International Airport Opens in Kaliningrad

LD1807020190 Moscow TASS in English 2323 GMT 17 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[Text] Kaliningrad July 17 TASS—Relief crews for Kaliningrad fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic will be now dispatched not via Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, as was the case in the past, but directly from the Khrabrovo Airport near Kaliningrad, a regional centre in the west of the Russian Federation.

Charter flights are made directly to Dakar, Luanda and Las Palmas from the local airport. The new air terminal was built and fitted out with the latest equipment by the production amalgamation Kaliningradrybprom, a major Soviet fishing and fish-processing enterprise.

Its expenses will be quickly recouped thanks to cuts in time and fares for fishermen.

"The airport is ready to serve foreign tourists and businessmen. According to a decision by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad region is now declared a zone of free enterprise," Nikolay Kiselevich, head of the Kaliningrad Air Traffic Administration, told TASS.

The airport can receive aircraft of the Caravelle type, small Boeings and private planes. However, it is necessary to enlarge the Khrabrovo Airport to carry on broader international tourist, cultural and business relations with the West. For this purpose, it will be necessary to implement a major programme for its development, technical re-equipment, the construction of a hotel complex and the establishment of services. The project will be fulfilled, along with the development of international cooperation.

Losses From Maritime Kray Flooding Detailed

LD1707161690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0845 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jul (TASS)—According to preliminary data, the overall loss from floods in a number of rayons in Maritime Kray (Soviet Far East) comes to about R140 million, including R90 million for the town of Vladivostok. As reported to a TASS correspondent today at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 730 blocks of apartments, 11 school buildings, five children's pre-school establishments, and 56 shops were flooded as a result of floods caused by torrential rain on 12-15 July on Khasanskiy, Nadezhdinskiy, Lazovskiy, and Shkotovskiy Rayons in the kray. More than 4,000 people were evacuated. Three bridges were destroyed, and 37 damaged. Two electric power stations, 30 km of power lines, and 42 km of communications lines were put out of action; 2,500 hectares of arable agricultural land were inundated with water.

According to data from the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, there are no casualities. A special commission is at work in the rayons hit by the disaster.

Housing Initiative Launched in Krasnoyarsk

PM1807100990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Video report on Krasnoyarsk housing construction initiative from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows houses, caption reading "Krasnoyarsk"] [Announcer] Many inhabitants of Krasnoyarsk, tired of waiting for years until the state provides them with housing, have decided to take matters into their own hands and have gotten down to individual housing construction.

In the coming year some 5,000 small detached houses like these will spring up on the outskirts of the city.

Tula Alcoholics' Center Strike Reported

PM1607102590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent N. Kireyev: "Neither Treatment Center Nor Labor Colony"]

[Text] Tula Oblast—On Sunday morning a little over 1,000 people receiving treatment at the Tula Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] administration for correctional affairs No. 1 treatment and labor clinic declared a strike and at the same time refused the food provided "until all demands are examined and satisfied."

These words end the appeal to the administration. Many of its points, for instance changing the duration of treatment to six months and also changing the status of the treatment and labor clinic to that of a medical institution and its transfer to the management of the Health Ministry, the granting of paid leave, and so forth, by virtue of existing legislation are outside the competence not only of the local authorities but also of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The simplest thing was to fulfill the penultimate line of the ultimatum—"invite a representative of the central press." And so with V. Shorokhov, USSR people's deputy from the CPSU and a worker at the Tula machine plant, I went to "pay a visit."

"There is nothing remarkable now about extraordinary occurrences in institutions of this kind," announced Major General A. Safonov, chief of the Tula Internal Affairs Administration. "Not so long ago mutinous alcoholics here broke down a fence and tried to make a break 'to freedom.' At the time we succeeded rapidly in making them see sense. Now there is a new, more 'democratic' action of mass insubordination and protest."

Nonetheless, for the uninitiated, what is a treatment and labor clinic? It is an institution for compulsory treatment and reeducation through labor for chronic alcoholics and drug addicts. These clinics were organized within the MVD system in the sixties. As a rule able-bodied people who have refused voluntary treatment in health care organs are sent there for two years. The court passes a decree on the basis of medical evidence. The prosecutor has the right to appeal against this decision.

As we can see, the idea did not seem bad: saving people sliding into the abyss, giving their friends and relations a brief respite. The ideologists of the creation of the treatment and labor clinics entertained the best of plans—curing if not all then at least some from a terrible

disease. Indeed initially keeping first-time inmates separate from returnees, from previous offenders, did not portend trouble. But it was only on paper that things proceeded smoothly.

In many places during the period of the "nationwide struggle" against drunkenness and alcoholism and the creation of showpiece sobriety zones, zealous officials rushed to unite clinics of various categories into single large clinics. They said, if we are going to struggle, then let's struggle—on a large scale! In Tula people now recall with a dreamy smile the idyll which reigned at the combine harvester treatment and labor clinic: flowers everywhere, quiet, polite, tidy first-time alcoholics stood to attention under the eyes of the bosses and bravely reported on their criminal careers. In the evenings a brass band, consisting of this same "contingent," would play.

Obviously, that is how it should have been. The treatment and labor clinic is not a labor colony, not a solitary confinement cell. So why after visiting the clinic was I left with a gloomier impression than after familiarizing myself with the premises occupied by those who had been sentenced or were awaiting sentence?

Let's take a look at who is kept in a treatment and labor clinic. According to specialists, there are very few "law abiding" citizens in the country's clinics. To be more precise, over half the alcoholics had served prison terms in the past. In turn, among this half the majority consisted of people who had two or more previous convictions. One of out every ten was of no fixed abode. About 40 percent had received compulsory treatment before.

The statistics for the Tula treatment and labor clinic are also sad and alarming. Nearly 500 had been sent for repeat treatment and there are "holdouts" who are on their third, fifth, or even seventh stay. The most terrible thing is that alongside utterly degraded elements there are people who have come here for the first time: quiet stay-at-home alcoholics, former intellectuals, and beardless youths.

And what about reeducation? There is none. Judge for yourselves, for instance, what benefit can be derived from the fifth point of the provision on treatment and labor clinics, approved back in 1974: "Political educational work in treatment and labor clinics is aimed at educating the people kept in them in a spirit of strict observance of the laws and rules of socialist communal living, an honest attitude toward labor, and a solicitous attitude toward state and public property, at improving the cultural standard of these people, and also at persuading them of the need to fulfill their treatment tasks"?

How is this combined with real life? Here's how: In the barracks-like wards prison laws rule over a horde of sullen peasants and before the eyes of the timid novice the moribund old timer drinks acetone or a concoction of nitrocellulose lacquer and... wheezes with pleasure. This year alone 70 people at the no. 1 treatment and labor clinic embarked on self-mutilation and anyone found throwing away butt ends into the passage between the rows of two-tier bunks is called a cissy. If they do not allow the oblast prosecutor to say a word, if they interrupt a general, if they welcome with displeasure the opinion of the people's deputy whom they themselves have asked to come...

What next? Everyone agrees that sick people are being kept in the treatment and labor clinic. Yes, they are not only alcoholics. Pleasure has to be paid for, as they say. The majority does not even regard gastritis as an illness. Fits are another matter. It is not for nothing that on the clinic's premises there is a large medical unit headed by a lieutenant colonel. The combat personnel consists of two dozen doctors, five feldschers, and nearly 30 nurses. Treatment of the main illness is "on the basis of the indications and recommendations of the USSR Health Ministry." But the only thing is that the results are useless.

...The day after visiting the treatment and labor clinic I telephoned the local internal affairs administration. I heard good news: "The strikers have had breakfast in the canteen and have gone to work." The local conflict would seem to have been settled satisfactorily. But the problems remain!

What should the modern clinic be like, who should be sent there, and for how long? People who can still be saved should undoubtedly be treated intensively and skillfully. For hopeless drunkards and for former criminals, some kind of stricter establishment should obviously be organized. Then the question of who these establishments belong to would disappear. The former would be under the auspices of the Health Ministry, the latter of the MVD.

Commercial TV Channel Formed in Ulan-Ude

LD1807152490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] In addition to the two all-Union channels, residents of Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatiya, now have the opportunity to watch a third, commercial, television channel.

The channel was established by Ulan-Ude Town Executive Committee, the town Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] committee and the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. The income from advertisements will go to develop the town's social, cultural, and municipal services. The new channel will, at viewers' requests, show feature films, documentaries, popular science, and educational films. Video programs from the United States, Britain, France, and Italy will be on the pay channel.

Interethnic Conflict Causes Death in Altay Kray

LD1807192890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] On 16 July a fight broke out on interethnic grounds between soldiers of Azerbaijani and Uzbek nationality in the territory of a military unit of the Ministry of Defense in the village of Novoromanovo in Kalmanka Rayon, Altay Kray. About 60 persons were involved in the fighting. Uzbek soldiers took two submachine guns away from sentries. While they were being disarmed by a group of officers, one soldier of Uzbek nationality was killed during an exchange of fire. Order was restored and an inquiry is being held.

Western Republics

Ukraine Supreme Soviet Continues To Meet

LD1807152190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The Ukraine Supreme Soviet session in Kiev today continued to discuss the structure of the state administration and the formation of a republic government. The structure proposed by Comrade Masol will be considered as provisional for the transitional period to market relations. Comrade Ivashko's statement on his resignation from the post of republic Supreme Soviet chairman has been examined and noted. Elections for a new chairman have begun: 27 candidates have been nominated to the post.

'Text' of Ukrainian Sovereignty Declaration

LD1807164890 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] **Text of the Declaration on the Ukraine's State Sovereignty, Adopted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet on 16 July 1990**

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—expressing the will of the people of the Ukraine, striving for the creation of a democratic society, providing for human rights and freedoms, respecting the national rights of all peoples, taking care to ensure the fully-fledged political, economic, social, and spiritual development of the Ukrainian people, and acknowledging the necessity to build a state of law in this country, with the aim of establishing sovereignty and self-government for the Ukraine—declares the state sovereignty of the Ukraine as a supremacy: independence, the fullness and indivisibility of power in the republic on its territory, and its independence and equal rights in external relations.

I. Self-Determination of the Ukrainian Nation

The Ukrainian SSR, as a sovereign national state, is developing within the existing borders on the basis of the inalienable right of the Ukrainian nation for self-determination. The Ukrainian SSR provides for the defense and protection of the national state system of the Ukrainian people. Any violent actions against the national state system of the Ukraine, performed by political parties, public organizations, or individuals, are prosecuted according to law.

II. People's Power

The citizens of all nationalities living in the republic make up the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people are the only source of state power in the republic. The people's power of the Ukrainian nation is realized on the basis of the constitution of the republic directly, or through the people's deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. It is the exclusive right of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR to act and speak on behalf of the Ukrainian peoiple. No political party, public organization, group, or individual has the right to act or speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people.

III. State Power

The Ukrainian SSR is independent in solving any issues of life in the state. The Ukrainian SSR secures the supremacy of the constitution and laws on its territory. State power is divided into legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Supervision over the observance of laws is provided by the procurator general of the Ukrainian SSR, who is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the republic and is responsible only to the highest body of state power.

IV. Citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR

The Ukrainian SSR has its own citizenship rights and guarantees every citizen the right to retain citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR are determined by the law of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed rights and freedoms envisaged by the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and norms of international law recognized by the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian SSR ensures equality before the law of all citizens of the republic irrespective of their origin, social and property status, racial or national belonging, sex, education, language, political views, religious beliefs, occupation, place of residence, or other circumstances. The Ukrainain SSR regulates immigration processes. The Ukrainian SSR displays concern and takes measures for the protection of the interests of Ukrainian SSR citizens, who live beyond the borders of the republic.

V. Territorial Supremacy

The Ukrainian SSR has a supremacy over all its territory. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR, within the existing borders, is inviolable and cannot be changed and used without its consent. The Ukrainian SSR determines the administrative and territorial strcutre of the republic and the order of creation of the national-administrative units independently.

VI. Economic Independence

The Ukrainian SSR independently determines its economic status and legalizes it. The people of the Ukraine have an exclusive right to ownership, utilization, and management of the national wealth of the Ukraine. The land, its depths, air space, water, and other natural resources within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR; the natural resources of its continental shelf and exclusive marine economic zone; all the economic, scientific, and technical potential created on the territory of the Ukraine; are the property of its people. They are material bases of the republc's sovereignty and are used to meet the material and spiritual requirements of its citizens. The Ukrainian SSR has a right to its part of the all-Union wealth and of the all-Union diamond and currency funds, as well as of the gold reserve created through the efforts of the people of the republic questions of all-Union property—common property of all the republics—are solved on the basis of agreement between the republics, the subjects of this propety. Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and establishments of other countries and their citizens—international organizations—can be placed on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and can use the natural resources of the Ukraine according to the laws of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Ukrainian SSR independently creates banking—including external economic banking—price, financial, customs, and tax systems; forms its state budget; and, if necessary, introduces its monetary unit. The national bank of the Ukraine, accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, is the highest credit institution of the Ukrainian SSR. Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and production units situated on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR pay for the use of land and other natural and labor resources, duty on currency inflow and taxes to local budgets. The Ukrainian SSR provides protection for all forms of property.

VII. Ecological Security

The Ukrainian SSR independently establishes the order of organization of nature protection on the territory of the republic and the order of use of natural resources. The Ukrainian SSR has its national commission on protection of the population from radiation. The Ukrainian SSR has a right to prohibit the construction and stop the functioning of any enterprise, institution, or organization, and other establishments, which are dangerous to the environment. The Ukrainian SSR provides for the ecological safety of its citizens and of the genetic fund of the people—its young generation. The Ukrainian SSR has reimbursement rights for the recovery of losses to the Ukraine's ecology caused by the actions of all-Union bodies.

VIII. Cultural Development

The Ukrainian SSR is independent in solving questions of scientific, educational, cultural, and spiritual development of the Ukrainian nation, and guarantees all the nationalities living on the territory of the republic the right to their free national and cultural development. The Ukrainian SSR provides and favors the national and cultural rebirth of the Ukrainian nation, its historical identity and traditions, national and ethnographic peculiarities, as well as the usage of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life. The Ukrainian SSR takes care to satisfy the national and cultural, as well as spiritual and language needs of Ukrainian people living outside the republic. National, cultural, and historical treasures on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR are the exclusive property of the people of the republic. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to return to the ownership of the Ukrainian people national, cultural, and historical treasures situated outside the Ukrainian SSR.

IX. External and Internal Security

The Ukrainian SSR has a right to its own armed forces. The Ukrainian SSR has its own troops of the interior and bodies of state security, subordinated to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian SSR determines the order of military service by the citizens of the republic. Citizens of the Ukraine carry out their military service on the territory of the republic as a rule, and are not supposed to be used for military purposes outside the republic without the consent of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its wish to become in future a constantly neutral state, which does not participate in military blocs and follows three non-nuclear principles: Not to acquire, produce or purchase any kind of nuclear weapons.

X. International Relations

The Ukrainian SSR, as a subject of international law, forms direct relations with other states; concludes treaties with them; exchanges diplomatic, consular, and trade missions; and takes part in the work of international organizations to the extent necessary for the efficient securing of the republic's national interests in the political, economic, ecological, information, scientific, technical, cultural, and sporting spheres. The Ukrainian SSR is an equal participant in international communication; actively promotes the strengthening of peace and international security; and directly takes part in the all-European process and European structures. The Ukrainian SSR admits the superiority of human values over class values, and the priority of generally-acknowledged norms of international law over norms of inner state law. The relations of the Ukrainian SSR with other Soviet republics are built on the basis of treaties concluded on the principles of equal rights, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs.

The declaration is the basis for a new constitution and laws of the Ukraine, and also determines the republic's position in concluding international agreements. The principles of the declaration on Ukraine's sovereignty are used for concluding a Union treaty.

Provisions Viewed

PM1607111590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Sergey Tsikora report under general rubric "Direct Line": "Independence Declaration Under Discussion"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is completing the article-by-article adoption of the state independence declaration—a document which will change the republic's relations with the union center in many respects.

Six drafts of the declaration were submitted for examination. Parliamentary commissions had to work very hard to sum up in one document the opinions of deputies and groups which sometimes differed widely. The declaration which has now been adopted by the session as the basis comprises 10 sections. Some of the provisions resemble the provisions contained in similar declarations adopted by parliaments in other republics. But there are also fundamental differences.

Here are some of the provisions which have already been approved by the republic Supreme Soviet. The declaration "proclaims the state sovereignty of the Ukraine, defining it as supremacy, independence, and full and indivisible power of the republic within the borders of its territory, and independence and equality of the republic in foreign relations."

No political party, social organization, or other grouping or individual can act on behalf of the whole people of the Ukraine. This right is vested "solely in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet."

Another fundamental provision reads: "The Ukrainian SSR ensures the supremacy of the republic Constitution and laws on its territory." Supreme supervision of their strict implementation will be entrusted to the general prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR rather than the republic prosecutor appointed by Moscow as was the case in the past. He will be appointed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and will answer and be accountable to it alone.

Most of the innovations feature in the "Economic Independence" section. I will cite just two. "The Ukrainian SSR will have its own price, financial, customs, taxation, and banking systems including a bank for foreign economic ties, it will formulate its own state budget and, if necessary, introduce its own monetary unit. The Ukrainian SSR's supreme credit establishment will be the Ukrainian National Bank, which will be accountable to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet."

Another paragraph reads: "The Ukrainian SSR has a right to its share of the all-Union assets, specifically the all-Union diamond and foreign currency funds and the gold reserve to which the republic's people have contributed by their efforts."

Ukrainian Premier's Restructuring 'Unsuccessful'

LD1807110690 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] How will social and economic policy be realized in the republic following the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine? This question was considered today in the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Here's what our parliamentary correspondent Volodymyr Slipko reports from there:

[Slipko] So far, Vitaliy Masol, appointed by parliamentarians as head of government, has been unsuccessful in convincing them of the effectiveness of the structure for managing the republic's national economy in new conditions. Here is what Valentyn Butko, an economist by profession and one of the representatives of the parliamentary group from Zhitomir oblast, says:

[Begin Butko recording] When Masol was presenting his program, I simply felt that there would be almost nothing new there. It would be the old way. But we don't have the time to conduct experiments. Right now we need a government that will work in a new way in new conditions. [end recording]

[Slipko] Our premier Vitaliy Masol is having to take a particularly large amount of criticism for an insufficiently thought-out—that is how many deputies think—conceptual basis for [word indistinct] various forms of glasnost in the national economy, which in the declaration on sovereignty are all acknowledged equal to the same extent. So it is not surprising that the program, presented yesterday for the general scrutiny of the session with Masol present, was sent to standing commissions.

Kiev Business Development Fund Established

LD1707132790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Report by Vladimir Sokolov from Kiev]

[Summary] The newly created Kiev-Reform Fund was initiated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Union of Scientific and engineering Societies and the city's Economic Society. A declaration adopted on setting up the fund, states: "The fund has set itself the aim of developing business enterprises, helping enterprises switch to working efficiently in market conditions, withdrawing property from state control, and of establishing new organizational and economic forms of economic activity."

Viktor Salnikov, a Kiev city soviet official, explained that the fund will finance and support progressive ideas and projects. It could buy enterprises which Kiev needs from the state. It receives voluntary contributions from enterprises, organizations, cooperatives, and so forth—anyone interested in a rapid transition to a market economy. The fund has assets of approximately R1 million, and is aiming for R100 million.

Problems Mount in Western Border District

PM1907103790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 90 Second Edition p 8

[Interview with Yu. Babanskiy, chief of the Red Banner Western Border District Political Department and member of the Military Council, by correspondent M. Odinets in Kiev; date not given; under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Door on the Border"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Kiev—Kiev is the location of the directorate of the Red Banner Western Border District, which protects the state border with Poland, the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], Hungary, Romania, and, along the Black Sea, with Turkey. Some 4,000 km in all. The Ukraine's 11 oblasts and 56 rayons are in direct proximity to the state border.

We asked Yu. Babanskiy, chief of the district's Political Department and member of the Military Council, to answer a few questions.

[Odinets] What is the situation currently on the section of the border guarded by the district?

[Babanskiy] Let me be blunt: The officers and men of the district, who defend the state border to the west, are concerned about the situation currently emerging on that border. The fact is that certain political forces have started to raise territorial issues. The lawfulness of interstate borders is being called into question, and the idea of revising those borders is being raised. The course of revising the postwar borders which have arisen in Europe—and that is how the actions of certain destructive forces should be assessed—is creating tension not only in the border region but in the western region as a whole. Consequently, attempts to infringe on our state's territorial integrity must be given a timely and fundamental assessment and rebuff.

Second, the idea of open borders has become widespread of late. Moreover, there have been calls to eliminate borders altogether. We border troops advocate open borders and are well aware that without this it will be impossible to build the all-European home. Or rather, it will be built but without us, without our country. The border should be open for free, political, economic, humanitarian, and other cooperation.

[Odinets] What has already been done to this end?

[Babanskiy] In the western sector of the border within our district there are 65 points for international communication and 41 for simplified crossing by citizens in the border regions of the Soviet Union and adjacent countries.

Last year more than 20 million people crossed through them—2.5 times more than in 1988. That is, in practice all obstacles to free movement across the border have been removed. But this situation presupposes that the border will be crossed in the required places and with the required documents. That is, just as in all civilized countries. That is how we view open borders. The border troops initiated the removal of engineering and technical installations, considerably reducing or entirely scrapping border zones and strips in many areas.

[Odinets] Is there another point of view?

[Babanskiy] Yes, there is. It is that the border can be crossed at any point and without passports, visas, or customs. These are not just calls, in certain places the practical course of implementing this approach has been adopted—which does not accord with the demands of the "Law on the USSR State Border."

Hundreds of violators were arrested in the first few months of this year. Thus, in a single day Warrant Officer Mariya Mikhaylo, control officer at the "Mostiska" crossing control point, arrested four people who were trying to cross the border on forged papers.

And, third, an extremely tense situation has now emerged at border crossing points. Many of the unresolved socioeconomic problems in the country have become closely interwoven in this area. The presence of organized crime is obvious. Economic damage is being done to the republic.

[Odinets] Could you please give a few figures?

[Babanskiy] Last year contraband worth R4.8 million was seized by customs organs operating together with border guards at border crossing points in the Ukraine alone. This is twice as much as in 1988.

[Odinets] What about this year?

[Babanskiy] At the Shegini (Lvov Oblast) crossing point alone, the amount of goods seized at the border was valued at almost R62 million. The goods prevented from leaving the Soviet Union at this crossing point included around 8,000 televisions, 900 refrigerators, 7,700 sewing machines, more than 7,000 washing machines, 13 tonnes of sugar, 10 tonnes of butter, 215 tonnes of meat products, and 340 liters of wines and liqueurs. All these were seized in the space of five months at just one crossing point. But the picture is the same at Chop and Brest. In total, contraband worth more than R29 million has been seized at the district's crossing control points this year in conjunction with the customs service.

[Odinets] Could you give some specific examples?

[Babanskiy] With pleasure! When the Kiev-Legnica train was being inspected at the "Mostiska" crossing control point a border detachment discovered contraband in the form of R30,668, $130, and a gold ring hidden under the seat in one compartment. When the No. 69 Moscow-Budapest train was being inspected at Chop a large number of cans of caviar worth R1,500 were discovered under the window of a sleeping compartment. Moreover, four paintings and 23 icons without export licenses were seized in the same compartment. Or take an example of violation of regulations at the "Vadul Siret" highway

crossing point. Polish citizens in three cars were traveling to Romania. During the inspection a secret compartment was discovered containing Soviet money and gold artifacts to a total value of R180,000.

Sometimes criminals are aided and abetted by lawbreakers in the shape of customs officers. The people's court in Lvov's Zaliznichnyy Rayon recently sentenced to three years' imprisonment Strogush, a former inspector with the Mostiska Customs who, in return for bribes, had helped foreigners to illegally move gold articles across the Soviet borders.

Following the adoption of the well known USSR Council of Ministers resolution regulating the export of consumer goods, the situation at crossing points has become even more acute. They have been blocked by the weight of people and conflicts have been created. People wait in line for two-three days at the crossing points. All this does not enhance the Soviet state's prestige.

[Odinets] Why the holdups?

[Babanskiy] They are mainly to do with the low throughput capacity of the crossing control points and their poor technical equipment standards. These crossing points were built in the fifties and sixties, when there was not much traffic across the border. But now the flow of passengers and transport has increased five- or six-fold. This places a heavy burden on the border guards, and customs officers, and gives rise to complaints from passengers crossing the border.

[Odinets] What about the discussions at the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] session about joining the all-European home?

[Babanskiy] This does not simply depend on the border guards. Clearly, we first need to carve out normal doors in that home.

The border is a kind of barometer which sensitively reflects the full diversity of the processes taking place both on the border and in our country. The profound sociopolitical transformations in the East European states and the changing domestic political situation in our country require new approaches to safeguarding state security on the border.

[Odinets] What is your attitude to the persistent demands made by representatives of our alternative political forces for the depoliticization of the Army, Navy, and Border Guards?

[Babanskiy] Border guards are the political representatives of Soviet power on its borders. We are convinced internationalists and supporters of democratic transformations on the border. But we also advocate order and the security of our borders. That is our party and official duty.

New Independent Newspaper Formed in Lvov

LD1507220890 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 15 Jul 90

[Text] A new broadsheet newspaper of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, ZA VILNU UKRAYINU [FOR A FREE UKRAINE], has started coming out in Lvov. It has declared itself an independent non-party publication, and will be covering the work of state bodies of power. It will appear five times a week.

TASS Views Recent Coal Mine Strike

LD1807204290 Moscow TASS in English 2031 GMT 18 Jul 90

["Polarisation in Soviet Mines—To Strike or not?"—TASS headline]

[Text] Makeyevka (Donetsk region, Ukraine) July 18 TASS—Although mines in Makeyevka have returned to normal working, the consequences of the recent strike are likely to linger. The strike served not only as a watershed in the struggle of views on the expediency of holding it, but also pushed the leaders of the miners' movement into different corners.

In Makeyevka, for example, protestors tried even to topple the strike committee on the day of the strike. They said they did not trust it and proposed their own candidates for a new strike committee.

"The strike committee deserved mistrust by its passive attitude, a wait-and-see position, and weighing the pluses and minuses of the forthcoming strike," R. Panyushin, chairman of the council of the labour collective of the Makeyevugol production association said. "Therefore miners decided to remove them from leading the workers' movement. A provisional strike committee was elected at the meeting and I was invited to head it."

That advocates of extreme measures express dissatisfaction is not accidental. Preparing for the forthcoming action, the strikers this time decided against using diktat and suggested that miners themselves decided whether to join the strike. Therefore, in the course of the referendum, miners carefully weighed all the pros and cons. How much will the strike cost? How can the losses of the association, which is in arrears as it is, be offset? Should production stop at all?

The strike provided an answer. Only two mines out of 19 stopped producing coal on that day, while the rest only suspended operations bowing to the demand of the council of the labour collective. But losses are quite tangible: Output was 18,000 tonnes short of target—an estimated loss of some 500,000 roubles.

"We could have lost even more if the strike committee had taken the same instigatory position as the council of the labour collective," says A. Kondratyuk, deputy chairman of the strike committee. "Therefore extreme

radicals demanded our resignation at the meeting. But we are opposed to tackling ay issues on city squares.

"Moreover, Panyushin was elected chairman of our strike committee at a meeting a year ago. However, mines themselves removed him from the post after seeing what methods he used. As for the current composition of the committee, most of us do not cling to our posts. Miners of the entire city, and not the individuals who dislike our activity, should decide on the make-up of the strike committee.

"Dual power in the miners' movement will clearly affect the situation in the labour collectives of mining enterprises. The attempt to push miners to the extremist wing may disrupt the working rhythm of mines even more than the strike," he said.

Donetsk Miners Polled on Strikes, Demands

904F0209A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No. 28, 14-20 Jul 90 p 6

[Report: "Sociological Survey in the Mines"]

[Text] Here we present data from an opinion poll conducted by the Academic Institute of Sociology at the coal-extraction enterprises of Donetsk; about 500 workers and other employees at five mines were queried. The purpose of the survey was to determine public opinion as to how miners' demands are being met—demands which were expressed during the strikes of the summer of 1989 and recorded in the "Protocol on Measures Coordinated Between the Miners' Strike Committee of the City of Donetsk and Commissions of the USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]."

What in your view are the most important issues of the protocol?

full economic independence	23 percent
wholesale price reform	12 percent
development of economic accountability	4 percent
administrative staff reductions	10 percent
wage increases	8 percent
public health improvements	4 percent
perfection of the pension system	7 percent
improved housing conditions	12 percent
other (increased leaves, improvements in trade, better equipment, labor safety)	20 percent.

Who is to blame for the lack of fulfillment of demands?

no response	29 percent
central organs	55 percent
local organs	14 percent
we ourselves	3 percent
trade unions	1 percent.

Do you believe it is your right to strike?

no response	2 percent
yes	79 percent
no	10 percent
difficult to say	9 percent.

Will strikes increase in scope?

no response	1 percent
yes	74 percent
no	11 percent
difficult to say	14 percent.

What organizations are necessary to protect the interests of the workers?

no response	4 percent
present trade union	6 percent
informal trade union	32 percent
independent organizations	54 percent
difficult to say	5 percent.

Donetsk Region KGB Uncover Fraud, Theft Cases

LD1607102490 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 15 Jul 90

[Text] And now here are several bits of information provided by the Ukraine's State Security Committee.

As a result of an operation held by the KGB, jointly with militia, a group of persons were arrested in the town of Khartsyzk, Donetsk region, on accusations of bootlegging and illegal sales of wines and hard liquors in two big liquor stores of the city. One hundred and nine thousand rubles of illegal profit were (?examined) as well as 25 tonnes of alcohol.

Facts of theft and bribery have been revealed at the meat processing factory in the city of Kharkov. The criminals managed to steal up to seven tonnes of meat daily.

In (?cherkasskoye) region, local KGB officers and militia detained a group of persons involved in fraud. As a result of the operation, broad name television and radio equipment, as well as items of gold, and firearms, were confiscated.

Ukrainian Peasant Party Goals Outlined

LD1807153590 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Summary] Another new party was created recently in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party. One of its cochairmen, Serhiy Plachynda, outlines the party's program: First, to halt the robbery currently taking place of the Ukrainian countryside; delivery norms for produce to be sent to other republics are much too high.

Second, to support the new law on land usage. Third, the party supports private ownership and wants a law on the same. Fourth, there is the issue of ecology because "in the Ukraine we no longer have a single hectare of clean soil."

The party intends to carry its program out by legislative means, would like to see representatives of all parties both in the republic's legislature and in the government, and would like to see a coalition government. Private ownership is a central point in the party's program.

Fascist Victims Memorial Erected in Lutsk

90UN2213A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 14 Jun 90 p 3

[UKRINFORM report by Z. Zhizhara: "Memorial to Victims of Fascism"]

[Text] Lutsk, 13 June (UKRINFORM)—A small burial mound on the outskirts of the oblast center has become another sacred memorial to the innocent Soviet citizens who died during the Great Patriotic War. A memorial complex to the victims of fascism has been opened here. Its beginning was a tombstone with the inscription: "To victims of fascist genocide from Lutsk."

At the end of the summer of 1942 Hitler's troops and his nationalist accomplices began barbarous actions to destroy the Jews from the Lutsk ghetto. Outside the city, in the place of the current burial mound, no fewer than 25,000 elderly people, women, and children were killed. This memorial will immortalize their memory.

Representatives of the people of the city, the oblast Society for Jewish Culture, and relatives and close friends of the deceased spoke at the mourning ceremony held in this connection. Wreathes and bouquets of flowers were placed on the memorial.

Odessa Launches Commercial TV Channel

LD1807132390 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] The USSR president's decree on the democratization and development of television and radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union has only just been made public, but alternative television has already appeared in Odessa. It is a commercial television channel opened up at the city's TV studio. Its task is to prepare reports on events, advertisements, and video-clips and to act as middlemen with entrepreneurs. In between the advertisements and announcements television viewers will see progams that so far they have not had access to. The name of this channel is also interesting—Pryvoz. The famous Odessa bazaar has the same name. So Pryvoz is the first example of commercial, news, and advertising television in Ukraine.

Exodus From Belorussian Communist Party Explained

90UN2189A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "I Request To Withdraw From the Party..."]

[Text] Last year in Belorussia 3,283 communists turned in their party cards and candidate cards. In the first quarter of 1990, 3,198 people left the party... Who are they, these people who have left the party? The first and largest group is made up of people who are disenchanted with life in the party today. Mass criticism of the CPSU which has reached its peak today has led to a situation where some communists who have been in the party for 25-30 years have become confused. They do not understand the new party policy... The second group are ballast—those who were brought to the party by selfish motives. They comprise approximately 23-25 percent of those who have withdrawn.

The third category is made up of those who have lost faith in the party's good will toward them: pensioners, single people, the elderly. Many of them feel unnecessary both in the society and in the party, and they are turning in their party cards as a sign of protest. Recently one more group has been taking form. These are people who unquestioningly accept as the truth everything negative that is said about the CPSU and have come to this conclusion: The party has no future and therefore we must part from it. Incidentally, they comprised the majority of the people who withdrew this year.

The Communist Party of Belorussia now has 687,600 members. The maximum of 699,100 were registered in 1988.

Belorussia Demands Return of Personnel

90UN2225B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 15 Jun 90 p 1

["Declaration of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Concerning Events in the Republics of the Transcaucasian Region and Central Asia"]

[Text] With regard to the aggravation of interethnic relations in the Transcaucasian region and several other regions of the country, officials of the organs of internal affairs, students and trainees of the militia school, and servicemen of the internal forces are being sent from the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] to regions with an extreme situation. The shortage of workers of the militia aggravates a situation that is already difficult in the fight against crime on the territory of the republic.

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has been receiving numerous letters and appeals from residents of the republic expressing their well-founded alarm and concern for the lives and health of their family members and friends serving beyond the borders of the Belorussian SSR, and demanding their return.

Servicemen and members of their families have been involved in local conflicts.

Guided by the will of the Belorussian people, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet requires the immediate return of officials of the organs of internal affairs, students and trainees of the militia school, and servicemen of the internal forces. We believe that henceforth their assignment to other regions should only take place upon the mutual agreement of sovereign republics.

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet urgently requests that the president of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Government of the USSR demand that the higher organs of state power and administration of the Armenian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Kirghiz SSR, and Uzbek SSR take measures to halt the violence and restore law and order on their territory by means of their own forces.

[Signed] The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Belorussian Voting Irregularities Noted

90UN2213B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 25, 23 Jun 90 p 2

[Report from correspondent T. Abakumovskaya: "Do Not Use Your Neighbor's Vote!"]

[Text] A real scandal broke out during voting for the candidate for the post of chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet's permanent commission for economic reform, independence, and sovereignty of the republic, who won by only one vote. And this vote was false since, as was proved by the investigation conducted at the request of the deputies, one of the parliamentarians cast the vote of his neighbor who was not in attendance at the meeting.

Moreover, it turned out that this was not a unique case. There were frequent discrepancies between the number of deputies registered and the number who voted. Fewer were registered and more voted.

This is not a trivial issue. It pertains not only to the ethics of interrelations in parliament but also to legality in solving problems that are vitally important for millions of voters.

Election Violations in Belorussia Noted

90UN2189B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] On 28 May in Minsk there was a regular meeting of the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputies. It considered cases of violation of the Law on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies in the Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 (the city of Minsk) during the runoff on 16 May of this year.

As was already reported at the preceding meeting of the Central Commission, which discussed this question, a decision was made to conduct an additional investigation of the materials that had been received.

During the course of the investigation conducted by the Central Commission it was established that there had been cases of gross violation of the Law on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies in Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3. In election precinct No. 32 there were 248 more ballots in the ballot box than had been issued according to the voter list. In election precinct No. 46 in the voting record the election commission arbitrarily reduced the number of voters indicated on the list by 496. There were also cases of unjustified reduction of the number of voters in four other election precincts.

Taking into account these facts which were reflected in the results of the runoff on 16 May for Belorussian SSR candidate people's deputies A.G. Samankov and G.S. Mukhin, the district election commission of Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 declared the elections invalid and dispatched materials concerning violations of the law on elections to the procurator of Leninskiy Rayon in the city of Minsk.

The central commission agreed with this decision of the district election commission. The district election commission and the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Leninskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of the city of Minsk recommended that the record of voters living in Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 be set straight and that they consider the question of the possibility of conducting repeat elections with the current members of the precinct election commissions of election districts No. 32 and No. 46. The runoffs for Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 are scheduled for 20 June of this year.

Other statements sent to the central commission were also discussed.

Decree Adopted

90UN2189C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 May 90 p 1

["28 May 1990 Decree of the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies on Holding Repeat Elections of the Belorussian SSR People's Deputy for Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3, City of Minsk"]

[Text] In connection with the declaration by the district election commission of the Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 that the election of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy held in the election precinct on 16 May 1990 is invalid, the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies hereby decrees:

1. To instruct the district election commission of Serebryanskiy Electoral District No. 3 of the city of Minsk to

conduct repeat elections of the Belorussian SSR people's deputy in the electoral district on 20 July 1990.

2. To establish that the nomination of candidate people's deputies when repeat elections are conducted takes place from 30 May through 8 June, and the registration of candidate deputies—from 8 through 13 July. Other pre-election measures are conducted according to the procedure and within the time periods envisioned by the law "On Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies." The voting will take place in the same electoral precincts and with the same voter lists that were compiled for conducting the general elections. When holding repeat elections the voter lists include Belorussian SSR citizens who have reached 18 years of age by the day or on the day of the elections and who live permanently on the territory of this election district and also those who have arrived for permanent residence.

[Signed] The chairman of the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, M. LAGIR.
Secretary of the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, I. LIKHACH.

Belorussia Acts To Solve Unemployment Problem

LD1807184790 Moscow TASS in English 1838 GMT 18 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Tatyana Khryapina]

[Text] Minsk July 18 TASS—An employement programme has been developed in Belorussia by psychologists, sociologists, economists, and trade union representatives.

The program envisages setting up labour exchanges in all Belorussian cities and towns. It will determine the legal status of jobless people. Unemployment benefits, equalling a minimum wage, is guaranteed to all who previously worked at enterprises but lost their jobs, were demobilised from the Army or have just ended their professional training, including young people looking for their first jobs.

"The unemployment problem has become manifest in Belorussia," chairman of the republican state committee for labour and social issues Anatoly Fomich told TASS. "There are 10,000 to 12,000 vacancies even in Minsk, where there are 1.5 million residents."

"Some 33,000 people turn to the city center for employment, re-training and professional orientation annually. Most of them can find a job here. Although not all of them are satisfied with proposed variants," he said.

Many workers, especially unskilled ones, will lose their jobs after market relations are established and production efficiency increases. Structural changes in the economy, military conversion and cuts in the Army will also render many people jobless.

According to specialists, the number of unemployed in Belorussia will reach 350,000 in the nearest future. The republic decided not to wait until the Soviet parliament adopts an employment law.

Special sociological research has been conducted in the republic. Having analysed the situation and made estimates, scholars prepared scientifically grounded forecasts of employment trends and retraining programmes.

Attempted Hijacking on Minsk Flight Detailed

90UN2340A Moscow TRUD In Russian 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by A. Trushin: "There Was a Strong Urge to Exchange the Kolkhoz for Brussels"]

[Text] On 7 July at 1720 aboard an An-24 aircraft on a Minsk-Vitebsk route an unknown person demanded through the stewardess that the crew fly to Brussels.

The threat was the usual one: I will, he says, blow up the plane with all of its 46 passengers, but the explosive is in the baggage. The crew contacted the ground and learned that the airport inspection was conducted carefully and that no suspicious objects were found. The aircraft commander decided not to pay attention to the threat of the "hijacker," and he landed the aircraft on schedule at the airport in Vitebsk. The transport militia were already waiting for him there.

The amateur of air travel to Belgium turned out to be L. Shavrovskiy, 30 years of age, who works on contract at one of the kolkhozes [collective farms] in Brest Oblast. No explosive substances were found in either his hand luggage or in his baggage. An investigation is being conducted.

As we were informed in the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MVD, together with the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the KGB worked up a draft of a USSR civil aviation state program. It will be applied in relation to civilian aircraft carrying out passenger and air cargo trips both on the territory of our country and outside its borders. A special security service will be organized whose employees, who will be correctly trained, will begin to escort air trips.

Moldavian Decree on Deputies' Immunity Published

90UN2231A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 14 Jun 90 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Moldova "On Measures To Ensure the Immunity of People's Deputies of the SSR of Moldova and of Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the SSR of Moldova"]

[Text] In accordance with the USSR law "Status of the People's Deputy in the USSR," the state and law enforcement authorities are called upon to assure the principle of the immunity of the people's deputies.

However, reports are being received from individual USSR people's deputies of Moldova on encroachments against their honor, dignity and immunity and on the failure to adopt the proper measures on the part of the law enforcement authorities.

The SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To instruct the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the state security authorities, the Procuracy and the Ministry of Justice of the SSR of Moldova and the authorities under their jurisdiction to adopt the measures provided for by law to ensure the immunity of people's deputies of the SSR of Moldova and deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the SSR of Moldova, public order, and the protection of the rights of the citizens.

2. To entrust to the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet Commission for Local Self-Government and the Local Economy, in conjunction with the Crime-Fighting Commission, the elaboration and presentation at a session of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet of the draft law "Status of the People's Deputy of the SSR of Moldova" and also drafts of other legislative instruments geared to protect the honor, dignity, and assured immunity of people's deputies of all levels in the SSR of Moldova.

3. That the local soviets of people's deputies of the SSR of Moldova and leaders of enterprises, establishments and organizations will ensure compliance with current legislation on the territories under their jurisdiction and in the work force.

[Signed] M. Snegur, chairman of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] 13 June 1990, Kishinev.

Moldavia Issues Decision on Broadcasting

LD1807083490 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 p1

[Decision of the MSSR Supreme Soviet On the Foundation of National Radio and Television of the MSSR]

[Text] The MSSR [Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To abolish the MSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

2. To found the National Radio and Television of the MSSR, headed by a director general. National Radio and Television of the MSSR is to be financed by the state.

3. The director general of National Radio and Television of the MSSR is to be appointed by parliament, having been proposed by the chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet, in accordance with the standing orders of the republican Supreme Soviet.

4. National Radio and Television of the MSSR is to organize its operations in accordance with the regulations on National Radio and Television of the MSSR.

5. The organizations of political parties and public movements may not function within National Radio and Television of the MSSR and its subdivisions.

6. To instruct the commission on matters of glasnost and the media of the MSSR Supreme Soviet to draw up a draft law on radio and television in the MSSR.

[Signed] M.Snegur, chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet. Kishinev.

[Dated] 15 June 1990

National Moldova Press Agency Formed

LD1807084890 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 p 1

[Text] Decision of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [MSSR] Supreme Soviet on the formation of the National Moldova Press Agency

The Moldova Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To abolish the Moldavian News Agency (ATEM) under the MSSR government. Workers at the agency will be found work in accordance with existing legislation.

2. To found the National Moldova Press Agency, to be financed by the state.

3. The director of the National Moldova Press Agency will be appointed by parliament after being recommended by the MSSR Supreme Soviet chairman in accordance with the standing orders of the republican Supreme Soviet.

4. The National Moldova Press Agency will organize its operations in accordance with the regulations on the National Moldova Press Agency.

5. The organizations of political parties or public movements may not function within the National Moldova Press Agency.

[Signed] M.Snegur, MSSR Supreme Soviet chairman

[Dated] Kishinev, 20 June 1990.

Article on Bessarabian Anniversary Published

90US1112A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Professor V. Vinogradov: "In a Common Union"]

[Excerpts] There are anniversaries that provide food for thought. Undoubtedly, the 50th anniversary of the return of Bessarabia to the composition of the Soviet state is one such anniversary. On 26 June 1940, Moscow sent a harsh note to Bucharest with the suggestion that this area occupied by the troops of the Romanian king in 1918 be returned. Romanian diplomats rushed to Berlin for help, but the advice given there was to yield, with the significant qualification "for now."

There could be no other answer in the situation which existed at the time. The demand was made in view of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol associated with it. Point 3 of the protocol read: "Regarding the southeast of Europe, the USSR's interest in Bessarabia is stressed." Hitler, extremely concerned about the Soviet Union becoming involved in a war that was to break out any at moment, empowered Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Ribbentrop, who was sent to Moscow, to meet all Moscow's conceivable demands.

Since the response of the Romanian Government to the Soviet ultimatum was evasive, a new ultimatum from Moscow followed on the second day with a demand to withdraw Romanian troops from Bessarabia within four days. This time, consent was secured.

The inhabitants of the area warmly welcomed Red Army units. However, the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] followed the troops, and an avalanche of repressions, arrests, executions by firing squad, and mass deportations came down on the populace. The memory of these horrors will forever live in the minds of contemporaries.

An assessment of the actions of the Soviet leadership was presented in December 1989 in the "Communique of the Commission for Political and Legal Evaluation of the Soviet-German Pact": Stalin "accomplished the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in a great power manner" which, along with other deeds of the time, "deformed Soviet policy and state morality." Let us stress that at issue here is the manner, the military-diplomatic design of what was done, but not at all the essence of it. We will have to go 75 years back into history and return to the times of World War I in order to understand the essence. [passage omitted]

The occupation of Bessarabia was accompanied by a duplicity that is rare even in long-suffering history. In his appeal to the residents of the area, General K. Prezan assured them: "I state for all to hear that the Romanian Army wants nothing but order and tranquility... As soon as order is established, Romanian soldiers will go home."

Meanwhile the military situation was changing, and the conditions were becoming threatening for the intervention forces. Red troops seized Kiev. V.I. Lenin gave the order to act "as energetically as possible on the Romanian front." Romania still had not ceased hostilities against the Austro-German bloc. Under the circumstances, Prime Minister General A. Averescu came to an agreement with representatives of the Soviet power on clearing Bessarabia within two months.

However, having taken advantage of the invasion of the Ukraine by the Austro-German troops, the Romanian authorities, helped by their adherents in the Sfatul Tarii (Council of the Country), had an act adopted on the annexation of Bessarabia by the Kingdom of Romania that changed the previously adopted declaration on this territory joining the Russian Republic as a member with equal rights. On 18 April, G.V. Chicherin sent a resolute protest to Iasi: It said that the annexation of Bessarabia was "an act of coercion with regard to the populace of Bessarabia. The forcible annexation by Romania does not destroy the unity and solidarity of the working masses of Bessarabia and Russia." [passage omitted]

The wisdom of the 1975 Helsinki Act is in acknowledging the firmness of the post-World War II borders in Europe. Centuries-long experience full of ordeals brought the European Community to this conclusion. There is perhaps not a single border in the world that is drawn strictly on an ethnic basis; this is hardly practicable. The peoples have lived "intermingled" for a long time. There should be no attempts "to correct" this situation by infringing on border lines.

A way out lies elsewhere: in developing democratic processes by all means possible; abandoning all inclination to impose another language; establishing completely equal rights for all citizens; introducing self-management extensively; ensuring free communication with relatives, friends, and acquaintances who live nearby but abroad. A lot has been accomplished since December 1989 in this matter with the participation of the republic itself which 50 years ago again became a member of the Soviet state.

Caucasus

Bakatin Holds Press Conference on Caucasus

LD1907001290 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The Soviet interior minister, Vadim Bakatin, gave a news conference in Moscow. Here is our correspondent's report:

The minister was asked about the roots of the problems in the Caucasus. What is the way out of the deadlock in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

We have always said that there are two reasons for all ethnic conflicts. The first one is socioeconomic tension. Secondly, they are incited by certain hidden forces bent on channelling people's discontent into pogroms and riots. In my view, there is a third reason we almost never mention because it's a shame to speak about it: It's nationalism, which started to flourish in some areas of this country. It's the kind of nationalism that finds an outlet for itself in the search for an enemy in another ethnic group, and not in the efforts to resolve the problem. In my view, Vadim Bakatin went on to say, the roots of the problem in the Caucasus lie outside the competence of the Interior Ministry. The only possible key to solve this problem is negotiations between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, neither side is willing to start talks. Both persist in acts of provocation and lawlessness. The government's of both republics are bent on confrontation, while the Interior Ministry troops play the role of a buffer between

the two warring sides. With reference to measures designed to facilitate our work, we reached an agreement which the Armenian government and parliament failed to honor: To impose a state of emergency in the five-km border zone where bandit units continue to concentrate. With this aim in view, we'll seek to induce the Armenian government to decide to disarm them. If these efforts fail, we'll have to impose a state of emergency in the Armenian territory and launch operations designed to disarm these groups.

Many journalists asked questions concerning the plans to depoliticize law-enforcing agencies. Here is how the Soviet minister of the interior answered these questions:

As for depoliticizing or abolishing [words indistinct], I believe that it would be harmful to incite political tensions within police units, said Vadim Bakatin. Our force contains 700,000 communists. We must wait for a law on political parties, which will enable the entire process of establishing a multi-party system to acquire definite contours. In the absence of such a law, we'll only further politicize the police force and this will be detrimental to the endeavors to combat crime in general.

One journalist asked whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee has preserved its department in charge of the Interior Ministry or not.

Today, when Article Six in the Soviet constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party has been changed, when we have a real multiparty system, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cannot and must not perform such functions. These functions are being transfered to the state, to the president, and to the Council of Ministers. Therefore, now there are no bodies controlling it, said Vadim Bakatin in conclusion.

Reports on Armenian Interior Ministry's Seizure

Minor Incidents Reported

LD1807154890 Moscow TASS in English 1541 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The situation in Armenia remains tense, TASS was told at the Soviet Interior Ministry press centre.

A Dodge car was stolen in Leninakan today. It was located several hours later. A shootout followed. One man was killed and others were detained.

A Kalashnikov automatic gun and 120 rounds of ammunition to it, a Degtyarev machine-gun with two discs and 300 rounds of ammunition and 86 anti-aircraft shells of the 23 mm caliber were seized.

Later in the day, a group of militants attacked a traffic inspector at the 62nd kilometer of the Leninakan-Yerevan highway to seize a gun and 16 rounds of ammunition.

In Masis district, some fifteen militants threw petrol bombs at a traffic inspection post on Tuesday. The building was damaged, but no casualties have been reported.

On Tuesday, some 60 armed people broke into the Talin district Interior Ministry department, breaking furniture, doors and windows. Fortunately, no one was hurt, and no weapons were stolen.

Attempt on Ministry 18 Jul

LD1807213790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2051 GMT 18 Jul 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] There is an extremely unstable situation at the present time in Armenia. It is sufficient to say that recently there was another attempt to seize the Internal Affairs Ministry:

[Correspondent Vladimir Nazaryan] The situation in the republic on the eve of the session was even discussed today at the meeting of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. Its participants—party, local council, management executives, representatives of the intelligentsia, unreservedly rejected a proposal to introduce a state of emergency in the republic, or in a number of its rayons.

It was proposed that the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium should discuss at a routine session—the last session with the present composition—its own decision to set up a Council of National Defense under the republic's parliament, and to include this issue on the agenda of the upcoming session.

Specially for "Television News Service", Vladimir Nazaryan from Yerevan. [Video shows parliament building and street scenes]

Ministry Blockaded 18 Jul

LD1907105590 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] On the night of 18 July a group of armed persons in 20 trucks blockaded the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia. The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was forced to meet the established terms and agree to talks with the leaders of informal military organizations of the republic in order to stabilize the situation in the capital. The situation in other towns remains tense. On 16 July, a (?Dodge) truck was hijacked in Leninakan. Some time later, it was discovered and stopped. During the shoot-out, one of the hijackers was killed by officers of the State Automobile Inspectorate. A submachine gun, machine gun, and 86 antiaircraft shells were removed from the truck. The same day, in Leninakan, a group of Armenian fighters attacked a State Automobile Inspectorate officer and disarmed him. On 17 July, about 60 armed vigilantes

broke into the Internal Affairs Department of one of Leninakan's rayons and ransacked it.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Situation Unstable

LD1807204790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 18 July during the "Vremya" newscast broadcasts a 1.5-minute video report by correspondent M. Mamedov. The video shows Mamedov and his film crew arriving in a helicopter, together with the latest duty shift, at a frontier post on a mountain ridge in Kelbadzhar Rayon in Azerbaijan. The border troops subunit itself is said to be situated just below it. The post is situated on one of the highest mountain tops in the rayon.

Mamedov reports that "its location enables the soldiers to fully control the movement of groups. Until recently they were to all intents and purposes penetrating Azerbaijan territory unimpeded in order to take hostages, drive away cattle, cause explosions, or perpetrate other acts of sabotage."

On top of the mountain ridge Mamedov interviews A.P. Dannikov, commander of the tactical operational reserve [voyskovoy operativnyy rezerv], who says that, unfortunately, it is impossible to call the operational situation there stable. Dannikov says that "we are constantly experiencing from the Armenian side attempts to penetrate Azerbaijan territory, in particular Kelbadzhar Rayon. We are constantly experiencing the fact that criminal elements are attempting to provoke some hotbeds of conflict. We are constantly seeing, observing, the concentration of large equipment. Frequently shelling of our border troops subunits personnel occurs." So far there have been no casualties, he says: "We are doing everything possible in order to save lives, but at the same time, nevertheless, ensure accomplishment of the mission."

'Extremely Tense Situation' Reported in Bertazor

NC1907103390 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] According to information reaching us, an extremely tense situation has developed around Bertazor, a group of several Armenian villages in Shushinskiy Rayon in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. According to Andranik Arutyunyan, head of the Bertazor self-defense brigade, for more than a week now anti-Russian and anti-Armed Forces sentiment has been expressed in Azerbaijan. Shooting incidents have occurred in Lachinskiy and Shushinskiy in the past three days. He added: I cannot judge the true extent of the clashes since there are no official figures and, as is usual in such cases, the central mass media have remained silent and there are no reports whatsoever in the local press or on television. However, according to our information eight military planes were dispatched to the conflict area on 9 July and nine more were dispatched the following day. According to unofficial figures, three officers were killed and 14 soldiers were wounded during clashes.

On the morning of July 12, Azerbaijani mobs from Shushinskiy attacked Bertazor's Tsaghkazor village where construction work is under way. The mob claimed that the territory belonged to Azerbaijan and stated that it will not allow the work to be carried out. A tractor driver was beaten up and his tractor was destroyed.

In addition, armed clashes are taking place between Azerbaijani and Kurdish inhabitants in Lachinskiy.

Armenian Nationalists Open 'Terrorist' Campaign

LD1907120390 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is continuing to grow more tense following a series of terrorist acts. This autonomous oblast, situated on the territory of Azerbaijan but populated predominantly by Armenians, has for a long time now been the seen of an acute interethnic conflict. On 14 July, a house was blown up in Stepanakert, the administration center of Nagorno-Karabakh. An unidentified person told the Military Commandant's Office on the phone that this explosion was the start of a broad terrorist campaign by Armenian nationalists of the Black Circle [Chernoye Koltso]. Leaflets calling for an armed struggle have also been found in the city.

'Insulting' Attacks on USSR Troops Denounced

PM1907103190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Major General A. Griyenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops, by TASS correspondent V. Gondusov; place and date not given: "Fueling Passions"]

[Text] Reports from Nagorno-Karabakh today resemble reports from the front line. Major General A. Griyenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops Political Directorate, talks with TASS correspondent V. Gondusov:

"There are both verbal and press reports of allegedly brutal violence against the Armenian population on the part of internal troops and of an attempt to bring them to their knees and to stifle the Karabakh liberation movement. What is being said is that the troops are not performing a mission to bring stability but engaging in pillage and tyranny. This is painful to the ears of the young men of 18-20 who are risking their lives doing everything possible to stop the bloodshed.

"There is direct incitement to guerrilla warfare. Leaflets of the so-called 'Salamandra' society have appeared in Stepanakert. The text is couched in the following tone:

'The time for decisive action has come. Wake up, friends, old and young. Take up arms. Patience is exhausted.' This is followed by insulting attacks on the internal troops and the commandant's office of the state of emergency special region. The leaflet ends with an appeal to take the path of guerrilla struggle and holy war.

"Inflammatory appeals find expression in specific criminal actions by Armenian terrorists, like the one that occurred recently on the road from Mir-Bashir to Kelbadzhar. An attack on a convoy of trucks and a bus carrying passengers resulted in three deaths and injuries to 24 people.

"There are many illegal armed formations in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and adjacent rayons. On 12 July a group of servicemen of a special-purpose subunit disarmed a band of 50 men. Seven mortars, 76 mines, a machine gun, submachine guns, four homemade grenade launchers, a fixed ground radio set, and a large quantity of ammunition were confiscated from the Armenian terrorists. There are many similar examples.

"In addition to actions to detect armed formations and render them harmless, political workers and the troops' propaganda aktiv carry out extensive explanatory work among the population. Its purpose is to rebut slanderous rumors and attacks and provocative appeals."

Details of Latest NKAO Incidents Viewed

PM1807131890 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by special correspondent V. Komarov from Nagorno-Karabakh: "Fighting of More Than Local Significance"]

[Text] The main military airport, which is today a kind of transshipment base and links the state of emergency region with the "outside world," is approximately 200 km from Stepanakert—in the city of Gyandzha.

All is calm in Gyandzha. Outwardly. Enterprises and stores are operating, as they were one, two, three months ago. People mill around noisily in the bazaar...

...But on the tarmac, beside the plane we flew in on, a coffin containing the body of Sergey Mezentsev, private in the internal troops, lay waiting to be dispatched.

...And in the central square in Gyandzha, a hunger strike was in its fifth day. Three people are taking part: A. Mirzayev, S. Ismailov, D. Dzhafarov—representatives of the Azerbaijani National Democratic Party and the People's Party of Freedom. Demands are put forward. To increase to three months the time for preparing for elections to the local soviets, and to that need to change the republic Law on Elections. To free political prisoners: Etibar Mamedov, Khalil Rza, Magomed Khatami, and others. To lift the state of emergency in Baku and hold elections—no earlier than two months after lifting it. Immediately to register all political parties whose statutes and programs are not contrary to the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution. And lastly: To form a national army of the republic, on the model of its neighbors.

It is not easy to get to Stepanakert without the help of the military. I traveled with a convoy of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operatives, who were now replacing their colleagues in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. Their term of duty is three months. Each one is armed.

On the way there are at least five checkpoints, where soldiers of the internal troops stand guard alongside infantry combat vehicles.

In Stepanakert, the only hotel is full of military men. The commandant's office and the republic organizing committee for the NKAO are stationed in the building of the former party obkom [oblast committee]. The obkom and oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] do not exist as such. The party gorkom [city committee] and the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] are functioning.

Everything is controlled by the commandant's office, and to some extent the republic organizing committee for the NKAO. The military men spend the nights in the hotel, and the members of the organizing committee and its press center right here, in the former obkom building.

Living conditions are therefore primitive: folding beds, a samovar, desks with typewriters, telephones. There is no water available, hot or cold. They turn it on twice a day, for an hour. The food is meager. It is supplied from surrounding Azerbaijani villages. Radio broadcasts are frequently jammed.

The people of Stepanakert, mainly Armenians, totally ignore the instructions of the organizing committee. They also refuse to join it. It is staffed solely by Azerbaijanis and a few Russians from Baku, all of them on a temporary tour of duty.

Temporary authorities?

What are they talking about in the oblast center? The latest events.

The attack on a vehicle convoy on 11 July, when Sh. Shukyurov, deputy chief of Sardobskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, Sergey Mezentsev, private in the internal troops, and T. Ismailova, wife of the first secretary of Kelbadzharskiy party raykom [rayon committee], were killed and three soldiers and 21 local inhabitants were injured.

The details of this extraordinary event have become known. The tragedy took place on the road between Mir-Bashir and Kelbadzhar, in a sector where on one side the forest forms a dense wall right up against the mountain road, and on the other side there is a high cliff. Submachinegun fire rang out at around 1600 hours. Militants in hiding were cold-bloodedly firing on the

convoy. The "Niva" truck in which the militiaman and the woman were traveling was well and truly riddled with bullets.

The next morning, a search party found in the region of the fighting five F-1 grenades, TNT charges, three radio sets...

Incidentally, equipment of precisely the same type was confiscated on 12 July, the day after the incident, from militants who were surrounded and subsequently laid down their arms. Special forces [spetsnaz] helicopters caught up with a group of 50 people dressed in camouflage uniform on Armenian territory. The group took up defensive positions at a livestock unit. And internal affairs troops had to cross an open locality.

"In order to prevent bloodshed and avoid sacrificing the lives of soldiers of the internal troops," Major General G.A. Malyushkin, commandant of the state of emergency region, says, "we set terms for the militants to hand over their weapons. They accepted, but only if they themselves were allowed to go. By then the chairman of Sisianskiy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] in Armenia and the local militia chief had arrived on the scene. After negotiations, the weapons were handed over and the people were allowed to go. Although we found no documents on them, there was no need to speculate—they were Armenian fedayeen."

On the night of 13-14 July there was a serious explosion in Stepanakert. A house in Martuni Street belonging to driver G. Sartaryan was blown sky-high. The owner himself, who drove military cadets, was injured. His wife, Ye. Ishkhanova, who was recently appointed local airport chief and was "collaborating with the authorities," was killed. Their son, Artur, is in a serious condition.

In the morning a pamphlet was found at one of the troop units stationed here, heralding, it is generally thought, a new turn of events. It contains a direct call to armed struggle.

I never expected to see alongside these calls... my own words about an "artist in unhappy circumstances." Someone had copied out from an article of that title in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA my heartfelt words about Karipbek Kuyukov, a man with no arms from near Semipalatinsk: "You cannot take away a man's dream, you can deprive him of good food, clean water, and air, you can condemn him to suffering and a slow death... But while he lives, hope lives on." I do not want these words to be used to call for killings, for violence. That is my right.

But no end to the violence is in sight. The latest sinister sign? Immediately after the violent reprisals against the family of "collaborators iwth the occupiers," someone called the commandant's office: "The explosion is the start of a broad terrorist action, the 'Black Ring.'"

Georgian Foreign Minister Interviewed

PM1807152590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Georgian Foreign Minister Georgiy Dzhavakhishvili by special correspondents V. Arsenyev and B. Urigashvili; place and date not given; published under the "Informed Sources" rubric: "Georgian Foreign Ministry: New Things Daily"— first paragraph is correspondents' introduction]

[Text] Until recently Union republic foreign ministries were rarely taken seriously. Their functions were extremely limited, as was their potential. And it is only now, it seems, that the position is changing. In Georgia the changes were initiated last year by a joint resolution of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers expanding the Foreign Ministry's functions. An administration to coordinate the republic's external relations was set up in the ministry. Guests from various countries have become regular visitors to Tbilisi. The results have been so fruitful that many people, and not just in Georgia, have had grounds for speaking of the autonomy and virtual sovereignty of the republic's Foreign Ministry. Georgiy Dzhavakhishvili considers that "the ministry is as sovereign as the republic itself is sovereign. That we are paving the way as far as possible to real sovereignty and are seeking to keep at least one step ahead...is another matter."

[Dzhavakhishvili] The main feature of the changes is that while previously the republic Foreign Ministry's work was by nature concerned with protocol and consular activities, we have now been vested with the functions of providing diplomatic and political backup for all the republic's external ties. Amateurism here, as you will appreciate, is unacceptable. We have taken on experts and specialists in various sectors of the economy, science, and culture—people able to communicate on equal terms with their counterparts. They are fluent in at least two foreign languages. True, many of the republic's ministries and departments initially regarded our resolve with wariness, thinking that we were intruding upon their bailiwick. Under the new laws they are able to conduct foreign ties themselves. But they soon saw that using our channels for contacts and approaching foreign partners on the basis of sound information rather than blindly is better and more beneficial for their business.

[Correspondents] Georgia, as far as we are aware, is the only republic in the Soviet Union which as a non-United Nations member maintains direct contacts with UNESCO and UNIDO. This was considered impossible until quite recently.

[Dzhavakhishvili] Yes, but the changes taking place in the Soviet Union now allow such an opportunity. The doors to the great big world outside are now opening. We no longer have to force them, but can structure our policy in an intelligent, sensible way. I met with UNESCO Director General Federico Mayor. We talked about the legal mechanism governing our relations. And

that meeting has already produced results. For example, the go-ahead has been given to organize a UNESCO-sponsored national park in the area of the famous David Garedzha monastery complex. We have similar relations with the UNIDO organization, which intends to open its own office in Tbilisi shortly.

[Correspondents] Do you maintain contacts with organizations in whose work the USSR takes no part?

[Dzhavakhishvili] We want to establish contacts with the international agricultural organization FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization], which comes under UN auspices. This desire stems from the particular features of the republic's economic structure. But more broadly, the fact of the matter is that, given sovereignty, the main task of any foreign ministry is to create the country's economic, political, and psychological image in the international arena. Otherwise it cannot become a fully-fledged member of the international community. The reality is that Georgia is not well known in the world. And we of course must do all we can to ensure that Georgia ceases to be terra incognita. In countries affected by the Georgian diaspora we have ensured that our staffers rotate in Soviet embassies. They are to some extent performing the functions of representatives of the Georgian Foreign Ministry. We are also restoring the system of honorary consuls. We are planning to open in Paris under the ministry's auspices a Georgian cultural and economic center, which will effectively serve as the republic's mission. Close ties at the level of missions are also being set up with certain regions of the FRG, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria...

[Correspondents] We can imagine the impression on our readers of what you have said. It seems your department is preparing for Georgia to become a party to international law...

[Dzhavakhishvili] Quite right. Moreover, through the good offices of the Canton of the Jura in Switzerland and the Walloon region in Belgium Georgia is the sole Union republic to have joined the European association of regions. Association membership means that we become inhabitants of greater Europe. Incidentally, at our suggestion the East-West Investment Bank is being set up and a general management school is being organized.

[Correspondents] The natural question is: What are your relations, then, with the Union Foreign Ministry?

[Dzhavakhishvili] Good and businesslike. They are built on principles of parity. I cannot remember a case where an initiative on our part has not met with Union Foreign Ministry back ng. We are now studying the question of opening a Ge orgian Foreign Ministry official mission in Moscow. And that raises no objections either. Our proposal to set up a permanent working party at Union republic deputy foreign minister level within the USSR Foreign Ministry has likewise been accepted. We are convinced that when discussing and elaborating questions affecting republics' interests their opinion must be taken into account without fail...

We are not of course dreamers with our heads in the clouds, we do not divorce ourselves from the realities of life. For instance, we were the first in the country to set up solid economic and cultural ties with Israel. But that does not mean that we have political contacts with Israel. We are part of the USSR. The USSR does not have diplomatic relations with Israel to date. And nor do we. I think that even when we are fully sovereign, whether inside or outside a renewed federation, we will have to respect and take account of the USSR's strategic and political interests.

Central Asia

Reportage on Continued Tension in Osh Oblast

Fighting, Stonings Reported

LD1907071790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] In Kirghizia's Osh Oblast, the situation remains tense. We now have the opportunity of going over live to All-Union Radio correspondent Aleksandr Mirtov in Frunze. Can you hear me, Aleksandr?

[Mirtov] Yes, we have to talk about this once again. During the past 24 hours, the situation in Osh Oblast has continued to remain tense. There is no let-up in the confrontation between Kirghiz and Uzbeks. In the town of Osh, an attempt was again made by Uzbek women to hold an unauthorized rally, but it was stopped by the forces of law and order. Fighting and the stoning of vehicles also took place. As a result, 18 people were taken to the hospital.

A tense situation still remains in Uzgenskiy Rayon, where many roads leading to the town are barricaded. Pickets made up of women of Kirghiz nationality are stationed along them. In Sovetskiy Rayon, a crowd of some 350 people, also mainly women, gathered. They demanded the return of Kirghiz nationals to Uzgen and Osh, and the establishing of order in the oblast center.

[Announcer] Aleksandr, you keep saying that these rallies are attended by women. Why this sudden upsurge of female activity?

[Mirtov] You know, it's somehow hard now to comment on that fact, which is certainly odd at the very least, since it was mainly young people and men who took part in the June events. Now women have also started to put forward their demands.

[Announcer] Aha!

[Mirtov] In the village of Mirza-Aki, there was a meeting between the republic's leaders and residents of Kirghiz nationality, which was attended by over 1,500 people. Masaliyev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, and first secretary of the

Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party; Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Kirghiz Council of Ministers;' and leaders of the rayon discussed with those present questions relating to the welfare conditions of the refugees and their quick return to Uzgen. Such meetings took place in the town of Uzgen itself with representatives of Uzbek nationality. Here, specifically, questions were raised about the construction of the motor road from Uzgen to Sovetabad—that's an Uzbek town—and the transferring of the rayon center to a different inhabited locality, and demands were also voiced for Comrades Ryzhkov and Karimov to come to the town. But in the town of Osh itself Colonel General Shatalin, the commander of the country's internal troops, met with workers at the cotton combine.

In conclusion, I want to say that a commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by Comrade Kryuchkov, deputy chairman of the Commission on Socialist Legality and Law and Order, has started work in Osh Oblast. Those are the events so far today.

Soviet Replaces Officials

LD1807141890 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1200 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Excerpt] A regular session of the soviet of people's deputies of Osh oblast was held in Osh city yesterday [17 July]. It examined an organizational matter. The session granted the request of Comrade Bekbolatov, chairman of the oblast executive committee, to be released from that post. Comrade Isabayev, who previously worked as secretary of the Osh oblast party committee, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet Executive Committee. Tadzhibayev was released from the post of head of the internal affairs administration. The session approved Abdurakhmanov as head of the Osh Oblast Executive Committee for Internal Affairs.

Comrade Masaliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Kirghiz soviet socialist republic Supreme Soviet, took part in the session. He spoke of the measures being taken by the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and government of the republic to stabilize the situation. The situation requires a radical change in the forms and methods of organizational and political work. The most important thing today is to extinguish the conflict and not let it grow, to ease the tension and not allow passions and emotions to be inflamed again.

The fundamental importance for ensuring a truly Leninst nationalities policy, the speaker stressed, is cadre work. We must pay more attention everywhere to nominating cadres taking into account their ethnic peculiarities, to ensuring due representation of nationalities and ethnic groups living in the republic, in the party, the local soviet, and other bodies.

Comrade Masaliyev spoke about joint events being held by the leaders of the Uzbek and Kirghiz republics, for further strengthening and developing friendly links in the field of the economy and culture. It has been decided to form local working groups to cordinate actions, for prompt settlement of issues as they arise, and to eliminate the aftermath of what has happened and for the exchange of objective information [words indistinct].

Comrade Sydykov, first secretary of the Osh Oblast Party Committee and chairman of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, spoke at the session. [passage omitted]

Increased Interethnic Clashes

LD1807155490 Frunze Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] The situation in Osh Oblast: Over the past 24 hours the current situation in the oblast center has remained complex. The confrontations between Uzbeks and Kirghiz continues. Interethnic relations have not improved.

Crowds of people can be seen near the pulp and paper combine on Democratic Street in Osh rayon and at the (?Tyeleken) housing estate.

There have been fights between Uzbeks and Kirghiz and passing vehicles have been stoned. As a result, nine people have sought medical aid, five have been hospitalized, and two vehicles have been damaged.

There was an arson attack again on the Osh Pedagogical Institute library. At 1200 the corpse of Fedotov, an electrical engineer at the Osh communications administration, was found in the (?Uvam) canal opposite the oblast hospital. He showed no signs of a violent death.

Uzbek women again gathered this morning in the central square, at the oblast party committee, 2,000 of them. They demanded the resignation of the oblast leadership, the replacement of the Osh Oblast commandant, the dismissal of Kirghiz nationals from the internal affairs organs, and also the release of detained Uzbeks. Following prolonged explanatory work, the crowd dispersed. Kirghiz women gathered at the pulp and paper combine, 300 of them. They demanded a meeting with the oblast commandant as well as party organ representatives and trade administration leaders. The crowd dispersed after obtained consent to a meeting at 0900 on 18 July.

At 2030 a crowd of Uzbeks attacked militia officers in the Yuzhnyy settlement on (?Kurenkeyeva) Street. As a result, an Osh internal affairs department militiaman, Muratov, was (?beaten up). His Kalashnikov submachine gun was taken and then (?abandoned). Later the militiaman was taken to the hospital.

In Uzgen rayon the situation remains tense. In Uzgen, at 1100 Uzbeks gathered to demand severe punishment for the organizers of the mass disorders, the replacement of

Kirghiz nationals on the Uzgen Rayon Internal Affairs Department staff, and the construction of a road from Uzgen to the town of Sovetabad. They demanded a political assessment of events in Uzgen rayon, the deployment of a United Nations commission from Moscow and Tashkent, and also an examination of everyday social matters. Two and a half hours after a conversation with the rayon commandant, the crowd dispersed.

During the night in (?Ilyichevka) village an arson attack on a house was carried out

The situation in Karasu rayon has become aggravated. There was a fight between Uzbeks returning from working in the fields in Andizhan Oblast to Uzgen and Kirghiz. As a result four people were injured. Two have been hospitalized. Criminal charges have been brought on this incident.

According to reports coming in, inhabitants of villages adjoining Karasu town intend to cut off the road from Karasu to Uzgen. As a result of this, an additional checkpoint has been set up here.

In the villages of Otuz-Adyr, Kensay, and Mady in this rayon, meetings of Kirghiz were held where 100-200 people took part. Those assembled demanded that measures be taken to stabilize the situation in Osh. In Alay rayon there were also two meetings of Kirghiz nationalists, each 500-600 strong, who demanded an end to hooligan acts by the Uzbeks in Osh, the release of detained Kirghiz, an impartial investigation, a show of resolution by servicemen in curtailing infringements on the law, and also unrestricted travel to Osh. Following explanatory work the crowd dispersed.

In Aravan Rayon, in (?Tepekurgan) village, at 2100 a crowd of young 50-60 Uzbeks gathered to demand the release of those who took the Aravan militia head hostage. Following explanatory work the crowd dispersed.

Over the past 24 hours, 67 crimes and incidents have been registered in the oblast. Among these are six injuries, 24 hooligan acts, 11 thefts, and others. In Uzgen rayon four corpses of those killed in the mass disorders were exhumed. In all the number of fatalities has reached 204. According to statements reaching the internal affairs organs, of 834 missing persons, 409 have been located.

City Life 'Paralyzed'

PM1807154190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Report by A. Umerbekov and F. Fedorov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Kirghizia: According to a TASS report, life in Osh city is virtually paralyzed. Transport is not functioning, enterprises are at a standstill.

Last night clashes between Kirghiz and Uzbek youths continued. The population of Uzgen city, from which Kirghiz inhabitants have fled, is demanding that a United Nations commission be summoned to the city. Additional subunits of law enforcement forces and troops have been brought in. According to preliminary information, material damage caused during the disturbances totals more than 40 million rubles to date.

[Correspondent] Despite the presence of troops [video shows troops alighting from aircraft carrying riot shields] and despite the curfew, gang fights, cases of arson, and instances of hooligan behavior have multiplied in the oblast center. A crowd of excited women in front of the obkom [oblast party committee] building called for the resignation of a number of party and law enforcement organ leaders [video shows women arguing with official]. Servicemen were insulted.

Passions continue to run high in Uzgen, city where the disturbances have been particularly brutal. [video shows graffito reading: "Uzgen militia into the dock!"]

[Unidentified local inhabitant] It is worse than a nightmare, frankly speaking. No one expected this, no one could have imagined that this kind of thing is possible between the Uzbeks and the Kirghiz. It does not bear thinking about.

[Correspondent] The calamitous socioeconomic situation of the local population, both Kirghiz and Uzbek, is being blamed. This is undeniable. It is also true that mistakes were made in the allocation of land for housing construction. The causes of the conflict also include the demand of a section of Uzbeks that they be granted autonomy within the territory of Osh Oblast. Following this logic, autonomy would also have to be granted to the Russians of whom there are as many in the oblast.

People are also aggrieved by what is described as "distortions in cadre policy"—that is the failure by local authorities to take due account of the ethnic composition of the population when staffing militia and law enforcement organs, among others. Hasty efforts are now being made to rectify these distortions by nominating Uzbeks, Russians, and representatives of other nationalities to positions of responsibility. A number of secretaries of the party city and rayon committees have resigned, that is to say, they have gone at their own request, so to speak. Naturally, many people are interpreting this maneuver as an attempt to sidestep responsibility, and this is only pouring oil onto the flames. Especially since people link the current excesses with corruption and bribe-taking and a black market where posts, lucrative jobs, and fiefdoms are traded.

A large group of USSR Prosecutor's office, MVD [Ministry of Interior], and KGB investigators are working literally flat-out in order to present the courts with a juridically accurate picture of the mass killings, atrocities, rapes, pogroms, and cases of arson. Yet only recently noises were being made from high levels in the republic to persuade the public of the relative stability of

the local situation in comparison with regions where active democratic renewal is under way.

More Troops Arrive

PM1807141090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by K. Karabekov under the "Stop Press!" rubric: "Osh, 17 July"]

[Text] This is the second day of the siege of the Osh Oblast Party Committee [obkom] by... Uzbek women. Here are the demands they are putting to the authorities: the resignation of the leadership, the replacement of the oblast commandant, the release of people arrested earlier for active operations, the dismissal of Kirghiz people from internal affairs and prosecutor's office organs. Similar demands are put forward by the demonstrators outside Uzgenskiy party raykom [rayon committee].

And yesterday the city was paralyzed. Acts of arson, robbery, and mass fighting began from 0700 hours. Student and workers' hostels came under attack. A group of Uzbek militants attacked the bus station. In the afternoon the teacher training institute's library was burning, and by the evening its hostel was also on fire.

The situation became so strained that additional forces of the internal troops were brought in from Suzakskiy Rayon and Dzhalal-Abad to help the contingent of troops stationed in Osh. In the evening the situation became complex in Aravanskiy Rayon, where the chief of the local rayon internal affairs department was taken hostage. There was an attack on the commandant's post. Small mobile detachments inflicted mass terror on virtually the entire border territory of Osh Oblast. The personnel of all city and rayon internal affairs organs were put on alert.

And here is the tragic tally of the events that were played out: About 100 people were beaten up and are in a serious condition. More than 30 people received gunshot and knife wounds, and dozens of homes and administrative buildings were set on fire and robbed.

Speaking on local television yesterday, Lieutenant General G. Kondratyev, first deputy commander of the Turkestan Military District, promised to take the most severe measures unless the atrocities end. But it seems that this action is too late. A new flareup of interethnic strife could have been prevented when events were only jsut beginning to develop, at the end of last week. It will be difficult, if it is even possible, to do this today.

Many cities and settlements in the oblast are now like small military strongholds. Every courtyard is surrounded by special fences, from which sorties are made from time to time. The military are not allowed across the fortifications. The oblast commandant has already issued several orders on the immediate removal of the fortifications. But as yet no one is hurrying to implement them...